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Abstract 
 
 
 This thesis examines healthcare provision in the Central African Federation, the 
late colonial union between the British colonies of Southern Rhodesia, Northern 
Rhodesia, and Nyasaland (the later independent nations of Zimbabwe, Zambia, and 
Malawi respectively). Unusually in federal formations, healthcare delivery in the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland became a federal function. “Settler Visions of 
Health” seeks to explain how the white settler elite reconciled the language of 
development and multiracial partnership with the underlying values of a settler society. 
Throughout its short existence, the Federal Health Service maintained a celebratory 
narrative of success designed to legitimize and justify both the decision to federate health 
and the Federation’s existence. The takeover of health allowed the federal government to 
project an image of the Federation as a rapidly developing, progressive nation that had 
brought significant benefits to the standard of living of African people. The reality was 
more checkered. The Federal Health Service struggled to live up to its promise of 
benevolent biopower. It largely perpetuated a colonial legacy that neglected to establish 
solid foundations of health consisting of sufficient infrastructure, adequate training, and 
equitable healthcare policies. I argue that the decision to federate health is best 
understood within a context of settler nation building and that paying attention to the 
rhetoric and realities of healthcare provision in the Federation illustrates how progressive 
ideas about access to healthcare and medical careers for African people could serve to 
maintain a settler colonial order. In addition to maintaining earlier colonial inequities of 
healthcare provision, federal healthcare policies and practices tended to marginalize 
	   ii	  
health delivery in the northern territories contributing to the fragile health systems that 
Zambia and Malawi inherited when they attained independence.  
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Introduction 
 
“Although the forward vision and bright ideals of the Federal Ministry withered at 
the end of [Federation], …it can be justly claimed that the Federal Government in 
its nearly 10 years of life gave a great impetus and drive to the development of 
health and medical service of the Federation… The Federal Ministry of Health 
made a major contribution to the improvement in health and happiness of all the 
people of the Federation.”1 
	  
 This thesis is the story of how a postwar vision of health manifested in a late 
colonial developmentalist setting. The Central African Federation, created in 1953, was 
the political union between the British colonies of Southern and Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland.2 The colonies were very different in character. Southern Rhodesia was a 
settler society and had enjoyed virtual political autonomy since 1923.3  Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland were administered by the British Colonial Office through the 
institution of Indirect Rule, a system of Native Authority designed to organize labor, 
collect taxes, and enforce law. Their economies, too, were different. Northern Rhodesia’s 
was dominated by copper mining, Nyasaland was predominantly agricultural, and 
Southern Rhodesia’s was mixed.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Annual Reports on Public Health, British 
Online Archives (BOA), 1963, 2-3. 
2	  These are the present African nations of Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi respectively. 
The Central African Federation was also widely known as the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland but also as British Central Africa or Central Africa or simply the 
Federation. I use all terms interchangeably. For general histories of the colonies see Alois 
S. Mlambo, A History of Zimbabwe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); 
John McCracken, A History of Malawi (Rochester, NY: James Currey, 2012); Andrew 
Roberts, A History of Zambia (New York: Africana Pub., 1976); For a more recent 
political history of Zambia see B. J. Phiri, A Political History of Zambia : From Colonial 
Rule to the Third Republic, 1890-2001 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006). 
3	  Southern Rhodesia came under the remit of the Commonwealth Relations Office. 	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 A closer association between the colonies of Southern Rhodesia, Northern 
Rhodesia, and Nyasaland gained currency in the aftermath of the Second World War.4  
The rapid development of the Copperbelt made Northern Rhodesia attractive to a 
Southern Rhodesia desirous of capital for development of its manufacturing 
infrastructure. At the same time, a vibrant post war economy and increasing numbers of 
settlers fueled settler nationalism within Northern Rhodesia. Settler interest coalesced 
with British fears of Afrikaner expansionism in the wake of the election of the Nationalist 
party in South Africa in 1948.5 Thus, from around 1950, the idea of a political alliance 
between Northern and Southern Rhodesia had bilateral support. Nyasaland was included 
almost as an afterthought. The British government wished to divest itself of the financial 
obligations of developing the colony while the Southern Rhodesia government saw it as 
the price to be paid for the bigger prize of harnessing the economic engine of Northern 
Rhodesia. 
 A major premise of federation was that Africans, particularly those of the 
emerging middle class, would realize substantial material and political benefits in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  For history of the process by which Federation came into being see: J.R.T. Wood, The 
Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation and Nyasaland, Durban, SA: Graham 
Publishing, 1983. Also see Philip Murphy, “Introduction,” in British Documents on the 
End of Empire: Central Africa, Part I: Closer Association 1945- 1958, ed. Philip Murphy 
(London: The Stationary Office, 2005), xxvii-cxvi. 
5	  For the geopolitical considerations of Federation see: Ronald Hyam, “The Geopolitical 
Origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1948–
1953,” The Historical Journal 30, 1 (1987): 145-72. For a different perspective 
highlighting the importance of settler nationalism in Central Africa see: Philip Murphy,  
“‘Government By Blackmail’: The Origins of the Central African Federation 
Reconsidered in The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival, ed. Martin Lynn, 
53-76. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
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form of a “racial partnership” with the white settlers. Racial partnership was a loose term 
that could be molded to match the aspirations of the elite African and the white settler. To 
elite and upwardly mobile Africans, “partnership” appeared to promise the possibility of 
a multiracial society based on “equal rights for all civilized men.”6 The appeal of racial 
partnership was strong enough, at least in Southern Rhodesia, to convince many African 
elites that amalgamation into the white settler society was possible.7 For the white settler 
ruling class, racial partnership was a means of dampening African nationalism by 
throwing a few crumbs of political participation to the African elite.8 
 In March of 1954, the newly created federal government passed legislation 
making the provision of health services a federal function. For the next decade, the 
responsibility for health care provision for nearly six million African people rested in the 
hands of a white settler elite. The Federal Health Service brought together three disparate 
colonial health systems. In Southern Rhodesia, a large European minority fostered a 
vibrant private practice sector and African healthcare was predicated on preserving 
European health. In Northern Rhodesia, reliance on revenue from the copper industry 
produced a political economy of health based on ensuring a plentiful supply of black 
labor. In Nyasaland, as well as in Northern Rhodesia, the emphasis was on providing 
health care commensurate with the economic standing of the colony. In effect this meant 
that health care was rudimentary, especially outside urban areas. Most rural Africans, if 
they had access to government healthcare at all, received it from basic dispensaries. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  “Equal rights for all civilized men” was borrowed from Cecil Rhodes and became the 
rallying cry of the African middle class in the 1950s. Michael West, The Rise of an 
African Middle Class (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2002), 193.	  
7	  Ibid. 
8	  Ibid. 
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Religious missions provided the bulk of rural healthcare.  
 The aims and objectives of the Federal Health Service included the promise to 
improve rural and urban health infrastructure, invest in the provision of locally trained 
medical personnel, and provide a health system that served all the people of the 
Federation. In addition, the service promised to privilege research into endemic tropical 
diseases such as bilharziasis and malaria while undertaking to provide facilities to allow 
“patients of any race… treatment for practically every condition.”9 This was a bold 
assertion given the historically low level of health care infrastructure in colonial Central 
Africa. Furthermore, in keeping with the colonial past, healthcare was to be provided free 
of charge to all Africans, all government employees, and those Europeans who could not 
afford to pay.10 
 
Visions of Health and Development 
 The Central African Federation was a late colonial developmentalist state, but one 
in which development policies were an integral part of settler nation-building.11 There are 
two schools of thought as to the role of welfare and development in colonial state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	   Roy Welensky, “In the Federal Assembly: Extract on Health from "The Break Up" - 
Effects and Consequences on the Two Rhodesias, Central African Journal of Medicine 
(CAJM), 9 (1963), 296.  
10	  Luke Messac argues that free healthcare for Africans emerged as a benevolent 
recompense for colonial taxation, to quell resentment against colonial rule, but also 
because of a desire to suppress African healing systems in order to foster a de-politicized 
ontology of healing. Of course the irony here is that biomedicine is itself inherently 
political in nature. Luke Messac, “Moral hazards and Moral Economies: The 
Combustible Politics of Healthcare User Fees in Malawian History,” South African 
Historical Journal, 66, 2 (2014), 376-380.  
11	  See for example, Julia Tischler, Light and Power for a Multiracial Nation: The Kariba 
Dam Scheme in the Central African Federation, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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building. Crawford Young argues that welfare and development was a belated 
legitimation discourse, a view that Nancy Hunt follows when she considers the role of 
medical services in the Belgian Congo as a remorseful gesture of a “nervous state.”12 
Hunt argues that the maternal and infant clinics established throughout the colony were a 
central part of the projection of the Belgian Congo as a model colony.13 In opposition to 
Young, Christophe Bonneuil and James Scott see welfare and development as a policy 
that underpinned the formation of the state itself.14 Both views bring key insights. The 
federal vision of a health service with its promise of universal access to health was 
foundational to the nation building aspirations of the Federation’s ruling settler elite. At 
the same time, the perceived benefits of the service were an important means by which 
the federal government sought to justify, legitimize, and shore up an increasingly 
beleaguered federation. 
 The main features of the colonial developmentalist state were an export-oriented 
infrastructure, an enlarged administrative organization, and a reliance on import and 
export duties for revenue.15 The developmentalist state emerged in Africa in response to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 208-213; Nancy Hunt, A Nervous State: Violence, 
Remedies, and Reverie in Colonial Congo (London: Duke University Press, 2016), 8-11. 
13	  Hunt argues that there existed two tracks or guises in the Congo, the biopolitical and 
the nervous. The former worked to promote life and health while the second attempted to 
police and contain therapeutic insurgencies. Nancy Hunt, A Nervous State: Violence, 
Remedies, and Reverie in Colonial Congo (London: Duke University Press, 2016), 8-11. 
14	  Christophe Bonneuil, “Development as Experiment: Science and State Building in Late 
Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, 1930-1970,” Osiris, 15 (2000), 259, fn.5; James Scott, 
Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed 
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1998). 	  
15	  Frederick Cooper describes the late colonial developmentalist state as a gatekeeper 
state. A gatekeeper colonial state is one in which sovereignty rests outside the territory, 
the colonial apparatus controls the flow of resources in and out of the colony, and decides 
	   7	  
the Great Depression.16 The extreme hardships of the 1930s drove imperial governments 
to implement policies designed to harness the resources of their colonies to alleviate 
domestic unemployment and rejuvenate economic activity in the metropole. 
Development, distinguished by increased state planning and regulation, meant colonial 
governments assumed greater control of the colonial economy.17 It also represented 
colonialism at its most intrusive. 
 The shift to a developmental ethos was also a response to widespread labor strikes 
in many parts of the empire. In Northern Rhodesia, the African miners’ strike of 1935 
engulfed the entire Copperbelt and mobilized many sections of the population, including 
women.18 When riots erupted in the West Indies, the Colonial Secretary warned that 
social services had to be developed if Britain wanted to keep her colonies.19 In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, development ideology contained a moral dimension 
in that it also encompassed the idea of African uplift, an expression of the older civilizing 
mission.20 The widespread poverty and hunger of the 1930s also influenced international 
health organizations’ ideas about the social and economic determinants of disease.21 At 
the same time, Britain and France realized that greater attention to the social welfare of 
their colonial subjects was vital if they were to harness the economic potential of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
who gains access to those resources. Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the 
Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5. 
16	  Bonneuil, “Development as Experiment,” 259.	  
17	  Ibid.	  
18	  Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940, 30. 
19	  Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the 
Development Concept,” in International Development and the Social Sciences, edited by 
F. Cooper and R.M. Packard, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 67.	  
20	  Randall Packard, A History of Global Health: Interventions into The Lives of Other 
Peoples (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2016), 93. 
21	  Ibid., 47-89.	  
	   8	  
colonies. As Frederick Cooper notes, development was an ideology based on the “need to 
find a progressive basis for continued colonial rule.”22  
 The moral dimension of development reflected the universal language expressed 
in a number of post war, rights-based declarations such as the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. These encompassed a moral imagination, a process by which people 
envision possibilities for a morally better world.23 For white settlers in the Federation, 
these possibilities crystallized around a future in which a white civilization in Central 
Africa was viable. Africans were part of this future but their place was clearly defined in 
terms that maintained a much older settler colonial framework of segregation and 
subordination. In this view, healthcare for Africans was an important part of development 
and African advancement but was also separate from provision for whites. Importantly, 
healthcare was a benefit to be extended to Africans by Africans but always under 
supervision from supposedly superior white medical staff.  For their part, Africans 
imagined a different future. For some, the start of federation, with its promises of 
partnership and the development of a multiracial society, appeared to offer possibilities. 
For others it was a period to be endured or resisted. The ability of the Federal Health 
Service to provide health care or to offer avenues of employment to Africans became a 
means by which Federation itself could be judged. 
 After the Second World War, African activists increasingly used European 
ideological constructs and the language of development to argue for more rights in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the 
Development Concept,” 70.	  
23	  Julie Livingston, Debility and the Moral Imagination in Botswana (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2005), 20. 
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colonial state. Trade union workers in Nigeria laid claim to citizenship rights by insisting 
on European ideas of men as head of households and providers for their families. They 
used the ideology of the universal worker as the male breadwinner to argue for wage and 
cost of living increases that would “allow men to build respectable households in which 
they provide for their children.”24 Michael West has argued that the first half of the 
federal decade was one in which Southern Rhodesian middle class Africans sought 
integration with white settler society on the basis that they were “civilized men” by virtue 
of education and lifestyle.25 West asserts that by the end of 1958, elite and middle class 
Africans realized that access to white settler society was a pipedream and turned to 
nationalist politics.26  While health does not feature at all in West’s analysis, my research 
suggests that access to biomedicine was a central concern for elite Africans illustrating, 
perhaps, that West’s analysis of the middle class could be extended beyond education, 
domesticity, and housing to include African demand for health care and access to health 
professions. 
 The federal vision of health reflected the nascent development ideology but also 
post war ideas about biomedicine’s ability to conquer disease. With the memories of the 
Second World War still fresh and the threat of a nuclear war growing more insistent, 
world leaders looked to create a new world order predicated on economic health, 
financial stability, and the improved health of world populations.27  Furthermore, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Lisa A. Lindsay, “Domesticity and Difference: Male Breadwinners, Working Women, 
and Colonial Citizenship in the 1945 Nigerian General Strike,” The American Historical 
Review 104:3 (1999), 812. 
25	  West, The Rise of an African Middle Class, 196.	  
26	  Ibid., 212-216. 
27	  Packard, A History of Global Health, 93. 
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rapid wartime development of medical technology appeared to promise that the 
improvements in health necessary to underpin development could be achieved without 
the need to attend to the broader social determinants of health.28 The World Health 
Organization encapsulated this enthusiasm in its draft constitution, which said that it 
would “stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, endemic and other diseases.”29  
The WHO appeared to offer a way to conquer disease.30  
 By the 1950s, the optimism surrounding the ability of biomedicine to banish 
disease fostered a new set of values and ideas, a moral order, of contemporary 
biomedicine based on a reductionist rationality that privileged the knowledge of the 
human body and therefore the authority of the medical practitioner reliant on 
technological innovations. For the practice of medicine, the moral order prioritized the 
hospital, the clinic, or the laboratory as sites in which medical knowledge could be 
furthered through the examination of the human body.31 The emerging moral order of 
biomedicine eschewed the broader social determinants of health such as poverty, the 
environment, and social wellbeing. Healthcare in the federal era reinforced this moral 
order because the federal government’s takeover of health separated health provision 
from that of social welfare and environmental sanitation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Ibid., 105. 
29	  The WHO, Article 2 section G, qtd in Bob H. Reinhardt, The End of a Global Pox: 
America and the Eradication of Smallpox in the Cold War Era (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 31. 
30	  Bob H. Reinhardt, The End of a Global Pox: America and the Eradication of Smallpox 
in the Cold War Era (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 
32. 
31	  Claire Wendland, A Heart for the Work: Journeys through an African Medical School 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 15-18.	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 In the Federation, development ideology and a moral order of biomedicine were 
articulated within a framework of settler colonialism. The optimism about the eradication 
of tropical diseases such as malaria, fuelled by wartime success with DDT, led to ideas 
that the Central African Federation could become like the United States, based at least in 
part on the belief that biomedicine could make the region a “‘white man’s country’ free 
of tropical disease.”32  
 During the federal decade, the Federal Health Service maintained a celebratory 
narrative of success. The federal takeover of health allowed the federal government to 
project an image of the Federation as a rapidly developing, progressive nation that had 
brought significant benefits to the standard of living of African people. A key part of this 
narrative was that the Federation had developed a health service that surpassed any on the 
African continent. This was part of a widespread federal campaign at home and abroad 
designed to legitimize the Federation and white settler rule.  
 Throughout its short existence, the Federal Health Service struggled to live up to 
its promise of benevolent biopower.33 It was hampered by a colonial legacy that had 
privileged health care for Europeans and productive African labor. In addition, there had 
been reluctance on the part of colonial governments to invest in medical training 
programs for Africans, meaning that medical services remained reliant on the ability to 
recruit expatriate doctors and nurses. This had the result of creating an enduring shortage 
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(2000): 204.	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of what Paul Farmer has termed the four S’s: staff, space, stuff, and systems.34 The 
federal service, like many initiatives in the late colonial period (and in international and 
global health) purported to benefit the African people. Instead, many of its policies and 
practices served to preserve and maintain existing inequities of health. The health service 
became increasingly beleaguered from 1959 onwards as political turmoil engulfed the 
entire region when African nationalists actively campaigned for independence. As such, 
my work underscores that effective healthcare provision is reliant on the existence of 
solid foundations of infrastructure, proper training, and equitable health care policies.  
 Attending to the rhetoric and realities of healthcare provision in the Central 
African Federation illustrates how otherwise progressive ideas about access to health 
provision and medical careers for African people could serve to maintain a settler 
colonial order. Federal healthcare policies and practices perpetuated the earlier colonial 
inequities of healthcare provision. In addition, despite protestations to the contrary, 
federal health policies tended to marginalize healthcare provision in the northern 
territories contributing to the fragile health systems that Zambia and Malawi inherited 
when they attained independence. 
 
Settler Colonialism 
 The Federal Health Service operated within a wider context of settler ideology. 
Settler colonialism differs from colonialism. Lorenzo Veracini has argued that 
colonialism and settler colonialism are antithetical formations even as they remain 
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compatible.35 While colonialism aims to permanently subordinate the colonized, settler 
colonialism seeks to erase the colonized through physically elimination, displacement, 
erasure of cultural practices, assimilation, or amalgamation.36 As Patrick Wolfe observed, 
this erasure is rooted in the settlers’ demand for land; thus, “territoriality is settler 
colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.”37 For Wolfe, settler colonialism’s dominant 
feature is not exploitation of the indigene but replacement. Veracini argues that erasure, 
the removal either literally or conceptually of the indigene from settler spaces, takes place 
through various strategies of transfer.38  
 In Southern Rhodesia a diverse number of strategies were used to literally and 
conceptually remove the indigene. The most obvious of these was the creation of African 
Reserves and the use of pass laws to control and limit African mobility.39 Other strategies 
were also important to make indigenous Africans disappear. A central tenet of Rhodesian 
heritage was that the first settlers, the Pioneer Column, encountered an empty land.40 In 
reality, this was a misreading of African land usage, African history, and the dislocations 
of colonial conquest, but became an important justification for land alienation.41 
 Furthermore, given that settlers bring with them a sense of entitlement of 
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  Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 12.	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  Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the elimination of the native,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 8, 4 (2006), 387 – 409. 
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  Veracini, Settler Colonialism, 33-49.	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  The 1930 Land Apportionment Act, the “Magna Carta of racial segregation,” divided 
the land in Southern Rhodesia along racial lines. The best land was permanently alienated 
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one million Africans received less than 30 percent. Mlambo, A History of Zimbabwe, 61. 
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  James Fairhead, and Melissa Leach, Misreading the African Landscape: Society and 
Ecology in a Forest-savanna Mosaic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
	   14	  
sovereignty or right to rule, the denial of a deeper African past was an essential part of 
asserting that right. To this end, the white settler elite re-imagined the relics of Great 
Zimbabwe, a large and powerful kingdom between 1270 and 1550, as the work of 
unknown Caucasians.42 The denial of an African past was also evident in the sphere of 
health where the benefits of biomedicine as an agent of uplift out of savagery and 
barbarism were marshaled in an attempt to obscure and repress a vibrant African heritage 
of health and healing.43 
 Veracini rightly observes that Southern Rhodesia (along with Kenya) was always 
an imperfect settler colony given the inability of the white settlers to “supercede the 
conditions of its operation.”44 It neither founded an independent nation (even though it 
attained a certain level of political autonomy from the metropole), nor was it able to 
effectively repress, co-opt, or extinguish a numerically superior African population. 
However, the white settler ruling elite did establish a Southern Rhodesian society in 
which the characteristics of a model settler state were much in evidence.45 The de facto 
autonomy granted to the Southern Rhodesian government in 1923 gave the Legislative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Mlambo, A History of Zimbabwe, 19-21. 
43	  The literature on African healing systems is vast but for a comprehensive introduction 
to the enduring multipluralism of African approaches to medicine, see: -Steven Feierman, 
“Struggles for Control: The Social Roots of Health and Healing in Modern Africa,” 
African Studies Review 28, 2/3 (1985), 73-147.	  
44	  Veracini argues that settler colonialism is most visible in Rhodesia and Kenya because 
they did fail. The successful settler state closely resembles the metropole of its origin. 
Lorenzo Veracini, “Introducing,” 3. 
45	  Ronald Weitzer has argued that a settler society strives for three pillars that underpin 
the social and political structures of a model settler state: political autonomy from the 
metropole, the consolidation of control over the indigenous population, and the 
maintenance of settler caste solidarity and state cohesion. Ronald JohnWeitzer, 
Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern 
Ireland and Zimbabwe, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 25-28. 
	   15	  
Council considerable political authority and coercive power. It allowed the government to 
enact discriminatory legislation of land appropriation and erect a color bar.46 In addition, 
pass laws, discriminatory policies in health, education, welfare, housing, and land assured 
the control and repression of the indigenous population. At the same time, a colonial 
hierarchy and segregation of social spaces together with the development of an elaborate 
racial etiquette established a settler caste and helped to forge an idea of Southern 
Rhodesia as a “white man’s country.”47  
 
Colonialism, Gender, and Education 
	   Europeans brought to Africa notions of gender roles that reflected Victorian 
Christian society in nineteenth century Britain. Victorian Christian values embraced hard 
work, duty, and deference to authority as essential to both spiritual salvation and a well-
ordered society. In this distinctly patriarchal social order, masculinity was embodied in 
the idea of man as the authoritative head of the family with his subordinate wife having 
primary responsibility for raising dutiful, deferent daughters, and respectful but assertive 
sons. Encompassing ideas of separate gendered spheres of influence, a woman’s place 
was in the home, while a man’s was in the workplace. Importantly, in western thought, 
women’s work was not seen as economically productive.48 	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  It is notable that although the British government retained a power of veto over 
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Nation: Racial Etiquette in Southern Rhodesia, 1910-1963, (Rochester, NY: University 
of Rochester Press, 2015). 
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 In the colonial setting, Victorian Christian ideas articulated a gendered, racialized 
hierarchy in which African men, while subordinated to European men and women, were 
supposed to control African women while being the sole mediator with the colonial 
state.49 The main ways in which African males intersected with the colonial state was 
through polices of taxation and productive labor. The imposition of taxes and 
monetization of African economies created a male labor force, which by working for 
Europeans, would provide the productive labor needed to build and maintain the colonial 
economy. Women were required to stay within the domestic sphere and their function 
was the reproduction of the labor force.50 Thus the ideal African woman was constructed 
as one who remained within the confines of rural African villages.	  
 The gendered colonial labor policies intersected well with the missionary project. 
The “civilizing” mission included inculcating values of hard work, discipline and 
obedience. However, while missionaries shared the colonial states’ ideas about the 
restriction of African women to the domestic sphere, they also realized that it was 
essential to the evangelizing mission that African motherhood be based on Christian 
values of  “the ‘civilizing’ influences of hard work, discipline, and obedience to [male] 
authority.”51 This meant that as future mothers, African girls required exposure to 
western values.  Missionaries and colonial governments, then, were in agreement about 
the role of education for Africans. While boys were to be taught skills to enable them to 
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become useful contributors to the colonial economy, girls were to be taught to be 
homemakers.52 	  
 The education curriculum for boys was designed to allow them to interact with 
the colonial state. As such, boys received English language instruction, literacy skills, and 
training for trades such as driving and carpentry. Conversely, a typical curriculum for 
girls at mission schools was based on teaching domestic skills such as cooking, sewing, 
and doing laundry. Girls were to be actively discouraged from academic work although if 
parents agreed to pay extra fees, some basic literacy training would be provided. African 
girls were much less likely to receive any English language instruction because it was not 
seen as a priority among mission educators.53 	  
	   Influences within African societies also tended to restrict the amount of schooling 
African girls received. The gendered division of labor within many African communities 
meant that women and girls were primary providers of agricultural labor. From an early 
age, girls helped pound maize, weeded and watered vegetable gardens, and helped to 
protect crops from foraging birds. Child productive labor was something African families 
could ill afford to lose and consequently it was usually girls who were kept out of 
school.54 In addition, many African elders resisted mission education for African girls 
because they believed it disrupted the social order and posed an economic threat to 
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parents. Educated girls were more independent and more likely to refuse to marry the 
man chosen for them. This usurped parental authority but also meant that parents would 
have to return the bridewealth they had received. In addition, the domestic training that 
girls received at mission schools meant that parents received no return on their substantial 
investment in education. Whereas boys were likely to acquire jobs associated with 
“colonial middles” such as clerks, parents believed that girls would “only” get married.55 
Even when girls did gain access to education, these African influences tended to mean 
that girls often did not complete many years of education. The result was a gendered 
education curriculum that for much of the colonial period worked to exclude many 
women from access to healthcare careers. 	  
 
Colonial and Mission Medicine 
 A formidable body of scholarship exists on the history of colonial medicine in 
Africa. Much of this scholarship has tended to focus on the earlier colonial period. 
Colonial conquest was a violent process that increased the disease burden of African 
people.56 The devastating effects of the consequent epidemics and social dislocation have 
provided fertile ground for scholars, particularly those who have viewed colonial 
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medicine as a tool of empire.57 The post Second World War period has attracted rather 
less attention as scholars turned their attention to the impact of global health interventions 
and of international finance policies on independent African nations’ health systems. 
Even less attention has been paid to the history of colonial healthcare in the three 
colonies that made up the territory of the Central African Federation.  
 It can also be argued that South Africa has attracted the lion’s share of scholarly 
interest in the history of health in Southern Africa, particularly for those scholars who 
advocated a political economy approach.58 These scholars argued that provision of health 
for Africans was closely linked to the needs of the colonial capital economy. Colonial 
industrialists profited from a political economy that provided the bare minimum of 
healthcare and shifted the social costs of production onto the African societies that 
provided the labor.59  Scholars of South African medical history have also written about 
the way in which matters of health have informed colonial government policy. Maynard 
Swanson argued that a sanitation syndrome emerged in Cape Town in response to the 
plague epidemic of 1901. White South Africans in the Cape Colony came to believe that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  The classic examples of this approach include David Arnold (ed.), Imperial Medicine 
and Indigenous Societies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988); Roy 
MacLeod and Milton Lewis (eds), Disease, Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on 
Western Medicine and the Experience of European Expansion (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1988). 
58	  Randall M Packard, White Plague, Black Labor:Tuberculosis and the Political 
Economy of Health and Disease in South Africa, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1989). Shula Marks and Neil Anderson, “Industrialization, Rural Health and the 
National Health Service Commission in South Africa.” In eds. Steven Feierman and John 
Janzen, The Social Basis of Health and Healing in Africa (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992), 131-174. For East Africa see: Meredith Turshen, The Political 
Ecology of Disease in Tanzania (New Brunswick: Ruthgers, 1984). 
59	  Livingston, Debility and the Moral Imagination in Botswana (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005), esp. chapter 3.	  
	   20	  
European health was best ensured by a policy of residential segregation.60 The ideology 
of segregation is important because it informed healthcare policies in Southern Rhodesia 
throughout the colonial period and remained the basis upon which healthcare for Africans 
and Europeans was provided during the period of federation. 
 Histories of colonial government medical services in Central Africa are sparse, 
and, for the most part, dated. They are part of a genre that generally emphasizes the 
supposed benevolence of the colonial authorities and the contribution of western 
medicine to the civilizing mission of empire.61 While acknowledging the moral impulse 
driving the federal government’s desire to expand healthcare services, I aim to highlight 
the ways in which doing so furthered white settler aims and ambitions.   
 The most extensive history of health in the territories of the Central African 
Federation has been that of missionary medicine.62 This is unsurprising given the 
importance of the mission sector in providing health for African societies. As Megan 
Vaughan has noted, missions provided the majority of medical care for Africans in the 
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colonies at least until at least the post Second World War period.63 Early histories of 
mission medicine emphasized the proselytizing aim of missionary work. In this 
formulation missionary medicine was an evangelical weapon as well as a tool with which 
to inculcate western norms and values.64 The problem for medical missions was that 
biomedicine for much of the early part of the colonial period was hopelessly inadequate 
for the increased disease burden that European colonizers had imposed through conquest, 
war, social dislocation, and migrant labor policies. Africans responded by embracing 
biomedicine when it worked, by incorporating missionary medicine into their own 
healing practices, and by walking away from treatment that appeared ineffective.65  
 More recently, scholars have investigated the ways in which missions and 
colonial governments shared the responsibility for providing health care. This is 
contested territory with some scholars arguing that any collaboration was limited to 
combating epidemics or treating specific diseases such as leprosy.66 Others say that 
government funding was vital for missions to carry out their work. In this formulation 
missions and governments collaborated in a “public-private partnership.”67  Scholars 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Megan Vaughan, “The Great Dispensary in the Sky: Missionary Medicine,” in Curing 
their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness (Stanford University Press, 1991), 56. 
64	  Ibid., 55-77.	  
65	  For a fuller discussion on the relationship between biomedicine, missionary medicine, 
and African healing practices see: Steven Feierman, “Explanation and Uncertainty in the 
Medical World of Ghaambo,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 74, 2 (2000): 317-44.  
66	  Good, The Steamer Parish, 337-345. 
67	  Jennings argues that the Colonial Service relied on collaboration with non-state actors, 
especially missions, to provide even a semblance of “national” health care even in the 
late colonial period, a period when colonial states are considered to have played a bigger 
role in providing medical services. Michael Jennings, “Cooperation and competition: 
missions, the colonial state and constructing a health system in colonial Tanganyika,” in 
ed. Anna Greenwood  Beyond the State: The Colonial Medical Service in British Africa 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 153.  
	   22	  
have shown that even in the early colonial period, missions relied on some limited 
government funding and received patient referrals while recommending some patients, 
often those with mental illness, to the fledgling colonial service.68 At the same time, the 
boundary between medical mission work and government service was permeable. 
Doctors moved between the two and generally enjoyed better pay and conditions within 
the colonial medical service.69 Cooperation between missions and the government 
continued to be important in the federal period. The federal government increased 
funding for missions but also became more involved in the ways in which they provided 
care and training. As a result the medical mission sector in Central Africa lost much of its 
independence during this period.  
 The experiences of African medical workers have been the subject of much 
scholarly attention in recent years. Early histories concentrated on the role of medical 
auxiliaries in disseminating western Christian values.70 This has been followed by 
scholarship examining the ways in which Africans working as aides, assistants, orderlies, 
and midwives have played a significant part in translating and re-interpreting 
biomedicine. In this view, Africans were not agents of cultural annihilation but 
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interpreters who imbued missionary medicine with local meaning.71 Scholarship on 
advanced medical training of Africans is relatively sparse reflecting its limited 
availability in the tropical colonial context.72  
 The question of whether to train African women as registered, professional nurses 
emerged in Southern Rhodesia amidst a severe shortage of white professional nurses 
between the mid 1930s and 1950.73 This was nearly half a century later than in South 
Africa where racial anxieties about white women tending black bodies paved the way for 
the entrance of African women into the South African nursing profession. Shula Marks 
has shown how the training of African medical staff in South Africa complicated and 
threatened the prevailing colonial medical hierarchy, which always placed white medical 
staff above black and gave doctors seniority over nurses.74 The entrance of African 
doctors into clinical workplaces and the possibility of black nurses having seniority over 
white nurses inverted and subverted this hierarchy.75 The tensions and conflicts that 
Marks points to are also apparent in Southern Rhodesia in the later federal period when 
the first African doctors and qualified nurses began working in the government service. 
 The shortage of white nurses in Southern Rhodesia in the 1940s was due to a 
combination of healthcare policies, settler colonial ideology, increased urbanization, and 
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  Walima T. Kalusa,  “Language, Medical Auxiliaries, and the Reinterpretation of 
Missionary Medicine,” 57-78. 
72	  One exception to this is John Iliffe’s history of the medical profession in East Africa. 
John, Iliffe, East African Doctors: A History of the Modern Profession (Kampala, 
Uganda: Fountain Publishing, 2002). 
73	  Clement Masakure, “One of the most serious problems confronting us at present”: 
Nurses and government hospitals in Southern Rhodesia, 1930s to 1950,” Historia, 60, 2 
(2015), 109-131. 
74	  Shula Marks, Divided Sisterhood: Race, Class and Gender in the South African 
Nursing Profession (Basingstoke, UK: The Macmillan Press, 1994).	  
75	  Ibid., 140	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wartime military demands.76 Clement Masakure contends that the shortage directly 
contributed to plans for the training of African state registered nurses.77  These plans 
came to fruition during Federation, a period Masakure doesn’t examine in his 
scholarship. My analysis moves his story into the federal decade and expands it to 
encompass medical officers and auxiliary staff. An important distinction between my 
work and his is that during federation, the color bar was supposed to be lifting and that 
the ideology of professional nursing as the province of white women had changed. The 
federal health department asserted the importance of black qualified nurses to its 
aspirations to provide a national health service. By the 1950s it was not a case of should 
they train African professional nurses but when and where. The effect of these decisions 
and those relating to the building of the medical school was to marginalize the northern 
territories in ways that reverberated in the years after the Federation collapsed and 
Malawi and Zambia gained their independence. 
 Senior health officials in the federal Ministry of Health imagined a medical 
community united in purpose and vision.78 Federating health brought together colonial 
medical personnel that differed in opinion, in color, and did not always follow imperial 
instructions.79 I attempt to capture some of that diversity by attending to the actions of 
European and African medical workers during federation. Furthermore, government 
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  Masakure, “One of the most serious problems confronting us at present,” 109-131. 
77	  Ibid., 130.	  
78	  Anna Crozier has examined how the doctors of the Colonial Medical Service formed a 
medical community with a shared identity based on background, education, and motives 
for joining the service. Anna Crozier, Practising Colonial Medicine: The Colonial 
Medical Service in British East Africa (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2007). 
79	  Anna Greenwood (Crozier), “Introduction: looking beyond the state,” in Beyond the 
State: The Colonial Medical Service in British Africa, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2016, 1-18. 
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health departments were often short of administrative staff affording colonial medical 
officers a degree of latitude in their work that they would not have enjoyed in Britain.80 
As such, I examine how European medical doctors and nurses grappled with the 
practicalities of transferring out of the colonial medical service to an uncertain future in 
the federal Ministry and whether federation actually brought about better opportunities 
for African medical personnel within a political climate supposedly predicated on 
“multiracial partnership.”  
 The theme of  “multiracial partnership” is central to the only scholarship that 
investigates healthcare within the Federation. Brendon Marsh uses health provision to 
examine the degree to which multiracial partnership was an attainable reality.81 Marsh 
concludes that partnership was more rhetoric than actuality based on an evaluation of 
health spending and lack of training for medical doctors, arguing, “one African doctor 
and a handful of medical students [at external medical schools] do not a ‘partnership’ 
make.”82  Marsh rightly points out that the Federal Health Service failed to carry out any 
real policy of partnership. It neither invested enough in infrastructure or in training. My 
work expands on this to examine the effect of this failure, placing it within a longer arc of 
colonial failures to build foundations of health and considering the ramifications for 
healthcare in the newly independent nations of Malawi and Zambia. I argue that the 
senior medical officials in the Federal Health Service had a particular vision of what a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Ibid.; Glen Ncube, “The Making Of Rural Healthcare In Colonial Zimbabwe: A 
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health service should look like. This vision did not preclude the supposedly progressive 
language of “partnership” but manipulated it to maintain a colonial medical order 
predicated on white settler domination.  
 In addition, Marsh’s analysis does not consider the extent to which a federated 
health service contributed to the nation building aspirations of white settlers in Central 
Africa. Indeed, his assertion that health “went to the Federation” suggests that the British 
government gave control of health to the federal government. What is clear from the 
sources is that far from bestowing health on the federal government, the British officials 
were either largely unaware that health as a federal function had been discussed or did 
not think health would be anything other than a territorial matter given that it was 
considered integral to Africans’ day to day existence.83 The federal government 
appropriated control of the service as part of an ongoing plan to build a white state in 
Africa and prove itself ready for Dominion status within the British Empire. My analysis, 
therefore, allows for an appreciation of the desire of the white settler ruling elite to use 
federation as a means of state-building and foregrounds health in this process. 
 
The Sources 
 The primary evidence that has informed this thesis has come from a variety of 
sources. Reflecting the realities of carrying out a project on African history from outside 
the continent, my sources are heavily weighted to those from official archives that were 
readily accessible. The fortuitous discovery of the complete set of departmental records 
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relating to Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia for their entire colonial periods made this 
project viable. While these sources only present one view, that of the colonial medical 
officials, it is possible to glean a more complex interpretation when read against the grain 
and in conjunction with other sources. 
 The departmental reports were supplemented by further archives consulted in 
visits to the British National Archives and the British Library in London. Access to the 
full set of the debates of the Federal Assembly allowed me to uncover an African 
perspective albeit one that was limited to an elite class of African MPs. This African 
perspective was further enhanced by the acquisition of a memoir written by a Malawian 
doctor. Austin Mkandawire trained as a medical assistant in Nyasaland immediately prior 
to federation and worked in the Federal Health Service until leaving to continue his 
studies in Britain in 1958.  
	   Memoirs, however, can be problematic as sources in historical research. They are 
written with hindsight, with a specific audience in mind, and with a definite agenda and 
so need to be used with caution. I was fortunate, therefore, to uncover the papers of a 
colonial doctor that covered the same time period and geographical location during a visit 
to the National Library of Scotland. The doctor was a member of the colonial medical 
service in Nyasaland and was seconded into the federal government service in 1954. The 
papers consist of weekly letters home to family in Scotland and so represent a 
contemporary record of life in the federal service. Included with the papers were two 
lengthy letters written by an African medical worker to the doctor after he left Africa at 
the end of 1957. The letters give a glimpse into the difficulties of the Federal Health 
Service from outside the official federal reports. 
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 The wealth of official reports and government papers was augmented by the 
examination of medical journals and periodicals of the period. The Central African 
Journal of Medicine was particularly useful for highlighting some of the tensions and 
conflicts between the government and the private service at the time. 
 An important point to note is that there was an uneven distribution of sources 
about the three colonies of the Central African Federation. In particular, sources for 
Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, were relatively scant. This was not helped by the 
dearth of scholarship on the colony’s history of healthcare. An email conversation with 
Walima Kalusa, one of the few historians to have written about health and disease in 
Zambia, confirmed that historians have generally overlooked this aspect of the nation’s 
past.  
 
A note on terminology 
 In this thesis I make a distinction between professionally trained medical workers 
and auxiliaries. In practice, there was significant overlap. For example, a medical 
assistant or hospital assistant working in a small, rural hospital or clinic would have had 
considerable autonomy because professionally trained doctors only visited these facilities 
sporadically. The demarcation is especially complex with regard to nursing. As such I 
have tried to refer to African auxiliary nurses as nursing orderlies, or simply as 
auxiliaries, to distinguish them from nurses who had undergone professional state 
registered training. Medical auxiliaries encompassed a broad range of functions including 
medical assistants, hospital assistants, nursing orderlies, medical aides, African 
midwives, and health demonstrators. When I refer to qualified or professional nurses, I 
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am referring to that category of nurse that had undergone a four-year training program 
leading to state registration. These nurses were overwhelmingly white until the final 
years of Federation. 
 
Chapter Outline 
 The thesis is divided into four chapters. The first examines the history of 
healthcare provision prior to the Federation paying particular attention to the gender and 
racial ideologies underpinning policies related to the provision of African medical 
training. My focus is on the fragile foundations upon which the Federal Health Service 
attempted to build and the difficulties the service faced when trying to unify what were 
three very different health services. 
 The second chapter examines how health came to be a federal function. I argue 
that the decision to federate health is best understood within a context of settler nation 
building. I further argue that the process of federating health created suspicion and 
distrust of the fledgling service and precluded the building of a medical community. 
 The third chapter moves the story into the Federation years. The chapter focuses 
on the stark disconnect between the idealized federal vision of healthcare and the 
shortcomings of that vision in practice. 
 The final substantive chapter turns to the politically turbulent final years of 
Federation. This chapter reveals the essential fragility of the Federal Health Service as it 
struggled to maintain services and failed to hold on to its medical staff. The chapter 
examines how the federal service responded to a crisis of staffing within the context of a 
failing federation. This chapter illustrates that despite rhetoric of improved opportunities 
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for African access to health careers, the service directed its efforts to recruiting 
professionals from overseas thus perpetuating a colonial practice of reliance on expatriate 
expertise. The thesis ends by examining the legacy of federated health for the territorial 
governments of Southern Rhodesia and the newly independent nations of Zambia and 
Malawi. 
 Examining healthcare in the Central African Federation offers a glimpse of 
healthcare provision in a late colonial developmentalist state. It illustrates the way in 
which the rhetoric of development and African uplift was articulated within a framework 
of settler colonialism. Furthermore, it shows the extent to which the maintenance of the 
colonial order was of primary concern to many of the white settler elite of the Federation. 
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Chapter One 
Shaky Foundations of Healthcare in Central Africa 
 
 
 The provision of health care in the federal era was shaped by the legacies of the 
colonial past. A robust health care system requires a sound base of infrastructure, 
training, and equitable healthcare policies. The failure of previous colonial governments 
to facilitate the development of solid foundations of health meant that the Federal Health 
Service inherited a fragile health system. In particular the limited attention paid to the 
training of African medical staff in this earlier period directly contributed to the chronic 
shortage of medical staff during federation.  This chapter examines the extent to which 
the colonial governments of Central Africa did (or did not) provide healthcare facilities 
for Africans from the period of colonial conquest to the eve of federation. A major focus 
is on the failure of colonial governments to build a base of locally trained medical 
expertise. In particular, it argues that the lack of provision for African medical training in 
the pre-federation era was a product of a gendered ideology about Africans’ roles in 
colonial society.  
 
Colonial Conquest 
 The colonization of Central Africa was a violent process that increased burdens of 
disease in the African people. In 1889, Britain granted Cecil Rhodes and his British South 
Africa Company (BSAC) a charter to occupy, govern, and exploit the vast lands north of 
the Limpopo. In 1890, Rhodes’ Pioneer Column marched into the territory and pursued a 
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hostile policy of unequal treaties to gain rights to lands believed to be rich in gold, 
copper, and other minerals.  The BSAC was essentially an army of occupation and 
followed an aggressive policy of land appropriation and forced labor.1 Following on the 
heels of the colonial incursion came a devastating rinderpest epizootic that swept Eastern 
and Southern Africa in the last decades of the nineteenth century. It virtually wiped out 
all cattle, destroyed African economies, and created famine.2 In Southern Rhodesia, the 
epidemic contributed to the causes of the Ndebele and Shona uprising of 1896-7 in what 
became known as the First Chimurenga.3 The fragile white settlement almost succumbed 
until imperial armed reinforcements from South Africa brutally repressed the rebellion. In 
Nyasaland, colonial occupation occurred in the wake of epidemics of smallpox spread by 
the wasting frontier of ivory and slave collection that extended from the Swahili coast 
deep into the African interior in the second half of the nineteenth century.4 Formal 
colonial rule was established in Nyasaland in 1891.  
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  Mlambo, A History of Zimbabwe, 36-43. 
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  Richard Waller, “Emutai: Crisis and Response in Maasailand, 1883-1902,” in The 
Ecology of Survival: Case Studies from Northeast African History, eds. D. Johnson and 
D. Anderson, (Boulder, Co. Westview Press, 1998), 73. 
3	  In his groundbreaking scholarship, Terence Ranger argued that religious authority 
united the Ndebele and Shona resistance fighters against the brutal BSAC company rule. 
His scholarship formed the basis of the foundation myths underpinning African 
nationalism in the 1960s. Revisionist scholars have questioned the extent of the unified 
African response to BSAC rule. Terence Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-97: 
A Study in African Resistance (Evanston. Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1967). For 
a discussion of the scholarly debate see Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Mapping Cultural 
and Colonial Encounters, 1880s-1930s,” in Becoming Zimbabwe A History from the Pre-
colonial Period to 2008, eds. Brian Raftopoulos, and Alois Mlambo (Oxford: Weaver 
Press, 2009), 50-58. 
4	  The term “wasting frontier” refers to the process in which the search for slaves and 
ivory was pushed deeper into the African interior as supplies of both dwindled during the 
nineteenth century. Richard J. Reid, A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present 
(Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 45-46. 
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 The early years of colonial rule witnessed further epidemics among African 
people. Colonial governments responded to the outbreaks with public health campaigns 
that were coercive and as much to do with asserting state control over human capital as 
with treating African bodies.5 The colonial violence associated with the suppression of 
epidemics of trypanosomiasis, smallpox, influenza, and venereal disease in Central 
Africa shaped early African experiences of and responses to biomedicine in general and 
public health campaigns in particular.6 Later complaints by federal health officials of 
African resistance to vaccination programs or malaria eradication campaigns should be 
considered in light of these earlier experiences.7 
 From the turn of the century, growing numbers of settlers immigrated to Central 
Africa. Most were attracted to the rich farmlands in Southern Rhodesia, drawn by the 
support of government policies that worked to disadvantage African farmers.8 In 
Nyasaland, the colonial government’s attempt to introduce settler agriculture largely 
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  Lyons, “From ‘Death Camps’,” 70-71.	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  John McCracken, A History of Malawi 1859-1966, 119; Glen Ncube, ‘The Problem of 
the Health of the Native’: Colonial Rule and the Rural African Healthcare Question in 
Zimbabwe, 1890s–1930, South African Historical Journal, 64, 4 (2012), 821; Jock 
McCulloch, “The Management of Venereal Disease in a Settler Society: Colonial 
Zimbabwe, 1900-30,” in Histories of Sexually transmitted diseases and HIV Aids in Sub-
Saharan Africa, ed. Philip W Setel, Milton Lewis, and Maryinez Lyons (Westport, Conn: 
Greenwood Press, 1999), 196-216;	  Bryan T. Callahan and Virginia Bond, “The Social, 
Cultural, and Epidemiological History of Sexually Transmitted Disease in Zambia,” in 
Histories of Sexually transmitted diseases, 168-195. 
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  Richard C. Keller, “Geographies of Power, Legacies of Mistrust: Colonial Medicine in 
the Global Present,” Historical Geography 34 (2006), 26-48. 
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  In Kenya, too, the colonial government sought to destroy the ability of African farmers 
to compete with whites. In Uganda, however, successful African cotton farmers led to the 
demise of significant European agriculture in the colony. Reid, History of Modern Africa, 
197-198. Mlambo, A History of Zimbabwe, 56. 
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failed.9 In Northern Rhodesia, a small number of Europeans settled along the railway line 
that ran between Livingstone, near Victoria Falls and the towns that would eventually 
become part of the Copperbelt south of the Katanga mining area of the Belgian Congo.  
 In common with much of sub-Saharan Africa, early colonial governments in 
Central Africa were not interested in improving the welfare of African societies.10 
Healthcare policies privileged European health. Such medical provision as was available 
served the needs of government employees, missionaries, and early settlers. As 
elsewhere, a “sanitation syndrome” emerged around 1900 when the idea of African 
bodies as reservoirs of disease drove a segregationist discourse, informing urban 
development and housing but also ensuring that the early hospitals were European-only.11  
The ideology of the pathologized African coalesced with a missionary-driven salvationist 
discourse promoting the development of missionary medicine across the region.12 
Without government investment in healthcare, the vast majority of Africans’ first 
encounter with biomedicine was through this missionary endeavor. Missions built rural 
healthcare infrastructure and trained medical personnel.13  
 The extent to which missions provided medical care varied between individual 
missions and across the region. The influence of David Livingstone and other early 
Scottish missionaries led to a sizable presence in Nyasaland. In Northern Rhodesia and 
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  Swanson, “The Sanitation Syndrome,” 387-410. Philip D. Curtin, Death by Migration: 
Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in the Nineteenth Century (New York: 
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Southern Rhodesia, much larger territories, missions were more scattered. The training of 
medical assistants in Nyasaland undertaken by the Scottish missions, owed a lot to that 
mission’s ongoing commitment to medical work. In 1910, Dr Caverhill stated, “the 
[Nyasaland] government has a right to look to us to supply natives skilled in medical and 
public health work and also to influence the community favorably towards sanitary 
reform.”14 In contrast, in Northern Rhodesia, the UCMA and LMS missions prioritized 
education over medical work, although the UCMA did train limited numbers of 
orderlies.15 
 The training of medical auxiliaries served practical and ideological purposes. 
Practically, the African aide was an indispensible member of the medical mission team. 
In addition to providing much needed health provision capacity, medical aides also 
functioned as translators, facilitating communication between medical missionaries and 
their patients.16 Ideologically, missions viewed medical aides as important collaborators 
in their evangelistic endeavors. In particular, missions trained African midwives to 
counter the social and moral control of elder African women that was considered a major 
hindrance to the dissemination of Christianity.17 Most of the earliest training was in the 
form of “individual apprenticeship.” Missionaries recruited long-term residents, such as 
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refugees, outcasts, or escaped slaves, or ex-patients who, at that time, often spent many 
months convalescing at missions.18  
 Early medical training offered at missions was almost exclusively aimed at men. 
In the African tropical colonial context, nursing was codified as male work until at least 
the 1940s.19 Dr. Laws of the Livingstonia mission in Nyasaland envisaged his training as 
a program for “Christian lads who will choose this work … who will seek not only the 
healing of the bodies of their patients, but to lead them to the Saviour.”20 At the General 
Missionary Conference of Northern Rhodesia in 1927, the prevailing view was that “the 
Native medical aids should be responsible male Natives ... men of good character.”21  
 Missionary attitudes to African men and women worked to generally exclude the 
latter from training programs. Missionaries expected their trainees to be Christian and 
they had doubts about the commitment of African women to the new faith.22 Conversely, 
African male trainees formed part of a select group of colonized “progressives” who were 
thought to have internalized a wide set of western values including literacy, reliability, 
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deference to authority, and a Christian morality.23 Missionary doctors such as Walter 
Fisher at Mwinilunga in Northern Rhodesia viewed these “colonial middles” as potential 
“black Englishmen” and their training formed part of an extensive social engineering 
project across colonial Africa that sought to transform cultural, medical, and social 
identities.24   
 In contrast, the CMML missions in the northwest province of Northern Rhodesia 
instigated training programs for both men and women.25 However, these were profoundly 
gendered in nature. African men received training in skills such as carpentry in addition 
to the rudiments of germ theory while the girls’ education focused on learning domestic 
chores such as sewing and laundry and attaining midwifery and nursing skills.26 The aims 
of the medical training program were also gendered. Men were trained for a career 
offering social mobility and enhanced social status.27 Male graduates could be employed 
elsewhere in the colony. Those who remained within the province found that medical 
work often led to political power and status allowing them to acquire a substantial 
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wealth-in-people, often establishing villages of their own.28 For women, their future role 
was as wives and mothers in the local villages providing western-based midwifery and 
infant healthcare while also teaching other women how to raise healthy children and 
families.29 The ulterior motive here was to dismantle the authority of the indigenous 
midwife often portrayed in missionary literature as the devil personified.30 
 
The Inter War Era 
  In the inter war years, the colonial governments slowly started to provide more 
health care for their African populations. Much of this was aimed at ensuring the 
preservation of a productive workforce but other forces were also present. Concerns 
about falling populations and mission advocacy played a part. At conferences in the 
region, missionaries reminded the territorial governments of their responsibility to 
provide healthcare for all their people. The governments responded by increasing grants-
in-aid to missions whereby missions received funds based on the number of beds and the 
amount of training they carried out.31  
 Increased attention to the health of colonized people in this era also owed much to 
post World War One discourse about the role of health and welfare in maintaining peace 
after the devastating loss of life during the war. The League of Nations Health 
Organization (LNHO) was formed principally to attend to the effects of the war on the 
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health of European populations. However, in Africa it did facilitate the sharing and 
transfer of knowledge about tropical diseases between the colonial medical services.32  
 In Southern Rhodesia, the establishment of a settler government in 1923, led to 
healthcare policies that operated within a settler colonial framework. Having secured 
virtual political autonomy from Britain, the settler ruling elite followed segregationist 
polices designed to permanently subordinate and control the indigenous population. Chief 
among these was the creation of African reserves.33 In the early 1920s, an acute 
sensitivity to the inherent fragility of the settler state caused in part by a small white 
population and memories of the Chimurenga, fostered a “moral panic” in which African 
sexuality and pathologized, syphilitic African bodies posed an existential threat to white 
settlers.34 Initially, such concerns did not stimulate the building of more health 
infrastructure but led to legislation providing for greater surveillance and the attempted 
containment of “diseased” African bodies. The “moral panic” of a supposed syphilis 
epidemic led to the passage of the Public Health Act in 1924 that co-opted teachers, 
employers, and heads of families into a system of surveillance and notification.35 In 
addition, white Rhodesian groups such as the Rhodesian Women’s League appealed to 
the need to protect white women and children from the syphilitic African domestic 
servant.36 While these interest groups called (unsuccessfully) for the construction of 
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health clinics, their motivation was not for more treatment for Africans. The goal was to 
initiate a system of medical certification that would spatially control the African 
population and ensure that Africans in European towns and housing were free of 
syphilis.37  
 The desire to create a buffer between a diseased African population and the 
European residential areas paradoxically spurred the development of rural health 
infrastructure in Southern Rhodesia in the 1930s. At the start of the decade, Askins, the 
colony’s Medical Director proposed a coordinated system of health care delivery to rural 
Africans. Although Askins, a recently immigrated British doctor, had brought with him 
ideas about social medicine, he couched his arguments in terms of pathologized African 
bodies and European vulnerability.38 Askins argued, 
“Here we have an extraordinary healthy country for white people to live in, but on 
the whole our death rate is not as low as it ought to be considering the young 
constitution of the population and as we want to have a healthy white nation we 
have got to tackle infectious diseases in the native. The native is the reservoir of 
these infectious diseases”39 
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After Askin’s early death, his successor, Martin, took over the project. Martin planned 
the development centrifugally, moving outwards from the central plateau region, home to 
most of the white settler population.40 The rollout thus fit into settler colonial ideas about 
attending to the health of Africans in order to safeguard European health.  
 For many tropical colonial territories, any humanitarian impulse to provide health 
care in the early colonial period was limited by the desire for the colonies to be self-
financing. However, during the 1930s, a changing colonial discourse that argued for 
greater attention to the health and welfare of colonized subjects around the globe 
emerged. The discourse reflected a growing awareness among international health 
organizations of the need to take greater account of the social and economic determinants 
of health. To be sure, the shift in thinking in international health circles such as the 
League of Nations Health Organization and the International Health Board of the 
Rockefeller Foundation can be attributed to the poverty, hunger, and economic hardships 
of the Great Depression. But it also reflected the reality of failed disease elimination 
campaigns and the limited effectiveness of chemotherapy for tackling disease mortality 
and morbidity. As Randall Packard has shown, this changing perspective influenced the 
way international health organizations approached projects aimed at eradicating malaria, 
improving rural hygiene, and attending to malnutrition.41 In each of these, the 
organizations proposed solutions that embraced concepts of development.42 These 
included agricultural reform, better housing and sanitation, and expanded health 
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services.43 The ideology behind these proposals began to influence the way that colonial 
governments viewed the health of their colonial subjects. In Africa, for instance, the work 
of the LNHO spurred widespread research into the nutrition of African populations.44 
Slowly, then, ideas emerged about the need to attend to the health of African populations 
and generated greater metropole funding for social services in the colonies. 
  The Nyasaland colonial government devoted a large proportion of this increased 
imperial funding to developing its health services in this period. For instance, 62 percent 
of monies directed at the colony for 1930 were spent on the development of healthcare 
facilities.45 Even so, health care remained limited and fragmented, especially for rural 
populations, illustrating the extent to which financing healthcare was absent in the earlier 
colonial era. Nyasaland was the most financially insecure of the three territories in 
Central Africa because it had no meaningful mineral reserves and what commercial 
agriculture did exist was fairly small scale. Unlike other colonies, the government 
remained reliant on hut tax as its main source of revenue until well into the 1930s. By 
1937 the colonial government had built just ninety-three rural dispensaries. In urban 
areas, government hospitals existed in Zomba and Blantyre.46 
 The Northern Rhodesian colonial government was similarly reluctant to build any 
meaningful health infrastructure for Africans until the 1930s. Any facilities that were 
developed were in response to the need to ensure a supply of labor for the burgeoning 
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copper mining industry. The first healthcare facilities for Africans were simple 
dispensaries but by the mid 1930s only fourteen of these existed along with eleven small 
African hospitals. 
 From the 1930s, the copper mining industry dominated the Northern Rhodesian 
economy. The industry relied on migrant labor drawn from impoverished rural areas. In 
contrast to South Africa, the Northern Rhodesian mining companies recognized from the 
outset that African migrant laborers would work more efficiently if they brought their 
families with them and consequently provided wives and children with rations and gave 
married men slightly better housing.47 Conditions were still dire. The Roan Antelope 
Mine in Luanshya, was known as “Death Valley.”48 High rates of mortality and 
morbidity persisted through much of the inter war era due to malaria, pneumonia, 
influenza, and fecal-borne diseases.49 In addition, the mine management failed to build 
hospital facilities for Africans.50 The widespread Northern Rhodesian copper mine strikes 
of 1935 were, in part, a protest at these conditions.51 
  Concerned by the economic impact of malaria on production, the mining 
companies initiated a program of integrated malaria control that would continue until 
1960. The program used a mixture of environmental control, sanitation and housing 
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improvements, and diagnosis and treatment in addition to surveillance and monitoring.52 
As part of the program, medical facilities for Africans were somewhat improved and by 
the start of federation the mining companies operated four African hospitals.53 However, 
government facilities on the Copperbelt remained sparse even as the urban population 
increased when demand for copper drove higher levels of production.54  
 The need for African labor for the mining industry also shaped health care 
policies in rural areas in Northern Rhodesia. Concerns about what appeared to be a 
precipitous drop in the African population in the south of the colony and the need to 
ensure labor supplies shaped responses to what the colonial authorities believed to be a 
long lasting epidemic of syphilis.55 The responses of the government medical services 
reflected the waxing and waning labor demands of the copper mines. The rapid expansion 
of the copper industry in the late 1930s and beyond created the context for vigorous rural 
treatment campaigns.  In addition, the campaign against syphilis in the southern province 
became the model for other interventions elsewhere in the colony.56 
 The perceived need for more rural health infrastructure in the 1930s convinced the 
Directors of Medical Services of all three colonies to begin training African medical 
personnel. In common with the missionary driven gendered construction of the medical 
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assistant, governments envisaged that training would be for men only, except for 
midwifery. The Northern Rhodesian colonial medical department asserted that “ the 
native female of this territory is at present inherently unsuited to such [medical] work and 
... she should be ... altogether disregarded in this connection."57 Given the dominance of 
the female nurse in western thought, it is noteworthy that this was one western practice 
that Europeans did not initially, at least, attempt to map onto the tropical African context.  
 Western nursing ideology that framed nursing as inherently feminine work did not 
sit well within missionary and colonial discourse that viewed the African female’s role as 
reproducer of the male colonized labor force. Nursing can be considered reproductive 
work, in the sense of healing bodies. If, instead, we view nurses as economic actors and 
the work that they do as productive, it is possible to see why female African nursing 
could be considered problematic within the colonial context.58 Medical work could 
represent significant opportunities for capital accumulation even if female nursing 
orderlies and midwives did not earn as much as male hospital assistants.59 In addition, 
nursing work would take women out of the home. An ideology of domestication created 
an ideal African woman whose place was within the confines of a rural village, a 
construction with which African elders collaborated in order to bolster elder, male 
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authority. The maintenance of the power and authority of chiefs, elders, and headmen 
was crucial to the success of indirect rule and thus to the entire colonial project. 
Successful colonial rule required the assistance of African male authority to collect taxes, 
enforce labor policies and maintain the colonial social order. The ability of women to 
achieve greater independence through paid work risked disrupting this chiefly power and 
therefore alienating the African allies that colonial rule relied on. Access to medical 
training offered opportunities for African women that risked upsetting this delicate 
balance. Colonial authorities generally put long-term political objectives before other 
concerns.60 In the case of medical training, it would appear that the governments were 
prepared to deny the utility of African female medical staff in order to maintain the 
colonial social order. 
 Gendered ideology about access to education also served to persuade government 
health officials to initially only provide medical training for men. Government neglect of 
education for Africans meant that prior to the Second World War, the primary way for 
Africans to be educated was at mission schools.61 Missionary ideas about education made 
it more likely that recipients of mission education were males. In addition, even where 
females had access, the gendered education curriculum at mission schools meant that it 
was men who generally had the literacy and English language skills required for 
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acceptance into a training program.62 In Nyasaland, the Scottish missions training 
programs for medical assistants required a candidate to have completed at least three or 
four years of academic schooling in order to be considered.63 In Southern Rhodesia, the 
government demanded that trainees in mission hospitals had to have attained at least a 
standard IV education and were literate in English if the mission wanted to continue 
receiving grants-in-aid from the government.64  
 The one area of training that was available to women from relatively early on was 
midwifery. While training for midwives was certainly not available in Central Africa as 
early as it was in Uganda or Kenya, the CMML program in Northern Rhodesia was 
underway by the 1930s. Midwifery was also taught at the LMS mission at Mbereshi, also 
in Northern Rhodesia. This program was supposedly designed to supply trained assistant 
nurses for use in the wider government medical service. The program’s adherence to the 
missionary educational ideology of domesticity reduced its efficacy, and it later lost its 
government funding amid criticism that it had not delivered on its promises to provide 
assistant nurses for the colony.65 
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 Government training schools opened in all three colonies in the late 1930s. Each 
aimed to provide male medical auxiliaries who would work in rural health care facilities. 
In Southern Rhodesia, schools in Bulawayo and Salisbury trained male nursing orderlies 
from 1937. The course provided breadth rather than depth of knowledge. Trained 
orderlies were equipped to treat minor ailments and recognize more serious conditions for 
referral. It seems that the government struggled to train sufficient numbers. Each rural 
clinic was supposed to be staffed by two or three orderlies. The African staff was to have 
a great deal of autonomy because a medical doctor only visited the clinics on a weekly or 
fortnightly basis. By 1944, although there were sixty-six clinics, only sixty orderlies were 
listed on the nursing orderly register.66  
 In Nyasaland, proposed government training programs aimed to produce male 
auxiliaries who could act as dresser-dispensers. They were taught diagnostic and 
therapeutic techniques that enabled them to treat many of the minor cases at rural 
dispensaries and clinics. Crucially, the program also sought to “produce men with a 
knowledge of hygiene and sanitation applicable to village life, so that they may play their 
part as advisors to native authorities.”67 Rural medical assistants were seen to have a dual 
role, curative and preventative, but this comment also seems to suggest that medical 
assistants would return to their villages with a social status enhanced by the accumulation 
of biomedical knowledge. It should be noted that while the government school trained 
male medical aides, the missions continued to train male hospital assistants. Hospital 
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assistants had significantly more training and also enjoyed a much higher status.68 
Hospital assistants trained at the Blantyre mission had comparable skills to the medical 
assistants who had been trained in Uganda since 1927.69 On graduation, hospital 
assistants were placed on the same register as sub-assistant surgeons, a classification used 
for non-European doctors.70 
 The emphasis on producing medical assistants for rural health work is a persistent 
thread in the sources. The rationale behind this is twofold. First, the understanding was 
that it was impossible to staff rural clinics and dispensaries with professionally qualified 
doctors and state registered nurses. While Southern Rhodesia established a state 
registered nursing program in the early years of the colony, this was entirely the preserve 
of European women. In addition there was no medical school. Thus all three territories 
were reliant on expatriate staff. This reliance tended to lead to shortages in staff and 
meant that rural areas were often at the end of the line when it came to deploying 
expatriate biomedical expertise. This was one reason why the contribution of missionary 
medicine to the provision of health care was so important throughout the colonial period. 
It was often the missionary doctors and nurses who were prepared to work and live in 
remote areas. The second rationale was that any moral impulse driving colonial medical 
authorities to provide more extensive health care was fiscally constrained by the overall 
colonial economy.71 Dr Mackenzie, director of medical services, explained that 
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Nyasaland, a colony dependent on a subsistence agricultural economy, needed a health 
service commensurate with its ability to fund it. In his opinion this meant Nyasaland 
needed a service consisting, for the most part, of a “cadre of African auxiliaries to staff a 
health service able to provide treatment … at a cost the country could afford.”72   
 By 1940, government training schools for men operated in all three colonies. 
While Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland concentrated their efforts on training staff for 
curative services, Southern Rhodesia also initiated a program for training hygiene 
demonstrators whose work encompassed a broad spectrum of preventative services such 
as health education, water treatment, and housing improvements and would later form a 
follow-up service in the efforts to control tuberculosis.73 
 
Towards the Post War Era 
 The 1935 strike on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt was an early manifestation 
of an empire-wide series of strikes, demonstrations and riots that erupted between the mid 
1930s and 1950.74 The strikes expressed African demand for more equitable labor 
policies and social services.75 The British government determined that a program of 
economic development was needed. The program aimed to stimulate the building of 
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infrastructure to improve the standard of living of colonial subjects. In 1940 the British 
parliament passed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act.76 In Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, this development ethos spurred the production of ten-year plans, which 
included provision for increased medical facilities. However, by the start of federation, 
little progress had been made and they subsequently became the basis for infrastructure 
development in the federal period.  
 During and immediately after the Second World War rapid development of a 
manufacturing sector transformed the Southern Rhodesian economy.77 Simultaneously, 
there was a shift in ideas about the role of the African population within the colonial 
state.78 This reflected the reality of a rapidly expanding urban African population. 
Africans provided the necessary labor for the increasing industrialization and they were 
also important potential consumers of manufactured goods.  In 1944, the Southern 
Rhodesian Prime Minister, Godfrey Huggins argued that a universal health service was 
vital for the future wealth and development of the colony in the aftermath of the Second 
World War.79 Huggins emphasized, “there can be no more important object than the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Ibid., 31. 
77	  By 1951, three times as many Europeans worked in the manufacturing sector as did in 
farming. John Richard Gray, The Two Nations Aspects of the Development of Race 
Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland  (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 
204.	  
78	  Part of paradox of settler colonialism in Africa is that white settlers wanted to banish 
Africans to native areas even as they recognized their importance in the colonial 
economy. 
79	  It should be noted that a similar discourse about the desirability of a national health 
service emerged in the 1940s in South Africa, leading to a National Health Service 
Commission in 1944, see: Shula Marks and Neil Andersson, “Industrialization, Rural 
Health, and the 1944 National Health Services Commission in South Africa,” in The 
Social Basis of Health and Healing In Africa, eds. Steven Feierman and John M. Janzen 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 131-161. 
	   52	  
attainment of health and the prevention of disease. It is an ideal that we must place first in 
our plans for reconstruction.”80 Huggins further stressed that the provision of health 
services was foundational to the building of the state saying, “all our plans for increased 
production and wealth will be to no avail unless we have a fit and healthy population to 
produce wealth and enjoy it when it is produced.”81 The building of the colonial state thus 
became intertwined with the need to pay more attention to the welfare of the indigenous 
population.  
 Despite rhetoric about the need for a national health service, by 1945, health care 
provision in Southern Rhodesia remained segregated and unequal. While the European 
population enjoyed a fairly comprehensive health system, provision for African health 
care was rudimentary. For example, while the number of rural health clinics rose from 31 
in 1935 to 67 ten years later, the number of Africans attending clinics as out-patients 
increased by a factor of 10, from around 22,000 in 1935 to more that 203,000 a decade 
later. In contrast, all the major settlements had general hospitals for Europeans providing 
sufficient beds, as well as radiographic and laboratory facilities.82 The government had 
built some hospitals for Africans in the major towns in the earlier colonial period but by 
the post war era, they were hopelessly inadequate for the task.83 African hospitals often 
operated at 135 percent of capacity.84 Medical commentators placed the blame for this 
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exponential increase in the numbers of Africans seeking treatment rather than any 
deficiency of investment on the part of the government.85 It seems that medical discourse 
lamented the persistence of “native practices” and the innate superstitions of Africans for 
the slow acceptance of biomedicine in the early colonial period only to complain that 
Africans were overwhelming the facilities later on. The increase in numbers is undeniable 
with admissions to African hospitals doubling between 1944 and 1949.86  
 After 1940, ideas about the male identity of nurses in tropical Africa underwent a 
revision. In part, the shift reflected the wartime demand for male medical auxiliaries to 
work in military hospitals resulting in staff shortages in civilian hospitals and clinics. The 
change also occurred because ideas about nursing as women’s work became increasingly 
dominant in the colonial setting.87 This perspective suggested that the inherently female 
aptitude for nursing would improve standards of care in hospitals. Thus colonial 
governments put greater emphasis on training female African nursing assistants. In this 
endeavor, missions were seen as the most suitable sites for nurse training because it was 
thought missionaries could better safeguard students’ moral virtue.88 However, increased 
numbers of African girls completing the requisite amount of education also led the 
colonial authorities to start government training of female nursing auxiliaries in all three 
territories by 1950. 
 On the eve of federation, the colonial governments, missions, and mining 
companies across the region carried out training of male and female auxiliaries including 
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medical assistants, midwives, laboratory assistants, and health assistants. However, 
training remained fragmented within each territory and reflected the needs of the 
individual colonies. Missions generally followed their own programs and either sent their 
pupils to government schools for a period of time towards the end of training or asked the 
government services to examine the pupils when training had been completed. These 
steps were taken to ensure that trained mission staff would be employable within a 
government service. The government-operated programs differed considerably. The 
programs in Nyasaland were longer and certainly more rigorous than that in Northern 
Rhodesia. In addition, the auxiliary training reflected the different roles that medical 
assistants played in health service provision in the three territories. In Southern Rhodesia, 
nursing orderlies followed a curriculum predicated on care-giving while in the Northern 
territories greater attention was given to the teaching of diagnostic practices because it 
was recognized that medical assistants had to be able to work in rural settings for long 
periods with only minimal supervision.89  
 Significantly, there were no facilities for providing advanced medical training for 
Africans in the region. While calls for training African state registered nurses dated back 
to the early 1940s in Southern Rhodesia, professional nursing remained the preserve of 
white women until well into the federal period. This is in contrast to South Africa, which 
had around 800 black registered nurses by 1948.90 Furthermore, unlike South Africa and 
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colonies such as Uganda and Nigeria, there was no medical school in which to train 
doctors. The nearest equivalent was the hospital assistant course at the Blantyre mission 
in Nyasaland. The Nyasaland government opened its own school for hospital assistants in 
Zomba in the 1940s but trained very few students. Austin Mkandawire, a hospital 
assistant in Nyasaland in the 1950s, was one of just four men selected for the training 
program after successfully completing the medical aides course.91 The lack of advanced 
training facilities had the effect of concentrating professional biomedical expertise in 
Europeans. In addition, policies that required white nurses to resign on marriage created a 
chronic shortage of professional nurses that persisted into the federal era. Reliance on 
European doctors meant competing within a global marketplace for an increasingly 
scarce resource. 
 
 The colonial governments of Central Africa paid greater attention to health care 
for their African populations in the decade prior to the creation of the Federation. Some 
infrastructure was added. Even so, the services were insufficient to meet rising demand. 
Furthermore, staff shortages had become a chronic problem. The lack of any professional 
medical training programs perpetuated a reliance on expatriate doctors and professional 
nurses, staff that was increasingly difficult to recruit. The gendered colonial attitude 
toward auxiliary training and neglect of African education limited the numbers of nursing 
orderlies, medical aides, and other medical workers that could be trained. As a result, 
governments struggled to adequately staff their hospitals and clinics, even as 
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infrastructure was added. It was on these shaky foundations of health that the Federal 
Health Service attempted to build.
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Chapter Two. 
Federating Health 
 
 The Central African Federation was a co-production of Britain and the leaders of 
white settlers in Central Africa.  The Federation owed its existence to the alignment of 
British and white settler interests. Africans, for their part, feared the potential loss of land 
and the prospect of white domination. In this chapter I examine how health came to be a 
federal function and argue that the story of how the Federation came into being and the 
process of federating health is best understood as part of white settler nation building. 
The importance of health to the settlers’ national project is indicative of the perceived 
links between health and development that emerged in the early 1940s. At the same time, 
federating health affected the working conditions of the hundreds of employees of the 
colonial government services. The manner in which this was carried out would have 
implications for the health service throughout the federal decade. 
 
Closer Union in Central Africa 
 The Central African Federation has been described as a “large-scale imperial 
exercise in constructive state-building.”1 Proposals for greater inter-territorial planning 
and coordination in areas of British controlled Africa emerged in the immediate post 
World War One era. They gained greater currency in the aftermath of the Second World 
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War when federation appeared to offer a means of improving government regulation and 
coordination of colonies within a wider geographical region such as East Africa.2 
However, the Central African Federation also owed its existence to the determination on 
the part of white settlers of Southern and Northern Rhodesia. Many of these had long 
envisaged the creation of a white state in Central Africa.3  
 The first stirrings of a political union between the colonies can be traced to an 
attempt in 1916, by the BSAC to amalgamate the two Rhodesias.4 The move invoked a 
backlash from white settlers in Southern Rhodesia who were agitating for an end to 
company rule and wanted to get responsible government. In the 1930s, the tiny white 
settler population in Northern Rhodesia began to expand in the wake of the discovery of 
vast deposits of copper near the Katangan border with the Congo. At the same time, a 
commission from Britain reported that some form of closer union was possible as long as 
the concept of native paramountcy, the protection of African interests over those of non-
Africans, was upheld.5 The report spurred a surge of settler nationalism within those 
Northern Rhodesian whites who looked enviously to the south where the interests of the 
white population were always privileged over those of Africans. The rapid wartime 
expansion of the copper mining industry brought increasing numbers of white settlers 
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onto the Copperbelt, many of them Afrikaners from South Africa. In 1945, the politician 
and leader of the small but growing white settler population in Northern Rhodesia, Roy 
Welensky, linked the defense of the British Empire to calls for a white dominion in 
Central Africa.6 He also argued that administration by the colonial office impeded the 
development necessary to improve the colony’s standard of living. Welensky pointed to 
Southern Rhodesia’s rapid development of manufacturing and expansion of health 
services as evidence of the benefit of a self-governing colony.7 He argued that the 
Southern Rhodesia trained nurses, paid higher wages, and had expanded medical 
education. He conveniently ignored that the number of nurses trained by the Southern 
Rhodesian service was tiny because state registered nurse training was limited to white 
women only, that it struggled to retain the services of the nurses and doctors it employed, 
and that the state had only trained (male) African nursing orderlies since 1937. From the 
start, then, the idea of closer association and the creation of a white nation and the part 
that health played in this were intricately linked. Amalgamation was a way to ensure 
European domination of political and civil institutions in the region. 
 Prior to the Second World War, The British government had been opposed to any 
initiatives to bring together the Rhodesias due to differences in policies towards 
Africans.8 The 1940s marked a change in attitude to one favoring, at least in principle, 
some form of political union. This was, in part, fueled by concerns of a northward creep 
of the Afrikaner apartheid worldview. British fears about Afrikaner expansionism 
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gathered pace in the wake of the Nationalist Party victory in the South African elections 
in 1948. As important, though, was the fear that increased nationalist activity could lead 
to a violent settler revolt on the Copperbelt.9 The perceived solution was the creation, in 
1945, of the Central African Council, designed to foster closer ties between the colonies. 
For the British government, the hope was that the council would deflect ideas about 
amalgamation. To Welensky and the Southern Rhodesian premier, Godfrey Huggins, it 
represented a stepping-stone towards the desired political union.10  
 At the same time, the idea of amalgamation was bound up with the economic 
interests of the white settlers in both colonies. The Northern Rhodesians pressed for the 
nationalization of the copper mining industry while Southern Rhodesians wanted the 
same for the railway system. To that end, the Southern Rhodesian government secured 
funding to take over Rhodesia Railways. The consequent loan commitments increased 
Southern Rhodesian desire for amalgamation in order to access the lucrative revenue 
from copper.11 Economically, then, Southern and Northern Rhodesian settlers took steps 
to secure control over the region’s resources, an important step in nation building. 
 Although the British government was more amenable to the idea of some sort of 
closer union during the 1940s, the ruling Labour Party remained firmly against 
amalgamation. This led the settler leaders’ Welensky and Huggins to turn to federation as 
a possible, viable alternative means of achieving the same ends. As Philip Murphy has 
argued, Welensky was prepared to resort to a policy of non-cooperation to force Britain 
to shift its stance towards acceptance of federation. Welensky played on the British 
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geopolitical concerns pointing to the potential for Afrikaners to be dominant in the 
Northern Rhodesian legislature after the general election, due in 1949-50.12 
 The turning point was the change in government in Britain in 1951. The 
Conservative party victory meant that for the first time, the interests of the British 
government and Rhodesian settlers aligned in support of federation. As John McCracken 
notes, reasons for the inclusion of Nyasaland have not been adequately explained. 
Arguments that Southern Rhodesia agreed to include the colony in order to secure access 
to Nyasaland labor are unconvincing.13 The long history of Nyasaland as a labor reserve 
illustrates that access was not dependent on a political union. Migrant labor from the 
colony had been important to Southern Rhodesian farms and mines since the early part of 
the century.14 Nyasaland’s inclusion was also unwelcome to the Nyasaland governor. 
Colby actively campaigned against Nyasaland’s involvement, warning that federation 
was likely to foster African unrest. The British government ignored Colby’s appeal, 
perhaps providing the basis for speculation in the historiography that British officials saw 
federation as an opportunity to divest Britain from some of its financial responsibilities 
towards the colony.15 It should also be noted that Nyasaland was one of a number of 
financially constrained colonies that the Colonial Office believed could only become 
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viable nation-states as part of a wider geographical political community.16 There is also 
some evidence that Britain insisted on the inclusion of Nyasaland in order to give the 
project the illusion that Federation was not a form of surrender to settler nation 
building.17  
 African resistance to any sort of closer union, amalgamation or federation was 
widespread and profound. Southern Rhodesian Africans viewed political union as an 
impediment to Africans’ desire for self-determination.18 They also feared that it would 
led to a more independent settler colony and threaten Britain’s existing veto power over 
any Southern Rhodesian parliamentary legislation that affected African interests.19  
 In Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Africans feared the expansion of the white 
settler state and the specter of white domination. In both colonies, antipathy to a closer 
union was intricately bound up with the land. In Nyasaland, resistance to federation was 
tightly linked to colonial development plans. Coercive soil conservation projects such as 
ridging were viewed as a threat to land security. The imposition of federation raised a 
similar fear as Africans worried about Rhodesian land alienation policies and a potential 
influx of settlers.20 The links between conservation measures and mass anti-Federation 
sentiment were aptly expressed by a women’s song sung in 1953: 
Federation capitaos 
e – e – e 
Sooner or later you will die 
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e – e – e 
Contour ridging capitaos 
e – e – e 
Sooner or later you will die 
e – e – e 
You will die but you don’t know it.21 
 
The song articulates the notion that from an African perspective, federation posed an 
existential threat. Africans listened when Welensky said,  “If they [Africans] do not come 
with us, …  they will meet with the same fate that came to the Indians in the USA. They 
disappeared.”22 Examining the trepidation with which Africans viewed federation helps 
explain future reluctance to federal employment and resistance to public health 
campaigns in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland during the federal era. 
 
Federating Health 
 It was not immediately obvious to many involved in the conferences leading to 
the creation of the Federation that health should become a federal function. At the 
Victoria Falls conference in 1949, for example, a subcommittee convened to consider the 
handling of social services under any such federal outcome, recommended that while 
hospitals would be better placed under federal control, clinics and dispensaries, the nuts 
and bolts of rural healthcare, should remain the responsibility of the territorial 
governments.23  At each of the ensuing conferences, health proved to be a contentious 
issue. Even as delegates acknowledged the benefits that could accrue from a unified 
health service, politically it was divisive. At the Officials Conference in London in March 
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  Qtd in McCracken, 321, emphasis in the original. 
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23	  Wood, The Welensky Papers,	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1951, the Southern Rhodesian contingent became frustrated when the Nyasaland and 
Northern Rhodesian delegations declared that health must remain a territorial concern. 
The northern delegates pointed out that the territories had existing development plans that 
could be difficult to combine and that funding had already been earmarked for expansion 
of health services. In addition, they argued that rural health provision was enmeshed with 
local district administration.  Further, they claimed that health was such an integral part 
of everyday life of the African that unification risked alienating support for the entire 
federal project. Lastly, they asserted that any proposal for unification of the territorial 
health services should not be considered at least until the territorial medical directors had 
been consulted.24 For their part, the Southern Rhodesians believed that Africans would 
not see any change in service and therefore would have no objection. At this juncture in 
the conference, health became a metaphor for what the Southern Rhodesians viewed as 
“the negative and destructive criticism” which countered any proposed mergers of 
services put forward by the southern colony. In their opinion the delegates from the 
northern territories were using well-known African resistance to federation to place 
obstacles in the way of a “free discussion of every problem.”25 In the end the conference 
report tried to reconcile the interests of both camps. It recommended that health should 
remain a territorial concern while also suggesting that some specialist services (to be 
determined) could come under federal control.26 
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25 Ibid., 178-179.	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   TNA CO 129/45/CP (51) I 22: Annex II, “Report of Conference on Closer Association 
in Central Africa,” March 1951, 16, 20, 39. 
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 In March of 1952, the Southern Rhodesians made another concerted effort to 
appropriate health for the federal government. The meeting, held in Lusaka in Northern 
Rhodesia, was one of a series held prior to an upcoming conference on federation in 
London. In addition to health, meetings were held to discuss the viability of federating 
the police and prison service as well as agriculture and marketing. No representatives 
from either the Colonial Office or the Commonwealth Relations Office attended. 
Colonial officers in London would later express surprise that the meeting had taken place 
at all as it was thought that the decision to make health a territorial matter had already 
been finalized.27 African representation was also conspicuously absent. The meeting 
brought together the most senior health officials of the three colonies, a member of the 
Central African Council, the Southern Rhodesian minister for health, and the member for 
health in the Northern Rhodesian legislative council.28  
 The archival record illustrates the forcefulness with which the Southern 
Rhodesian delegates approached this meeting. It is obvious that they arrived in Lusaka 
intent on securing agreement for the unification of health services. While the ultimate 
decision would be taken at the London conference in the April, it appears the Southern 
Rhodesians wanted to be able to leave the meeting with a firm recommendation that the 
rationale for unification on technical and professional grounds outweighed any political 
consideration. The Southern Rhodesian medical director, Morris, was arguably the 
strongest advocate for this position. Morris had been part of a medical sub-committee set 
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  TNA CO 1015/634: J.W. Stacpoole, circulation notes on the Record of a Meeting on 
the Unification of the Health Services in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and 
Nyasaland. 	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  TNA CO 1015/634: “Record of a Meeting on the Unification of the Health Services in 
Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland,” 2.  
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up under the Central African Council prior to federation.29 The committee had been 
formed with the intention of coordinating the health work of the three colonies. 
According to Morris, it utterly failed to achieve its purpose.30 Morris would later say: 
“There were those of us who endured the occasional but over-prolonged sittings of 
the medical sub-committee set up under the Central African Council, with the duty 
of co-ordinating the health work of the three territories. This subcommittee achieved 
nothing. It failed even to provide a channel whereby information on "major public 
health schemes" could be exchanged.”31 
 
At the Lusaka meeting, Morris argued that the examples of the Union of South Africa and 
Australia, where the provision of health had been divided between federal and state 
departments had not “proved very happy in their results.”32 Morris believed that any such 
move would be “wasteful of both manpower and finance and lead to friction between the 
directors of medical services and to frustration on the part of the officer called upon to 
administer the federal rump.”33 
 For his part, the Southern Rhodesian Minister for Health, Fletcher, minimized any 
differences of opinion amongst the participants. Morris and the Northern Rhodesian 
Director of Medical Services, Robinson, differed over the extent to which federalizing 
health presented increased opportunities for professional advancement. Morris said that 
the larger federal service offered better prospects than the smaller individual territorial 
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Minute, February 28, 1945. 
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services. Robinson, however, argued any such advantage would only be realized by the 
Southern Rhodesian European staff because, in contrast, the staff of the northern 
territories stood to loose their connections to the global professional network of the 
colonial medical service. Fletcher brushed off Robinson’s objections and quickly moved 
on to emphasize the benefits and practicability of unification.34  
 The Southern Rhodesian delegates argued that one of the major benefits of 
unifying health would be the standardization and expansion of medical training. The 
broader base of training would provide more curative staff capacity but also more staff to 
work in preventative medicine enhancing the dissemination of health education and 
hygiene practices.35 The meeting threw into sharp relief the regional differences in the 
services’ ability to fill their respective training programs each year. While those in 
Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland received twenty applicants for each available place, 
the delegates from Northern Rhodesia admitted to persistent shortages in suitable 
candidates.36 In addition, the Southern Rhodesian contingent argued that federal control 
of health would allow the more rapid expansion of advanced training because it was 
probable that the federal government would attract more investment and because of 
greater efficiencies in a unified service.37 Furthermore, they asserted that merging the 
health services would allow the health ministry to regulate medical training so that 
numbers trained could be better matched to demand across the Federation.38  
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  Ibid., 8.	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  Ibid.	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  The only dissenter was Dr Mackenzie, the director of the Nyasaland Medical Service 
who strongly asserted that, in his opinion, training should be a territorial function. His 
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 The Southern Rhodesian contingent based their arguments for unification on the 
premise that merging the health services was both feasible and practical. In addition to 
the benefits for medical training, the delegates argued that federating health would 
provide better responses to epidemic diseases, more coordinated polices in tackling 
endemic disease, and greater efficiencies in procurement and disbursement of medical 
equipment and drugs. Furthermore, they declared that a federal body was best suited for 
securing the borders of the federal territories against immigrant importation of disease, 
coordinating research, and for dealing with international entities such as the World 
Health Organization.39 
 The one disease that all delegates agreed should not be included in any federal 
control of health was silicosis, a growing health problem within the mining industries of 
Southern and Northern Rhodesia. After much discussion, participants at the meeting 
agreed that there were too many differences in the ways in which each territory handled 
the issue for any benefit to accrue from unifying the service. First, the mining industry 
itself differed in that Northern Rhodesia’s was composed of large clustered mines while 
Southern Rhodesian mines tended to be small and scattered. Second, Northern Rhodesia 
had established the Medical and Research Bureau in 1945 and enacted legislation 
requiring medical screening for all employees at the start and end of their employment. 
Southern Rhodesia had its own legislation. Lastly, the nature of compensation differed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
perspective may well have been encouraged by the relative robustness of training of 
auxiliaries in Nyasaland. Medical auxiliaries from Nyasaland had been employed 
throughout Central Africa since the early colonial period and enjoyed an enhanced 
reputation for their medical skills. Ibid.	  
39	  Ibid., 10. 
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After a discussion of these differences at the Lusaka meeting, Morris declared it was 
“beyond the whit of man to codify the two acts which are at present in force.”40  
 What is interesting about this decision to leave silicosis to the territorial 
governments is that it was based on the premise that the different approaches of the 
territorial governments towards the disease made it impractical to bring the issue under 
the federal umbrella. In fact, the same argument could have been made for health as a 
whole. Legislation of health differed, in that Southern Rhodesia had a medical board to 
oversee the registration of medical practitioners and state registered training programs, 
while Northern Rhodesia did not. In addition, the staff of the two health care systems had 
different terms and conditions with differing rates of remuneration. What may have been 
the crucial factor for silicosis was the question of compensation and the degree to which 
the federal government was prepared to assume any liability for payments. The extent to 
which that figured in the decision to leave silicosis under territorial control is unclear. 
 The meeting in Lusaka did secure agreement between all delegates that federating 
health was justified, at least on practical grounds. The three senior health officials 
concurred that unification would be the most cost effective way of providing health 
services and that a Health Minister should have the services of an advisory board with 
representation from all three territories. Furthermore, importantly, all participants agreed 
that the African would not notice any difference in service. Lt Col E.M. Wilson, the 
Northern Rhodesian Member for Health and Local Government and chairman of the 
meeting, said the “African in the village would [not] realize anything had happened at all. 
He would just go quietly on in the same way to his clinic, and if he were sick he would be 
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picked up by the nearest ambulance and taken to the nearest hospital in the same way as 
at present…and he would not be able to care less.”41 This assertion assumes that a 
centralized policy would not bring about changes in priorities, and that funding for 
individual clinics or hospitals would continue at a similar level. Given that clinics and 
rural hospitals throughout the colonial period were often faced with the threat of closure 
due to lack of available staff or funding issues, this was a bold assumption.42 In addition, 
it seems that while Wilson was aware of African antipathy towards the prospect of a 
Central African Federation, he underestimated the amount of distrust that came to shape 
relations between many Africans and federal officials in the northern colonies.  
 Wilson’s assertion also underscores the extent to which the entire quest to bring 
health under the federal umbrella was less about actual provision of healthcare and more 
about impressing the Colonial Office in London that a white settler controlled federal 
government could be trusted with a function so integral to Africans’ everyday existence. 
This was an important part of white settler nation-building aspirations and illustrates how 
the perceived success of the health service could serve as justification for white settler 
minority rule and pave the way for the Federation to be awarded dominion status within 
the empire.  
  The meeting broke up having secured agreement for federating health but without 
clear recommendations from the delegates to their respective governments. Only 
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because of a lack of funds and personnel. Mission hospitals and clinics in, which 
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Fletcher, as the Minister for Health in Southern Rhodesia, had the authority to accept any 
recommendation for the unification of health on behalf of his government. The 
representatives from Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland could not do the same. The 
Nyasaland Director of Medical Services, Mackenzie, made it clear that he had no 
authority to commit the Nyasaland government to any decisions on whether health should 
be federalized. Wilson, the Northern Rhodesian delegate, was concerned about the 
political ramifications of federating health and recommended that further consultation 
was needed before his government could make a decision as to whether to formally 
support the measure.43   
 After the meeting, the territorial governments expressed their formal views on the 
matter. As expected, the Southern Rhodesian government endorsed the idea that the 
health services should be federalized, saying, “health services would be unworkable 
except on a Federal Basis.” It based its argument on economics, saying that given the 
expense of running a national health service, it was unlikely that individual territories 
could continue to maintain the present level of service let alone carry out any expansion 
without the need for large increases in taxation.44 In contrast, the Nyasaland government 
maintained its commitment to health being a territorial concern as conceived in the 
original division of functions produced at the officials meeting in London, in 1951.45 The 
Northern Rhodesian government formally acknowledged the practical and technical 
benefits that could emerge from federating health but considered the importance of the 
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political ramifications merited further debate at the upcoming London conference in 
April.46 
  The following month, the London conference decided how the various functions, 
including health, would be divided between the federal and territorial governments within 
the Federation. In 1951, a straightforward division between federal and territorial 
responsibility had been proposed. However, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Godfrey 
Huggins had later put forward a case for a concurrent list of legislation. The concurrent 
list would contain those functions that came under the remit of both federal and territorial 
legislatures.47 Importantly, though, if the territorial law conflicted with the federal law 
then the federal legislation would prevail.48 Thus the federal constitution would consist of 
an exclusive Federal Legislative list and a Concurrent Legislative list. 
 The white, settler faction of the Southern Rhodesian delegation to the April 
London conference used the conclusions of the Lusaka meeting to argue for health to be 
placed on the exclusive Federal Legislative list. When this proved to be too difficult, they 
successfully pushed for it to be put on the Concurrent Legislative List. The placement 
was a compromise between the desire to keep African affairs within the remit of the 
territorial legislatures and the presumed technical benefits of a unified service. The point 
that carried the day was the view that Africans would not notice any difference in the way 
they received health care.49  
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 The placement of health on the Concurrent Legislative list was an important step 
in the process of federating health. It meant that when the Territorial Laws Amendment 
Act was passed in the Federal Assembly in 1954, the federal government could assume 
control for health along with any other function that had been placed on the concurrent 
list.50 The act enabled the federal government to take over responsibility for any service 
that was deemed to fall within the federal sphere. This included non-African agriculture, 
copyright, weights and measures, and public health.51 By the end of 1954 some fourteen 
functions, including health, had been removed from the concurrent list and placed under 
the complete control of the federal government.  
 There is evidence to suggest that the Territorial Laws Amendment Act was a 
deliberate move on the part of the federal government to assume control of as many 
functions as possible with the goal of creating a unitary state in Central Africa. In June 
1956, Sir Arthur Benson, Governor of Northern Rhodesia, sent a scathing missive to his 
superiors in the Colonial Office criticizing the centralizing policies of the federal 
government.52 Benson pointed to the complete lack of negotiation that had accompanied 
the federal take over of functions such as health. Benson said that bills deleting territorial 
jurisdiction were presented to the territorial governors as fait accompli. In his opinion, the 
centralizing policies were designed to ensure that the Concurrent Legislative list would 
cease to exist and thereby necessitate changes in the overall constitution of the Federation 
well ahead of the constitutional review scheduled for 1960. The chairman of the 
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Nyasaland Federal Party summed up the ambitions of the federal government when he 
announced at a meeting, 
“I am informing this Committee off the record that leading Europeans in the 
Federation and the Federal Government, ably led by Sir Godfrey Huggins, have only 
one object in view—that is, over the course of the next few years to federalise every 
department in the Territorial Governments and vigorous steps are being taken 
already to pave the way to complete amalgamation. It is a question of holding on 
until then.”53 
 
The chairman’s view highlights the importance of federating government functions to the 
nation-building aspirations of the ruling white settler elite. The assumption of a large 
“big-spending” department such as health could confer legitimacy on a government 
whose long-term aim was a white state in Africa.54 This perspective explains why the 
Southern Rhodesians approached the negotiations over the question of federating health 
with such forcefulness. It should be acknowledged that the senior medical personnel 
largely agreed that unifying health would bring certain benefits. However, it was 
problematic from a political perspective. The lack of awareness on the part of the British 
officials that health was to become a federal function demonstrates the backhanded way 
in which the Southern Rhodesians approached the issue. 
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 One hurdle facing the newly created Ministry of Health in the months prior to the 
federal assumption of health was how to mold together the very different medical 
services of the Northern territories with that of Southern Rhodesia. Most significant was 
that the medical professionals in the Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland services were part 
of the London administered colonial medical and nursing services while those in 
Southern Rhodesia were a part of a locally based and recruited service. The services had 
evolved along very different lines. 
 The expatriate medical staff of the government services of Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland was part of an empire-wide colonial medical service. British doctors and 
nurses who desired to work abroad applied to the colonial medical service or the overseas 
nursing service in London and were posted according to imperial needs. A career in the 
colonial medical service often encompassed a number of appointments in different parts 
of the empire. Opportunities for promotion often came by way of a transfer to a different 
service in another colony. Nevertheless, some colonial doctors stayed with one territorial 
service or at least within one region, for many years. Dr William Petrie’s career is a good 
example. Petrie originally came to Africa as a missionary doctor, working in Nyasaland 
from 1938. After serving in the King’s African Rifles during the Second World War, 
Petrie joined the colonial medical service in 1946 and returned to Nyasaland where he 
stayed until he left the service at the end of 1957.55  The medical services of Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland often struggled to recruit sufficient personnel. This was a 
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perennial problem not helped by the low status afforded the services in those colonies 
compared with more prestigious postings in West Africa, Sudan, or India.56  
 In contrast, the government medical service in Southern Rhodesia was a locally 
based service that accepted applications directly and processed them either in Salisbury, 
the colony’s capital, or at Rhodesia House in London. The service also recruited widely 
from South Africa and from its locally based nursing school. Even though the nursing 
service had a rapid turnover due to a policy requiring resignation of women upon 
marriage, the doctors and nurses of the Southern Rhodesia medical service tended to be 
part of a settler community and viewed Southern Rhodesia as their home.57 A defining 
feature of the Southern Rhodesian nursing service from the Second World War onwards 
was its growing reliance on temporary nurses due to its marriage policy. The nursing 
service rehired women who wanted to return to work but never as permanent staff.58 
 The services also differed because the racialized and gendered professional 
hierarchy that was a feature of colonial medicine was more marked in the medical service 
of Southern Rhodesia than in those of the northern colonies. The bigger European 
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in most western countries for much of the twentieth century. While incoming doctors to 
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population with its comparatively larger numbers of white professional nurses precluded 
the use of non-European doctors because of the desire to maintain supremacy of white 
over black.59  Hospitals were segregated clinical spaces in which African nursing 
orderlies, who were overwhelmingly male, did not care for European patients. The top 
level of the medical hierarchy was the preserve of white, male, medical doctors, usually 
trained in British medical schools. The next rung was composed of white, female, 
professionally qualified nurses while locally trained African auxiliaries provided the 
supporting base.  
 A further difference in the medical services of Southern Rhodesia and the 
northern territories is that in the former there was a clear demarcation between curative 
and preventative medicine that did not exist to the same extent in the latter. 
Administratively in Southern Rhodesia, preventative medicine was a separate department 
with its own cadre of African hygiene demonstrators. The demonstrators’ work consisted 
mainly of health education and assisting with campaigns such as anti-malarial spraying, 
water treatment, and vaccinations. The department worked closely with the local Native 
authorities in the African reserves. In contrast, in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
preventative medicine was merely one facet of a colonial medical officer’s job. A 
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colonial doctor went on “safari” visiting rural clinics and dispensaries and attended to 
curative and preventative functions simultaneously.60  
 The government medical service of Southern Rhodesia was also part of a larger 
medical community that included private medical practitioners and nurses serving the 
European community. For the most part this did not exist in either Northern Rhodesia or 
Nyasaland. The exception was on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia where mining 
corporations provided health services for their employees and a growing, but still small, 
European population encouraged some medical practitioners to set up private practice. 
 Conditions of service also differed considerably. Officers serving in the Northern 
territories were eligible for retirement on a full pension earlier, had more generous 
housing allowances, and generally better salaries. However, those in the Southern 
Rhodesian service had more opportunities to supplement their salary through private 
practice. The services in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland also provided a generous 
amount of tour leave. Officers going on leave usually returned to Britain and could be 
away from their postings for up to three months every two or three years. This tended to 
create temporary difficulties of staffing especially when other medical posts were vacant. 
In one year, four of Nyasaland’s medical officers, including the Director of Medical 
Services, were on leave when three other posts were vacant. As result the service 
operated with just two-thirds of its staff.61   
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 By the eve of federation, then, the territorial medical services had evolved along 
divergent paths. The federal Secretary of Health, Morris, imagined a federal medical 
community united in purpose and values.62 He was deeply mistaken. The process of 
federating health sowed seeds of distrust and suspicion amongst African and European 
staff from the outset.  In particular, the medical staff of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
appeared to view the proposed merger as a loss of professional autonomy and resented 
what was viewed as the subsuming of their territorial services into a Southern Rhodesian 
medical service.  
 Furthermore, Morris underestimated the extent of African antipathy to the concept 
of federation, which biased African medical personnel against working in the federal 
service. Africans had been vociferous opponents of any sort of closer union between the 
colonies of Central Africa. Opposition was strongest and most sustained in Nyasaland 
and Northern Rhodesia but anti-federation sentiment in Southern Rhodesia was 
particularly virulent prior to the start of federation.63 Collaboration between African 
organizations of the three colonies resulted in the formation of an All-African Convention 
to oppose federation.64 While it was not successful, African opposition continued 
unabated throughout the period of federation, most noticeably in the northern territories. 
In Southern Rhodesia, anti-federation sentiment waned as the imposition of federation 
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became inevitable and elite Africans, at least for a while, pursued a policy of 
accommodation with the white settler elite.65 
 The move of the federal government to appropriate health appeared to unnerve 
colonial medical officers in the field and clearly took officials in the colonial medical 
service at the British Colonial Office by surprise. In the early months of federation, Dr. 
Robinson, the Director of Medical Services of Northern Rhodesia, joined his counterparts 
in the Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesian services on a tour of the Federation as part of a 
working party formed to investigate the best way of merging the territorial medical 
services. On his return to his headquarters in Lusaka, Robinson wrote to his colonial 
medical officers about the changes to working conditions that his officers would 
experience when health “went federal.”66 Robinson wrote the circular far in advance of 
the date that the federal government was due to take over responsibility for health, known 
colloquially within the service as “D-day,” and demonstrates that there was a great deal 
of speculation over what the change in administration could entail. Robinson also sent a 
copy to Dr. Buchanan of the Colonial Office in London. Here, the missive generated a 
great deal of discussion about how the federal assumption of health would affect the 
officers in the field but also its impact on the colonial medical service as a whole. A 
number of commentators at the Colonial Office appeared to be completely unaware that 
health was to become a federal function and the responses to the circular reflect the air of 
uncertainty and suspicion that the process of federating health generated.67  
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 Buchanan expressed a number of reservations about the proposed reorganization 
of the health services. A primary concern was that the administration in London would be 
inundated with requests for transfers from officers in the field who did not want to work 
in the federal service. This was a potential problem for the colonial medical service as the 
shrinking empire meant fewer posts were available to absorb those officers who wanted 
to leave Central Africa. In addition there was unease about the rigor of the Southern 
Rhodesian recruitment process. In Buchanan’s view, the colonial medical service 
demanded a higher caliber of candidate than did the Southern Rhodesian service but 
Morris, who was to be Secretary for Health in the federal service, was intent on using the 
Southern Rhodesian process for federal recruitment. Furthermore, Buchanan viewed with 
disquiet the empire-building tendencies of Morris. Morris did not want to appoint a 
federal deputy, was intending to retain control of the Southern Rhodesian branch of the 
federal service, and would have direct control over the branches in the northern 
territories.  Effectively, the federal the Southern Rhodesian headquarters would become 
the same entity, giving the impression that the process of federating health was more an 
absorption of the northern services into the Southern Rhodesian service than a unification 
or process of federation.68 
 A core issue for European officers in the field was the very different conditions of 
service enjoyed by government medical officers in Southern Rhodesia and those in the 
colonial medical service. Those in Southern Rhodesia seem to have generally welcomed 
the unification of the service because, according to the Colonial Office, there was a 
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perception that their service conditions would be raised to match those of the “pampered 
Colonial Service.”69 The reaction of medical officers in Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland was markedly different. In addition to losing generous service conditions 
relating to leave, housing, and paid passages home, they believed that they were 
sacrificing the opportunities of being part of a unified, medical service offering 
opportunities throughout the empire.70 In his circular, Robinson cautioned his medical 
officers to consider their future carefully and suggested that the wisest course might be a 
wait and see strategy until such time as the federal terms became known and the pros and 
cons of transferring permanently to the federal service could be properly weighed.71  
 A further source of distrust and resentment was the lack of any concrete 
information about the proposed federal terms on offer even as “D-day” set for no later 
than July 1st 1954, neared.72 Each post was to be individually assessed as to equivalency 
of grades, salary, and other conditions of service with a comparable existing post in the 
Southern Rhodesian service.73 There simply wasn’t enough time for a task of this 
magnitude to be taken in the few months available to the commission appointed to carry 
out the work, before the federal government was due to take over. This affected colonial 
officers’ ability to make an informed decision about whether to accept federal terms or 
not as they were essentially flying blind.  
 The vacillation also created difficulties in recruitment for posts that were already 
vacant. Nyasaland was in need of at least three medical officers but recruitment had thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Ibid. 
70	  Ibid. 
71	  TNA CO/1015/1090: P.B. Robinson, H.D. Circular No. 60, December 3, 1953. 	  
72	  Dr. J.M. Mackenzie to Dr. Buchanan, March 3, 1954. 
73	  Ibid. 
	   83	  
far been unsuccessful. According to the Director of Medical Services, Mackenzie, the 
Colonial Office had promised to do its best to fill the vacancies but it could not guarantee 
that the usual quality of candidate would be maintained. In conversations between 
Mackenzie and Morris concerning the vacancies, Morris said that he was currently 
recruiting medical officers for Southern Rhodesia and that assuming there were more 
candidates than available jobs, then perhaps some candidates might be persuaded to take 
federal terms and go to Nyasaland. Understandably, Mackenzie was of the opinion that 
the needs of his service in Nyasaland were being marginalized.74  
 In the event, all employees of the territorial medical services were transferred on a 
temporary basis to the federal service.75 The temporary transfer was for five years and 
ensured that the federal health department could continue to function while federal 
service conditions and pay were determined. The hope of senior officials within the 
federal health department was that most personnel would make their temporary 
placement permanent once they had received formal notification of federal terms of 
service.76  
 The terms of the temporary transfer privileged the European staff. They could 
resign at any time and receive financial compensation for the loss of their territorial 
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post.77  African government employees, too, could resign at any time but they were not 
entitled to the same compensation. Many did not want to work for the federal government 
and many African federal employees, including medical workers, resigned rather than 
work for the federal government. This was despite the lack of alternative employment in 
some areas. Some proceeded to devote their time to anti-federal activities.78 Malawian 
doctor Austin Mkandawire who trained as a medical assistant in 1950, wrote in his 
memoir that most auxiliaries did not want to work for the federal government. However, 
he also recognized that for many, resigning in protest was not an option and that 
individual material conditions drove their decision to resign or to “stick it out.”79 Even so, 
an astonishing fifty-six percent of African medical staff in Nyasaland refused to transfer 
to the federal staff.80    
 The temporary transfers created problems for the federal service administrators. 
Officers could choose to either transfer permanently to the federal service or retire at any 
time prior to the expiry of the transfer period. This made it difficult for the service to 
forecast recruitment needs. It also contributed to an ongoing chronic shortage of 
professional biomedical expertise as officers took advantage of the generous monetary 
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compensation available. This would create problems for the federal service as it 
attempted to build a “great health service” in the years to come.81 
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Chapter Three. 
Creating a “Great Health Service,” 1954 – 1958 
 
  
 The federal government assumed responsibility for providing health services on 
the first day of July 1954. The health department set about creating a health service 
befitting the government’s view of the Federation as a modern, rapidly developing nation. 
In this vision, the hospital loomed large. It was visible evidence of the Federation’s 
intention to improve the health of its people but also functioned as a marker of 
modernity.1 At the same time, the health service looked to expand training of African 
medical personnel. Providing career opportunities for Africans provided proof of the 
Federation’s commitment to “partnership.” The reality was rather more checkered. The 
uncertainties and suspicions that federating health had fostered, persisted and grew in the 
early years of the Federation. Staff turnover was high causing instability and prejudicing 
the formation of a unified medical community. In addition, the health service pursued 
policies that raised concerns from the wider public about its ability to address local needs 
and contributed to the growing marginalization of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.  
 Central to the health department’s imagination of a national health service was the 
construction of significant infrastructure. As a consequence, the department launched an 
ambitious schedule of hospital and clinic building in urban and rural areas. The emphasis 
on improving healthcare facilities was important to the federal government because it was 
one way in which the Federation could appear to be a legitimate candidate for greater 
political autonomy from Britain. The ability to provide improved health care could 
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demonstrate that the federal government was capable of taking over the Colonial Office’s 
role in looking after the interests and welfare of its African subjects and so strengthen the 
case for eventually attaining dominion status within the empire.  
 The federal health department inherited development plans for new hospitals from 
the colonial governments. Each government had started construction of substantial 
hospitals for their African populations in major cities. Two were in Southern Rhodesia, 
one on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, and one in Nyasaland. The hospitals became 
showcases for the Federal Health service’s professed commitment to improve healthcare 
and became symbols of the biopolitical face of the Federation and its intention to promote 
life and health in its population.2  
 From the Health Ministry’s perspective, the completion of the hospitals 
represented the pinnacle of achievement for the health service.3 No matter that they had 
been conceived of prior to federation. The federal government claimed the credit. The 
opening ceremony of each was a lavish affair, attended by the Governor-General of the 
Federation, Lord Dalhousie, senior government ministers, and prominent European and 
African dignitaries. In his opening speeches, Lord Dalhousie emphasized the 
magnificence of the buildings and pointed to the hospitals as symbols of the “growing 
civilization of this young country” and as evidence of the federal government’s intention 
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to provide more health facilities across the Federation.4 The pomp and circumstance that 
surrounded the opening of the African hospitals also illustrates the centrality of the 
hospital in the settler vision of health. In each of the speeches at the various opening 
ceremonies, Lord Dalhousie emphasized the hospitals as sites of technological expertise 
being equipped with specialized departments of medicine and surgery but also as a haven 
for the sick to recover and reclaim their place in society.5 Paying attention to the moral 
economy underlying these speeches illustrates the extent to which the political economy 
of health had shifted since the early colonial period. Rather than primarily privileging the 
health of Europeans and African laborers, the developmental ethos that emerged in the 
wake of the Second World War viewed healthier African societies as crucial to the 
success of the colonial state.6  
 The hospitals also demonstrate that there was a growing emphasis on a limited 
number of large hospitals in the 1950s.7 The hospitals were designed to serve as the 
central referral facility for surrounding settlements. In practice, this meant development 
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plans for smaller hospitals in neighboring towns were often shelved, raising concerns 
about the willingness of the federal health department to pay attention to local needs. As 
one federal MP questioned, "are we serving the population or are we serving the name of 
a town or one particular Ministry?"8 In particular, the construction of the Kitwe hospital 
in Northern Rhodesia angered residents and local authorities in the neighboring town of 
Ndola. When building started in Kitwe, it soon became apparent Ndola was not going to 
get a replacement for the very dilapidated existing African hospital. Elite Africans and 
the town council launched a scathing attack on the federal Ministry of Health and on 
Federation itself. This was noteworthy because the platform for this attack was the 
normally pro-Federation newspaper, The Northern News. 
 The existing African hospital in Ndola was over 20 years old and in a state of 
extreme disrepair. When the Ndola council asked the federal government for a new 
hospital, the request was refused on the grounds that funds had been committed 
elsewhere.9 Throughout the winter of 1955, the Northern News carried ever more 
emotionally charged articles depicting the deplorable conditions at the hospital. One 
article described the hospital like a “scene from the Crimea.”10 Another suggested that the 
federal government’s refusal was the “high price of Federation.” A third asserted that the 
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  Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federal Assembly, “Health and Medical 
Services,” Debates of the Federal Assembly (Salisbury: Government Printer, April 9 
1960), 756.	  
9	  Private Secretary to Minister of Health to Private Secretary to Minister of Transport and 
Communications, May 13, 1955, Welensky Papers, Box 358.	  
10	  “Tour of Ndola African Hospital like a scene from the Crimea,” Northern News, June 
16, 1955, Welensky Papers, Box 358. 
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federal government was “morally bound to … build this hospital.”11 Editorials and 
columnists argued that the failure to provide funds for a new hospital would stall the 
future development of Ndola and of the colony as a whole. One editorial said,  
“Let the [Health] Minister and his Department understand clearly that treatment of 
this kind is NOT acceptable. Unless health services (particularly hospitals) with 
roads and education are adequate to the need, the development of this country is 
endangered. In cases as urgent as Ndola’s the excuse that there is no money is just 
not acceptable. The money simply must be found.”12 
 
When an outbreak of smallpox occurred in the midst of the furor, critics of the federal 
government were quick to say that the epidemic was inevitable given the conditions in 
the hospital. One editorial was particularly critical, saying that the government had been 
fully aware of the deplorable state of the hospital at the start of 1954 and twenty months 
later nothing had been done.13 In the event, the African residents of Ndola never got their 
new hospital during the federal period. It was still on the backlog of construction when 
the Federation was dissolved in 1963.14 
 The large central hospitals that were built also demonstrate that clinical spaces in 
the Federation remained deeply segregated. Mpilo and Harari hospitals in Southern 
Rhodesia only treated Africans. While the hospitals in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
were nominally multiracial, there were separate wards and even separate kitchens for the 
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  “High price of Federation,” Northern News, June 16, 1955, Welensky Papers, Box 358; 
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  “The hospital must be built,” Northern News, June 15, 1955, Welensky Papers, Box 
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  “The warnings were in vain,” Northern News, September 22, 1955, Welensky Papers, 
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preparation of patients’ food.15 This policy persisted despite acknowledgements from the 
Minister for Health that such arrangements were far more inefficient and costly to 
provide than integrated services.16 It seems that although funds could not be found to 
replace seriously deficient African hospitals, money was available to provide services in 
a way that maintained the settler colonial order of segregation. 
 The opening of the hospitals also allowed the Federal Health Service to claim that 
it had fulfilled a longstanding promise to offer state registered nurse training to African 
women. Calls for state registered training of African nurses actually predated federation 
by at least a decade. In the late 1930s, European patients, nursing staff, and elite Africans 
all urged the medical director in Southern Rhodesia to start training African nurses.17 The 
ethos behind these calls was that by training African nurses, there would be more 
European nurses available to care for white patients. It was never envisaged that African 
nurses should directly care for white bodies.18 As already noted, there was a chronic 
shortage of qualified nurses exacerbated by a restrictive labor policy that kept 
professional nursing as the preserve of white women and policies that insisted nurses 
resigned when they got married.19 The Federal Health Service, then, inherited a chronic 
and continuing problem. The expansion of the service to include health care provision for 
the entire Federation only made matters worse. Prior to federation, the Southern 
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  Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federal Assembly, “Health Services: Separate 
Services,” Debates of the Federal Assembly (Salisbury: Government Printer, August 9 
1961), 641-642. 
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  Masakure, “One of the most serious problems confronting us at present”, 128. 
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  Ibid.	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Rhodesian service directly recruited its nursing staff from both within and outside of the 
colony. In contrast, the medical services of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had access 
to an empire-wide labor pool of nursing staff managed by the colonial nursing service in 
London. A change in policy within the colonial nursing service meant that by the early 
1950s, applicants to the service were only offered positions in those colonies that did not 
have their own training schools. This excluded dominions and colonies such as Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, and Southern Rhodesia. When the federal government took over 
responsibility for healthcare provision, it also took over the recruitment of its medical 
staff. Hence Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were removed from the colonial nursing 
service list of available postings for recruits. This narrowed the pool of potential recruits 
for those colonies. 
 All of the large central urban hospitals were designed with the intention that they 
should become sites for training professional African nurses. However, on their 
completion, training was restricted to those hospitals built in Southern Rhodesia. Why the 
federal health department did not start state registered training in the northern territories 
is not entirely clear. For political reasons, the initiation of state registered nurse training 
for Africans at multiracial hospitals (but with segregated wards and kitchens etc), would 
have reflected well on a federal government that was supposed to be committed to the 
creation of a multiracial society.20 In the case of the hospital in Nyasaland, one excuse 
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given was the lack of sufficiently educated applicants.21 This is plausible given the long 
neglect of colonial governments to provide education for their African populations. But 
just a few years later, after gaining independence, Malawi opened a school on the premise 
that they had enough qualified applicants making that excuse less credible.22 A second 
reason expressed was that the hospital did not offer sufficient diversity in care to provide 
proper training.23 This is somewhat surprising given that the hospital was one of the four 
celebrated at its opening as a site of modern, biomedical expertise. In the case of the 
Kitwe hospital in Northern Rhodesia, promises were continually made but training never 
materialized.24 The excuse was that the school did not have formal recognition from the 
General Nursing Council (GNC) in Britain. While recognition was considered important 
because it conferred legitimacy on the training program, it was not essential. The primary 
reason for pursuing recognition was that graduates would be qualified to work in British 
hospitals.25 Given the shortages in the federal nursing service, recognition conferring the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Annual Reports on Public Health, 1958 
(BOA), 	  
22	  “National School of Nursing,” CAJM, 11,9 (1965), 271. 
23	  “Consideration of the Report of Commission of Inquiry into Health and Medical 
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  Mr. Yamba, African Federal MP for Northern Rhodesia, argued that training of nurses 
should be carried out in Kitwe because the completion rate would be much higher if 
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ability of federal nurses to work in Britain would perhaps have been counter-productive.  
In any case, the ministry was not prepared to start training until this recognition had been 
received.  The GNC refused to extend recognition to the Kitwe school because at the 
time, there was no legitimate examining body or means of medical registration in 
Northern Rhodesia. There was no medical council and the council in Southern Rhodesia 
had no jurisdiction outside of that country’s borders.26 The GNC recommended that the 
Kitwe school should open anyway and begin training students while working towards 
GNC recognition but this advice was ignored.27 This inflexibility was a hallmark of 
health care policies in the federal era, a trait that was to become more apparent in the later 
years of federation. The insistence on getting GNC recognition prior to opening the 
Kitwe school also underscores the extent to which the senior health officials in the 
Federal Health Service were concerned with demonstrating that the federal service was 
one that adhered to international standards. This was an important part of legitimizing the 
decision to federate health and also conferred legitimacy on the Federation itself.  
 The failure to open professional nurse training schools in the northern hospitals 
increased the inequality of health provision within the Federation. The northern hospitals 
did not benefit from the contribution that students made to health care provision, a 
resource that became more important in the later years of the Federation. By 1962, for 
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instance, Southern Rhodesia benefited from the labor of more than three hundred African 
student nurses. This number is equal to the total number of qualified nurses working in 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia combined for that year.28 What is more, the decision 
not to establish professional nurse training schools in the northern territories meant that 
when the Federation was dissolved and Zambia and Malawi attained their independence, 
neither country had the capacity to train professional nurses of their own. This meant they 
had to enter a very competitive global market place in order to procure sufficient nursing 
staff. Thus the failure of the Federal Health Service to train African professional nurses in 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland can be seen as evidence of a growing marginalization 
of the northern territories through policies that disproportionately benefited Southern 
Rhodesia.  
  
Planning a Medical School 
 The architects of the Federal Health Service viewed the lack of a medical school 
in the Federation as a significant gap in their idealized vision of a health service.29 In part, 
this reflected an awareness of the role of training doctors as evidence of a modern, 
functional health delivery system.30  At the same time a growing international body of 
opinion asserted that a medical school was best established in those countries with a 
developed economy, a robust tax structure, sufficient investment in secondary education 
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taught in a European language, and strong institutional ties to a medical faculty in the 
metropolis.31 From this perspective, a medical school was an important marker that a 
nation had reached a certain level of development. It signaled both modernity and a 
commitment to provision of health care. It was also evidence of a vision of health that 
privileged the western trained doctor as the primary locus of biomedical authority.32 The 
impetus for a medical school further reflected a growing pragmatic awareness within the 
elite federal medical community of the need to train African doctors and nurses. The 
federal service was simply not able to recruit sufficient European medical personnel.   
 The principal of the newly opened multiracial University College of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland endorsed the need to train African doctors.33 At a dinner of the Southern 
Rhodesian Medical Association, Dr. Adams asserted that the school would encourage 
research into diseases of the tropics, allow a curriculum to be designed suitable for 
Central Africa, and lastly and most importantly, facilitate the training of African doctors. 
Indeed, he was of the opinion that African doctors were necessary to “provide full 
physical and psychological health for a population of six million Africans.”34 In reply, 
Lord Malvern, the federal Prime Minister, said that “the government had decided that 
Africans should become doctors…. that there was no colour bar in disease and medicine 
was one of those professions that showed no distinctions.” Malvern said that after 
Africans had completed the lengthy training, “the only decision that could be made was 
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to accept him on the same grade [of pay] as a European doctor.”35 In fact, doctors were 
the only Africans in the civil service who were automatically accepted into the highest 
branch of the Federal Civil Service after its reorganization in 1956. What is revealing 
about this exchange is that it both maintained the progressive idea of African 
advancement that was supposed to underpin “partnership” but also perpetuated the 
segregation that the white settler regime desired. Yes, Africans should be doctors but 
their role was to be that of general medical practitioners of their own people. As much as 
the elite medical community believed in the innate superiority of the expatriate, white, 
European doctor, it also realized that their parallel vision of a universal health care 
system in which all hospitals and at least the larger clinics contained qualified medical 
personnel was unattainable unless they were willing to acknowledge the potential utility 
of African trained doctors and nurses. Anne Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper have 
suggested that colonizers altered their visions and reexamined their own hegemony when 
faced with difficulties and challenges of colonial rule.36 In the Central African 
Federation, the challenges of providing health care for six million Africans forced the 
elite medical community to acknowledge the need to train African doctors but within a 
context of a settler state, this acknowledgement seems to have been qualified and the 
altered vision, partial. African doctors would provide care for African patients, primarily 
in rural hospitals where their presence would not challenge the existing complex medical 
hierarchy. Indeed, the relocation of the first African doctor to work for the Federal Health 
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Service, Dr. Tichafa Samuel Parirenyatwa, to a rural hospital in the extreme southwest of 
the country in the “interests of race relations” supports this contention.37  
 By 1956, the drive towards establishing the medical school was well underway. 
The Nuffield Foundation in Britain agreed to fund a planning committee to advise the 
University College on the “desirability and practicability of establishing” such a school.38 
During the following year, the committee undertook an extensive tour of the Federation 
visiting major towns, hospitals, and clinics. The committee’s findings, drafted in two 
reports published in 1958 and 1959, recommended that the establishment of a medical 
school was urgently required to address the severe shortages of doctors in the 
Federation’s government service. The report argued that shortages of doctors had lowered 
standards of care and created inequality between the numbers of doctors in major towns 
and those in rural areas. The committee noted that in Southern Rhodesia, the 
concentration of doctors in the large urban centers meant than half the doctors were 
serving less than five percent of the population.39 The committee also argued that training 
overseas did not provide the local knowledge so important for understanding the 
epidemiological, environmental, and social conditions in which doctors within the 
Federation would practice.40 The committee concluded that adding yet more 
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infrastructure in the form of patient beds within the context of personnel shortage and 
without establishing proper medical training programs was akin to adding to the 
“superstructure when the foundations are faulty” and that it was better to “make the 
foundations firm and strong” thereby, over time generating a sustainable improvement in 
quality and quantity of health service delivery systems.41  
	   Where, exactly, in the Federation the medical school was to be sited was a matter 
of some debate. While the site of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 
Salisbury appeared to dictate that the Southern Rhodesian capital was the obvious choice, 
it was not a foregone conclusion. Livingstone and Lusaka in Northern Rhodesia and 
Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia were all candidates. In the end the committee endorsed 
the choice of Salisbury. While building the medical school there made sense given the 
ties between it and the new university, the decision almost certainly further enhanced the 
view among Northern Rhodesian Africans of Salisbury as Bamba Zonke (take all).42 
Selected as the federal capital and the principle business center, Salisbury received the 
lion’s share of federal investment in better transport infrastructure as well as significant 
expansion in service industries, manufacturing, and housing.43   
 The proposed medical school fit the federal vision of healthcare in a number of 
ways. A relationship with the University of Birmingham in Britain meant its graduates 
could receive a British accredited degree. This ensured that they would receive the 
international recognition deemed so important for career advancement. It would provide a 
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cadre of African doctors to carry out the bulk of medical care for African patients thus 
providing evidence of the Federation’s commitment to partnership. Lastly, its situation in 
Salisbury furthered the vision of the Federation’s capital as the primary site of biomedical 
expertise. Salisbury was already home to a major African hospital, the headquarters of 
the Federal Health Service, and the prestigious Bilharzial Research laboratory. The 
placement of the medical school in the Federation’s capital also promised the 
construction of a large university teaching hospital at some time in the future. 
 Furthermore, the establishment of a multiracial medical school was also a way to 
impress on the outside world that the Federation was a modern, fast developing nation 
intent on maintaining world class standards. It also illustrates the extent to which the 
federal leaders were aware of how the promise of healthcare and professional medical 
training had the potential to elevate the international standing of the Federation. On a 
visit to Birmingham University, Roy Welensky asserted that   
“we are a British country, and because we have British standards, it is vital that 
the training institutions we set up in the Federation … should be of the quality 
you insist upon here… I am far from unhopeful of our success, both in matching 
political progress to ability and in maintaining British standards. Already we have 
a network of hospitals and medical posts which offer to the African people of the 
Federation probably the finest health service on the Continent of Africa… 
Our medical school is a great act of faith, not only in the physical development of 
the Federation, but, as we take it, in the honesty of our purpose in making 
partnership between the races a reality for the first time in Africa….to provide 
training and opportunity for the men and women of our country, of whatever race, 
to raise them up from low standards to high, to fit them for participation in all 
sections of a civilised life…. That, in simple terms, is what we are doing in the 
Federation.”44  
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This rhetoric encapsulates the way in which the white settler elite appropriated the 
progressive language of development and African advancement to present an image of 
the Federation that would be acceptable to an international audience grown skeptical of 
colonialism and empire. It also underscores the way in which the language of 
qualifications and standards replaced the language of race in public life. In this 
formulation, access to advanced, professional medical training was open to anyone with 
sufficient qualifications. The reality, of course, was that, as already noted, long colonial 
neglect of education meant that few Africans were suitably qualified. 
 
The Failure to build a Medical Community 
 The shortage of European doctors providing the impetus for the planning of the 
medical school was due, in part, to the deteriorating relations between the Ministry of 
Health and its staff. From the outset, the suspicion and uncertainty surrounding the 
process of federating health helped foster a geographic rivalry and an “us and them” 
mentality within the service. There was widespread dissatisfaction among the European 
medical staff with the federal takeover of health. Some European doctors in Nyasaland 
and Northern Rhodesia complained of the “new Rhodesian ways.”45 William Petrie, a 
long serving colonial doctor summed up the feelings of the colonial staff in Nyasaland: 
“since we have been Federated with the other two Rhodesias, the Nyasaland MOs 
(who are in the Colonial Service) have felt that we are not wanted – while the 
Rhodesians think that the Colonials don’t want to join in Federation. 
Unfortunately our chap at the head in Salisbury [Morris] has no interest in his 
M.Os as men and so there has been a steady drift away from Nyasaland of doctors 
who do not want to work under Federation. We have been given until 1959 to 
make our minds up. By that time I think there will be very few Colonials left. The 
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old friendly days have gone as far as our Dept. is concerned. The Federal salaries 
are to be less than what the Colonial ones were and no passage allowance home. 
The choice if you Federate is that Rhodesia becomes your home! So these are the 
reasons why we are so short staffed. The new chaps coming out are very 
inexperienced… In many ways I wish I was coming home earlier.”46 
 
This observation highlights a number of grievances that medical officers harbored while 
working for the federal service. It underscores the extent to which Nyasaland doctors felt 
marginalized and undervalued by a Health Ministry situated far away in Salisbury. In 
addition, it criticizes the senior management of the federal service for failing to foster a 
sense of esprit de corps within the service.47 Lastly it illustrates the extent to which 
doctors thought they were being underpaid. A perceived lack of competitiveness in 
federal terms and conditions was a major cause of the ongoing staff shortages. 
 Amongst the most senior staff, the major grievances were the loss of autonomy 
and the over centralization of the service as well as its bureaucratic nature. The Directors 
of Medicine reported to Morris, the Secretary of Health, in Salisbury and were required to 
seek his approval for any expenditure or decision. This resulted in delays and effectively 
rendered the directors powerless. It also probably contributed to the unusually high 
turnover in the Director of Medicine post in Nyasaland during the first few years of the 
Federation. The DMS of Nyasaland at the start of federation had been in charge of 
medical services in Nyasaland since 1949. By the end of 1955, he had gone, as had his 
deputy (and the DMS of Northern Rhodesia). Nyasaland had no less than four directors 
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  This was also a common complaint amongst medical officers in Northern Rhodesia. 
The Zambezi Branch of the British Medical Association, Memorandum, March, 18 1960 
in Report – Appendix VIII, Evidence, Volume II, Northern Rhodesia, (London: HM 
Stationary Office, 1960), 129-130. 	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between 1955 and 1957.48 One only stayed three months having done an about turn in his 
opinion of the Ministry. Having been strongly in favor of officers of the colonial service 
transferring to the federal service, he resigned declaring that he would rather have a 
“bullet in his back than continue to work under Salisbury’s dictation.”49	   It was not until 
Sheffield, a transfer from Northern Rhodesia, halfway through 1956, that some stability 
returned to the medical leadership in Nyasaland. It is ironic that Petrie viewed Sheffield 
as very much a Rhodesian in the same mold as federal employees from Southern 
Rhodesia, despite the latter’s long service history in Northern Rhodesia. Petrie appears to 
have had a difficult working relationship with Sheffield, which, along with a growing 
disenchantment with the idea of federation, contributed to his decision to quit the service 
at end of 1957. Petrie came to believe that ““Federation” means – “all things to be done 
as in Southern Rhodesia” and his letters catalogue a number of instances where Petrie 
believed that the director was both over authoritative and unfair in his dealings with 
African staff.50 On one occasion, after objecting to the sacking of fifteen workmen, 
Sheffield told Petrie, “If you can’t carry out my orders, you may hand in your 
resignation.”51  
	   Replacements for departing doctors were federal employees. Some did not want 
to be in Nyasaland. They complained that they had been assured during the recruitment 
process at Rhodesia House in London that they would be posted to Southern Rhodesia. 
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original. 	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  Dr. W. Petrie to his mother, February 24, 1956. See also letters dated March 2, July 21 
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These newcomers often did not stay long and Petrie suggested that the false promise 
made by Rhodesia House was a deliberate and desperate ploy by the Federation to recruit 
doctors.52 Rhodesia House may have thought that Southern Rhodesia was a more 
attractive prospect to an incoming doctor given its comparatively sophisticated medical 
facilities, better opportunities for career advancement, and the larger European population 
that promised the benefit of private practice. Furthermore, the larger and more numerous 
towns in Southern Rhodesia meant that doctors were more likely to be posted in an urban 
area than in the more rural Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland.  
 In the case of Southern Rhodesia, there is evidence that government medical 
practitioners believed that the federal Ministry of Health privileged expenditure on health 
in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia over what they saw as necessary development in the 
south. There is also a suggestion that some Southern Rhodesian doctors looked down on 
their medical colleagues in the north and the health service that the territorial services in 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia had provided. One medical superintendent declared:   
“Those braggarts in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia are always dancing around 
their puny little hospitals singing proud songs about what great medical benefits they 
are bringing the Natives. No one seems to realize that we spen[t] more on the Native 
Hospital at Bulawayo in one year than the government of Nyasaland spen[t] on all 
their medical services for both white and black [before Federation].”53 
 
 The failure to foster a medical community within the medical professionals of 
Federal Health Service was both a cause of and a consequence of the chronic shortage of 
doctors. Indeed, the lack of esprit de corps alluded to, may, in part, have been a result of 
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the federal service’s inability to keep its medical personnel, creating conditions that 
further undermined any idea of community. Demoralized by the rapid turnover in staff 
and by a policy of recruiting inexperienced replacements for those who left, many 
government medical officers simply decided it was better to leave the service altogether. 
 African medical staff had varied reasons for discontent with their federal 
employers. For some, particularly in Nyasaland, it was part of a deeply held antipathy 
towards the Federation. African nationalists in the colony continued their resistance to the 
Federation after it had become a reality. Medical workers participated in widespread riots 
and demonstrations in many parts of the colony throughout 1953.54  By June 1958, the 
total number of medical employees in Nyasaland had dropped from 1241 in 1953 to less 
than 600, a loss of fifty percent. The vast majority of these were medical auxiliaries.  
 Many African medical staff considered the European doctors recruited by the 
federal service to be tainted by a white supremacist ideology. Austin Mkandawire, a 
medical assistant in Nyasaland during the Federation, referred to the federal period as one 
of  “racial suspicion and tension.”55 In one incident, a white male nurse discovered two 
students in possession of aspirin and band-aids. White police officers consequently 
arrested twenty-five trainee medical assistants on suspicion of petty theft and conducted a 
complete search of the students’ accomodation. Five students were sentenced to between 
three and five years imprisonment with hard labor.56 Mkandawire also recalled the racist 
attitude of federally recruited doctors towards him and his African colleagues as well as 
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  Ibid., 139. 
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  Ibid.	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towards the African patients.57 In his opinion, the new doctors had been “brainwashed” 
into believing Africans were inferior. One new recruit regularly called Africans “the 
scum of the earth.”58 Furthermore, Mkandawire said that European staff refused to let 
medical aides perform tasks that they were trained to carry out, eroding their 
responsibilities and that they were refused “simple job[s].”59  
 Mkandawire’s observations explain why so many Africans were suspicious of the 
racial “partnership” that federation had promised. It also underlines the extent to which 
Africans in Nyasaland viewed Federation as a white settler plan to dominate and 
subjugate the African population in Central Africa, and why so many African 
government employees in the colony participated in a widespread walkout from the 
federal service in 1959. It is important, however, not to attribute all grievances to the 
growing nationalist movement and anti-federation sentiment. Grievances with matters of 
pay and working conditions also played a part, even if some of these were entangled with 
negativity towards the Federation. 
 Soon after the Federation was established, an Interim Federal Public Service 
Commission had established a European pensionable branch of the Federal Civil Service 
while leaving existing arrangements for African employees in place. It was thought that 
in the short term it would be too disruptive to standardize Africans’ conditions of service 
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and so African employees retained their territorial terms.60 However, the creation of a 
European branch implied that it was closed to non-Europeans and hence was a violation 
of Article 40(2) of the federal constitution:  
“No person domiciled "within the Federation who is a subject of Her Majesty or a 
person under Her Majesty’s protection, shall on ground of race only be ineligible 
for employment in the Federal Public Service, and in appointing or 
recommending any person for such employment, regard shall be had only to his 
competence, experience and suitability.”61 
 
As a consequence, the Federal Civil Service was reorganized into four branches. All 
Europeans were automatically placed in Branch I, while the other three branches were 
effectively for non-Europeans. Importantly, while the reorganization was supposed to 
allow Africans the opportunity to reach pay parity with Europeans, in practice, non-
European doctors were the only occupation to be given automatic entry into Branch I. 
Illustrating the persistence of a colonial discourse about the African’s lack of a sense of 
responsibility, work ethic, and integrity, Branch II was presented as a proving ground for 
those Africans whose occupations would have gained them access to the top tier if they 
had been white. For the health department, this meant that, apart from doctors, all 
professionally trained African medical staff such as nurses and midwives, was placed in 
Branch II until such time as they had proven their ability to handle the responsibilities of 
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the position. This was for a period of not less than two years.62 Medical auxiliaries were 
placed in Branch III regardless of the differences in job functions.63  
 The exclusion of Africans from the top most branch of the civil service until they 
had “proved their worth” can be viewed as an example of the way the white elite in the 
Federation professed a progressive agenda while at the same time perpetuating the 
colonial hierarchy. At the same time it continued a colonial practice of unequal pay for 
equal work. Prior to the reorganization of the civil service, the very few African state 
registered nurses working in the health service were paid less than half of that of 
European nurses on the same grade.64 While reorganization purported to remove this 
difference, in practice, the placement of African nurses into Branch II allowed the 
differential in pay to remain. At the end of 1959, there were 52 African state registered 
nurses working in the federal service.65 Of these, only fourteen had been promoted into 
Branch I by the end of the following year.66  
 The status of medical auxiliaries was also undermined in Nyasaland in the federal 
period.67 Prior to federation, training for hospital assistants, the most prestigious of 
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auxiliary positions, was a two-year extension of that given to medical aides. Competition 
for places in the program was extremely competitive. Mkandawire was one of only four 
graduates from the medical aide course to be considered for the hospital assistant’s 
course.68 During the Federation, the training for hospital assistants was reduced from four 
years to three.69 In addition, their qualification was reduced in value. They were no 
longer recognized as hospital assistants. Their certification referred to them as medical 
assistants, a title with less status. It also did not give them the privilege to practice 
medicine, surgery, or midwifery, and they were no longer entitled to be registered under 
the Medical Practitioners and Dental Act of 1924.70 Federation partnership policies were 
supposed to supersede the existing racial policies that limited employment opportunities 
for Africans and subjected them to unequal pay and working conditions. As 
Mkanadwire’s evidence illustrates, in practice, partnership appeared to be an empty 
promise.  
 
Rural Health and Missions 
 The worsening relations between African staff and their federal employees 
created problems for a Federal Health Service whose vision also embraced the increase of 
rural health facilities.71 The service embarked on a program of upgrading and building of 
smaller health units across the Federation but faced significant difficulties in ensuring 
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that they were staffed. Questions about the lack of staff at rural medical facilities were a 
regular feature in the debates of the Federal Assembly.72 
 In Northern Rhodesia, health units often took the form of one room functioning as 
a dispensary, with small wards either side with perhaps three beds in each. In Nyasaland, 
the unit was brought into line with the design of small rural hospitals in Southern 
Rhodesia. U- shaped, the wards formed the wings and the outpatient and treatment rooms 
were in the center. A central feature of this layout was the health lecture room.73 In the 
late colonial period, in British Central Africa, the nascent moral order of biomedicine 
meshed with a medical paternalism to privilege the hospital as a site of health education. 
Rural hospitals functioned as conduits for disseminating the value of biomedicine but 
also for educating what was viewed as “the primitive groups of the population” about 
standards of hygiene and cleanliness.74  
 In Northern Rhodesia the number of rural health clinics and dispensaries 
increased by sixteen percent between 1954 and 1958.75 The rate of expansion could not 
keep pace with demand. While rural clinics provided 950 beds, they consistently operated 
at more than 130 percent of capacity.76 In Nyasaland, greater urgency was given to 
upgrading facilities, as the absolute number of clinics did not increase substantially in the 
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same period.77 Examining the usage of rural health facilities in Nyasaland is also 
illuminating. According to one survey, the rural government health units in the colony 
operated at fifty percent of capacity.78 By comparison, the number of beds in medical 
missions operated at 173 percent of capacity.79 This discrepancy points to the continuing 
importance of missions for providing the bulk of healthcare but could also be indicative 
of a preference of Africans to use missions rather than government facilities. Reasons for 
this could include the antipathy of many Nyasaland Africans towards federation, the 
perceived anti-federation stance of many missions (particularly the Scottish missions), 
and simply because Africans were accustomed to getting their health care from the 
mission sector.80  
 The urgent need to train medical auxiliaries required health administrators to 
make choices about how to fill available places in training schools. There had long been a 
belief within colonial medical circles that training should aim for quality over quantity. 
Missionary doctor, J Howard Cook recommended that training should aim to produce a 
“few thoroughly dependable workers rather than a [larger] number of less reliable 
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[ones].”81 Cook also recommended that candidates should be carefully selected based on 
their character and that strict moral supervision was needed during the training period.82 
This observation was based on long-standing stereotypical ideas about the African’s 
weak work ethic and lack of moral character. The African, it was thought, was reluctant 
to take on responsibility, particularly that which came with health work. A medical 
superintendent in Southern Rhodesia explained to his American visitor in late 1953 that 
hospital trained male orderlies were sent out to the eighty-eight clinics and hospitals 
scattered throughout the colony but that “native boys being what they are, they require a 
lot of replacements.”83 This view surfaced again as African qualified nurses began to 
enter the workforce. That some seemed to “shirk [their] responsibilities” was seen as only 
“to be expected” at first.”84  
 The comprehensive health service that the federal health department promised to 
provide could not be achieved without a substantial contribution from missions in both 
provision and training. As in the earlier colonial period, the federal government continued 
a long-standing practice of subsidizing training programs in missions using grants-in-aid. 
Funding from the colonial governments for mission medical work had increased in the 
post war period as changing imperial visions of health dictated greater attention to the 
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health of colonial populations.85 The federal government increased funding for missions 
in 1954, increasing the maintenance grant for each bed by fifty percent, allowing many to 
expand services and facilities.86 Between 1953 and 1958, federal aid to missions grew by 
two-thirds in Southern and Northern Rhodesia and by eighty-five percent in Nyasaland 
reflecting the dominance of the mission sector in that colony.87 A portion of the funding 
available went towards the training of medical and maternity assistants and a number of 
missions started training schools in the 1950s.88 However, there is evidence that this 
generally positive picture obscures the situation with individual missions, as there is 
anecdotal evidence that some missions actually had funding cut at some time in the 
federal era.89  
 The money received for training represented a financial lifeline for missions who 
were often fiscally constrained. Chilonga mission in Northern Rhodesia for instance, 
received a grant of £180 to train medical assistants and pay trainees wages. Without this 
funding, the hospital could not have continued to function.90 Training, too, helped with 
staffing issues in mission hospitals as students contributed to the provision of care.  
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Mission and government interests were both served by this financial arrangement, but it 
came at a cost of greater government intervention into the health work of missions. In 
order to receive enhanced funding for training, missions had to ensure there were 
sufficient beds and qualified staff available in their hospitals to provide an acceptable 
standard of training. They also had to teach to a standardized curriculum.91  
 The need to ensure that a mission hospital was sufficiently staffed to offer training 
presented a stumbling block for many missions. While some had doctors and nurses who 
stayed for many years providing much needed stability and continuance of service, others 
struggled in this regard. The geographic remoteness of some missions, length of tenure, 
funding, and personal circumstances could affect the degree to which medical missions 
enjoyed good levels of staffing. The example of the Church of Scotland missions in 
Northern Rhodesia illustrates some of this difficulty. The church ran three mission 
hospitals in the north west of the country but contributed very little to their running costs. 
At Chitambo, the mission only paid the salaries of one doctor and one staff nurse and the 
hospital was reliant on federal government grants for all other funding. The situation 
reached a crisis point in 1959 and a choice had to be made to either cut the numbers of 
beds or to introduce user fees. The latter option was contentious because the local 
population had built Chitambo hospital under the promise of free health care in return for 
their labor. However, faced with the prospect of closing the hospital, it was decided to 
introduce a small fee. The decision resulted in a backlash from local people who 
boycotted the hospital, and from the federal government who already viewed the Scottish 
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missions with suspicion because of their alleged support for African nationalism.92  In 
addition to the funding issue, Chitambo mission had ongoing difficulties in providing the 
requisite numbers of staff needed to secure government recognition of its training school. 
This recognition was important to secure vital government funding. In order to qualify, 
mission hospitals with between 70 and 80 beds were required to have one doctor and 
three nursing sisters.93 Again, in 1959, the prospect of yet another doctor resigning from 
Chitambo mission endangered the government funding. In the end some skillful 
negotiations with the medical department secured the recognition of training contingent 
on another nursing sister being found.94  
  
 By the end of 1958, there was a deep divide between the Federal Health Service’s 
celebratory narrative of success and the realities of health service provision. The Federal 
Health Service was close to breaking point. Relations between African staff and their 
European supervisors in Nyasaland had deteriorated to the extent that one medical aide 
declared that anyone “who saw the fine work of the medical service 10 to 20 yrs ago 
would be shocked to see the present state of affairs of it and would probably refuse to 
rejoin it even for a thousand dollars a month.”95 The department lacked support from both 
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within and without the service. Internally, the deep divisions and widespread 
dissatisfaction caused a rapid turnover in staff and contributed to an ongoing shortage of 
medical expertise. To critics outside the service it represented a failure of federation 
itself.  
 The fortunes of the Federation were also fading. Economic depression between 
1956 and 1958 led to a decreasing confidence in the prospects for the developing nation. 
Politically, too, 1958 was a turning point. African nationalists widely condemned changes 
to the federal constitution that threatened African representation in the federal 
government. In Southern Rhodesia, the ousting from power of the supposedly pro-
African Garfield Todd by right wing political factions together with the emergence of the 
Reconstituted African Congress galvanized African nationalists in the colony.96 In 
Nyasaland, African nationalism resurged with the return of Hastings Banda to 
Nyasaland.97 The colonial governments of Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia 
also proposed changes to the composition of their legislative councils that seemingly 
further entrenched white minority power. Furthermore, Welensky, premier of the federal 
government, was increasingly vocal about demands for dominion status for the 
Federation.98 The scene was set, therefore for political turbulence in the years to come.  
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Chapter Four. 
The Struggle to Maintain a Colonial Medical Order, 1959 – 1963 
 
  
 Writing on the impending retirement of the First federal Secretary of Health at the 
end of 1958, the Central African Journal of Medicine, opined: 
“[Morris] leaves a fine medical service, one of the best in the colonial empire fully 
up to strength, and one for which this country has much reason to be grateful. 
Southern Rhodesia especially is noted for its good race relations between the white 
and black sections of its population and in our opinion no other department has 
done as much as his with its doctors and nurses to bring about this happy state of 
affairs.”1  
 
 The events of 1959 and onwards would shatter this illusion. As the Federation 
plunged into political chaos and lurched towards dissolution, the Federal Health Service 
found it increasingly difficult to fulfill its obligations. What had long been a chronic 
condition of understaffing became an acute crisis as many expatriate and African staff 
left the service and recruitment significantly slowed.  
 Furthermore, the health service came under attack from many quarters. Elite 
Africans and European critics of federation called attention to the failings of the health 
department and increasingly pointed to issues of access to health care and health 
professions as a means of exposing the contradictions and hypocrisies of federation. 
Critics used the Federal Assembly and two important commissions into federal functions 
as platforms for airing their grievances. The 1959 Morton Commission was a wide-
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ranging investigation into the functioning of the government health service. The 
Monckton Commission of 1960 was a comprehensive commentary on the Federation as a 
political unit but one in which matters of health emerged as a central issue.  
 Under siege, the federal government responded to criticism of its health service 
by launching vigorous recruitment campaigns and introducing structural changes 
designed to make employment in the service more attractive. Crucially, these responses 
were generally aimed at attracting more expatriate professionals rather than building a 
base of African expertise. Despite the rhetoric of partnership and the stated intention of 
expanding training and providing career opportunities for Africans, the response is best 
understood as a desire to maintain colonial medical hierarchies and perpetuate the settler 
colonial order. 
    
The Crisis of Staffing 
 The acute crisis in staffing erupted in the middle of 1959. Two primary factors 
contributed to its timing; the expiry of the temporary transfer of territorial staff to the 
Federal Health Service at the end of June and the political turmoil generated by a surge in 
African nationalist activism from the start of the year.  
 In January 1959, the leaders of the African Congress parties in Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, Kenneth Kaunda and Hastings Kamuzu Banda, returned from the Accra 
All-African People’s Conference invigorated and motivated to escalate the struggle for 
self-government and constitutional reform. Time was short. A comprehensive review of 
the Federation and its constitution was scheduled for 1960 and African nationalists feared 
that the British government would yield to federal demands for dominion status, resulting 
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in the “perpetual subjugation” of Africans to the white settler regime.2 During the first 
two months of the year, tension rose in the colonies as Kaunda and Banda launched 
verbally aggressive attacks on the Federation and its supporters. Neither leader explicitly 
endorsed the use of violence to achieve their aims. Nevertheless, the protests and 
demonstrations, which were part of the ensuing campaigns of civil unrest carried an 
underlying threat of force.3 
 The intensity of the nationalist campaigns invoked a robust response from the 
colonial and federal governments. In Northern Rhodesia, the Zambian African National 
Congress was banned and its leader, Kaunda, imprisoned. In Nyasaland, the governor, 
with federal backing, prepared a crackdown on the Malawi Congress party based on the 
understanding that Congress was “bent on pursuing a course of violence, intimidation, 
and disregard of lawful authority.”4 In Southern Rhodesia, the government banned the 
Reconstituted Congress Party, declared a state of emergency, and mobilized federal 
troops to support the Nyasaland government.5 On March 3rd, the Nyasaland governor 
declared a state of emergency. In the aftermath of the declaration, colonial military and 
police forces detained more than 1300 people. Fifty-one lost their lives and a further 
seventy-nine suffered gunshot injuries in action that was reminiscent of the British 
response to Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya.6  
 The governor of Nyasaland later asserted that he had declared a state of 
emergency based on intelligence that a plot existed to murder all Europeans if Banda was 
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arrested. According to an informer for Special Branch, on a designated day, “R-day,” 
between ten and twenty-four days after Banda’s arrest, a coordinated uprising of 
sustained violence including the murder of women and children would sweep the colony. 
According to the Special Branch Report: 
 “Each District Chairman was responsible for murdering his own DC or where there 
was a PC, the PC and his staff first, followed by the Police Officer and then any 
other European. In the township areas there was to be widespread murder of 
Europeans and Asians. H.B. Chipembere said the murders were to include all 
women and children. Their bodies were to be mutilated and then burned if 
possible.”7 
 
 The Devlin Commission, appointed by the British government to investigate the 
emergency was extremely critical of the colonial government’s handling of the situation. 
It referred to the colony as a police state and concluded that there was little credible 
evidence to suggest that “R-day” referred to a timed murder plot.8 As the Devlin report 
noted and oral sources later confirmed, “R-day” actually marked the ending of the 
arrangement by which government employees had been temporarily transferred to the 
federal civil service.9  “R-day,” on June 30th, was the last day for medical staff to elect to 
make their temporary transfer permanent. Those who did not wish to do so had to resign 
on, or before that date.10  
 Large numbers of African and expatriate medical workers resigned from the 
federal health department on “R-day,” turning what was a chronic shortage of staff into a 
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crisis that threatened to cripple the service. The effect of “R-day” was the opposite of 
what the newly appointed Secretary for Health, Dyson Blair, had expected.  Blair thought 
that the end of the temporary transfer arrangement would help to build a unified medical 
community saying, “Finally, all the staff of all races will have one loyalty to the federal 
service.”11 Blair appears to have seriously miscalculated the extent to which neither 
expatriate nor African staff wished to be part of the service. 
 The crisis in staffing did not occur without warning. In Nyasaland, less than half 
of African medical workers had transferred to the service in 1953. By the end of 1956, 
only thirty-eight percent of expatriate medical officers in the Federation had accepted 
federal terms. Most were stationed in Southern Rhodesia. Only twenty-two percent of 
officers in Northern Rhodesia and none of those in Nyasaland had transferred. A full one-
third had left the service altogether. There were warnings that if this pattern was repeated 
in 1959, at the end of the transfer period, “the already serious staff situation … will 
become catastrophic.”12 The question is why didn’t the health department address the 
problem earlier, either by offering better terms, stepping up recruitment, or changing the 
conditions of employment to make the federal service more attractive?  As the years 
rolled by, it appears that it was easier to blame the ongoing issue on the press coverage 
maligning the Federation outside of the country than to take remedial action. 
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 It seems many European members of staff resigned because they were unsure 
about committing to a long-term future in Central Africa.13 It is also true that they could 
take advantage of favorable compensation terms if they chose to resign rather than 
transfer permanently to the federal service.14  In total, forty-eight expatriate doctors 
resigned on “R-day,” leaving fourteen percent of professional staff posts unfilled.15 In the 
professional nursing service, “R-day” resignations further exacerbated shortages due to 
the number of nurses who left the service to get married. For example, in Northern 
Rhodesia, fifty-nine qualified nurses resigned during 1959, representing a quarter of the 
permanent, professional nursing workforce. Of these, thirty-eight got married and a 
further fourteen resigned on “R-day.”16 The health service continued to function but the 
loss of so much professional medical expertise was significant.  
 Senior federal health officials asserted that medical auxiliaries in Nyasaland and 
Northern Rhodesia decided to resign on “R-day” because they had been unduly 
influenced by the inflammatory political rhetoric of African nationalists. In Blair’s 
opinion, the decision had been a hasty one, based on naive and unformed political 
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motives.17 However, there is evidence that African medical workers anticipated the 
prospect of a significant walk out on “R-day” many months in advance of the event. 
In November 1958, the Nyasaland Auxiliary Medical Organization (NAMO), decided to 
bring forward the date of its annual meeting to March or April of 1959 because its board 
members thought that “R- day” could result in many African auxiliaries walking off the 
job.18 This illustrates that motives for the “R-day” action were at least in part due to 
grievances and concerns relating to working conditions within the federal service. 
However, the walkouts should also be seen as part of an ongoing campaign of civil 
disturbance aimed to disrupt the activities of the federal government.  
 Walkouts on “R-day” in Nyasaland among African medical workers were 
widespread. In Cholo, thirty miles from Blantyre in the Southern Province, fifty percent 
resigned while in Karonga in the Northern Province, two out of three medical assistants 
and fifteen out of seventeen medical aides left. In the latter case, it took three months for 
attendance at the hospital to recover as rumors circulated that the federal government had 
replaced the staff with unskilled laborers.19 The Ministry of Health attempted to minimize 
the extent of the “R-Day” action, asserting service had been disrupted at only “one or 
two” rural health units. Attendance at government units in Nyasaland in 1959 dropped by 
twenty-five percent, amounting to more than one million fewer visits. The health 
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department attributed the drop to people’s fear of leaving their homes during the riots and 
disturbances during the year but it is also possible that non-attendance at government 
health facilities was also an expression of anti-federal sentiment. By comparison, 
attendances at mission facilities in Nyasaland increased by twelve percent over the 
previous year, around 168,000 more visits.20 Furthermore, at least one rural hospital 
stopped admitting patients because security forces took over the ward accommodation 
during the emergency.21 Larger urban hospitals were also affected. Many medical 
employees walked out at the flagship Queen Elizabeth hospital in Blantyre, after being 
promised re-employment when Nyasaland gained its independence.22  
 The crisis in staffing reverberated through the following years of federation. At 
the end of 1960, one-third of all medical posts were vacant. As a result, the health service 
was forced to rely on the goodwill of retired doctors returning to work.23 In the nursing 
service, some 250 posts were vacant and a further 355 nurses were employed on 
temporary contracts. The staffing shortages also exacerbated the inequity of health 
provision between urban centers and rural areas. In 1961, there were only three European 
health inspectors for the whole of Nyasaland and shortages of medical auxiliaries 
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persisted following the “R-day” walkouts. Consequently, work at rural leprosy treatment 
centers was severely curtailed.24  
 Stretched to almost breaking point, senior officials at the Ministry of Health drew 
up plans for concentrating health provision at fewer centers. It cut services and closed 
some medical facilities in rural areas in each region, prioritizing continuity of service in 
urban areas.25 However, the situation also threatened healthcare delivery in major urban 
hospitals. In Southern Rhodesia, branches of the British Medical Association stepped in 
to organize a casualty roster at the central hospitals in Salisbury and Bulawayo. The 
colony was more fortunate than its northern neighbors in this regard, having a large 
number of private medical practitioners who were prepared to step into the breach.26 
 The continued fallout from the “R-day” resignations increased pressure on a 
health service already heavily dependent on its African auxiliary staff.27 African 
auxiliaries comprised more than seventy percent of the Health Ministry’s employees.28 
By 1960 there were ninety-six rural hospitals and 254 rural health clinics in the 
Federation, many staffed by auxiliaries working, for the most part, unaided.29 In addition 
the shortage of medical officers meant visits to rural hospitals became much more 
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infrequent increasing the autonomy of the medical assistants in charge.30 In urban areas, 
too, medical assistants took on more responsibility as unfilled vacancies and generous 
leave entitlements meant that even larger hospitals struggled to maintain a sufficient 
medical and nursing establishment.31  
 The increased reliance on African auxiliaries placed a greater burden on training 
schools in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to graduate adequate numbers of medical 
aides, nursing orderlies, and other auxiliary staff. However, in the wake of the 
emergencies and amid increasingly strident African resistance to the Federation, the 
federal health department experienced greater difficulty in attracting sufficient students or 
achieving a satisfactory graduation rate. In Nyasaland, for example, all second and third 
year nursing orderly trainees who were supposed to be completing midwifery training 
were dismissed, supposedly due to political agitation that had fostered unacceptable 
insubordination among the students.32  
 The issue of student graduation was most pressing at the government training 
schools in Northern Rhodesia. The government operated two medical assistant training 
programs. At the women-only school in Livingstone, thirty-two percent of trainees 
abandoned their training in 1959 and another twenty-three percent in 1960. At the Lusaka 
men-only school, an average of twenty-five percent of students left the training program 
in each of the years between 1959 and 1962. Less than fifty students in total completed 
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the medical assistant courses at the two schools in those years.33 The poor rate of 
completion caused Blair, to lament that the future “looks bleak” for a rural medical 
service dependent on its medical assistants.34  
 The Lusaka school, in particular, had difficulty in attracting and retaining men in 
its program. In 1960, out of 190 male students accepted for auxiliary training in Northern 
Rhodesia, only thirty-six entered the Lusaka school. The federal Ministry of Health 
attributed this to the targeting of the school by political agitators, something that 
illustrated the “immaturity of perpetrators of agitation and dissension” who maliciously 
influenced a student body “undergoing training for a vocation of vital importance to the 
health of African people.”35 As Frederick Cooper has observed, this formulation speaks 
to British ideas that politically, Africans were viewed as either “primitives or 
demagogues, the latter threatening to mobilize the inchoate grievances of the former” 
rather than having political views of their own or legitimate grievances.36 By some 
accounts, conditions at the Lusaka training school were bad. In 1961, An African federal 
Member of Parliament drew attention to the poor food and substandard accommodation 
for trainees in the school. The somewhat off hand response from the federal Minister of 
Health was that standards at the government school were probably better than at many 
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training schools in Southern Rhodesia.37 The unsatisfactory conditions may have been 
why forty students at the school went on strike in 1962. All were dismissed from the 
training program.38 Yet, the idea of federation had been extremely unpopular with much 
of the African population in Northern Rhodesia well before it became a political reality 
and their antipathy only increased during its existence. This is evidenced by the marked 
increase in rumors of Banyama, vampire men who allegedly kidnapped Africans, drained 
their blood or extracted their brains transforming them into zombies.39 Accusations of 
Banyama were leveled at Europeans and Africans who supported federation through 
membership of the liberal, multiracial, elite, Capricorn Society or whose work was 
closely associated with the federal government.40 Is it possible that Banyama as a form of 
political intimidation deterred men from enrollment in federal training programs and 
caused students to abandon their courses?  
 
Commissions and Critiques  
 The extreme staffing difficulties within the Federal Health Service emerged at a 
time when the federal government was bracing itself for the anticipated review of its 
constitution. When the Federation was established, the constitution made provision for a 
Federal Review Conference within seven to nine years to consider any changes deemed 
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necessary.41 Ahead of the conference, the British government appointed an advisory 
commission, led by Walter Monckton, to advise the Federal Review Conference on the 
Federation’s future form.42 The commission, carried out over the first six months of 1960, 
was a wide-ranging investigation into every aspect of federation. The British government 
assured the Federation’s Prime Minister, Roy Welensky, that the commission did not 
have the authority to recommend that any territory could secede from the Federation and 
that the commission could only recommend changes to the Federation’s constitution.43 
African nationalists objected to the commission’s limited terms of reference, arguing that 
they made it nothing more than a sham.44 In Nyasaland, the Malawi Congress Party urged 
for a complete boycott of the commission, a measure largely successful, particularly in 
the Northern Province.45  
 The commission was a commentary on the Federation as a political unit but one in 
which health emerged as a major issue. The authors of the subsequent report were to state 
that the provision of health was the cause of much political controversy and that no other 
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federal function provided a greater volume of evidence.46 This was particularly true of 
evidence collected from Northern Rhodesia. There, Africans, who gave evidence, vilified 
the Federal Health Service accusing it of inadequate funding, discriminating against 
African employees, and causing standards of service to fall. One witness’s evidence 
encapsulated many Africans’ perspective saying: 
“the Federal Ministry of Health...has proved a failure…the African hospitals are in a 
disgraceful state, the standard of service has dropped; the surroundings are very dirty, 
the Government (Federal) trucks which in the rural areas were doing the work in 
place of the Ambulance no longer do that…there is no money …for cutting grass 100 
yards from the hospital…for replacement of old, old blankets…better plates, for 
proper cooking of food….for better uniforms…for building better Isolation wards, 
what is the use of saying Federal Services are good if the good things cannot be seen? 
Are we to rely upon what we hear, and not what we see?”47 
 
Here, the witness exposed the tendency of the federal government to loudly proclaim the 
excellence of its health service and the benefit it had brought to the African people. This 
trend was part of a widespread federal campaign at home and abroad designed to 
legitimize the Federation and white settler rule. Within the Federation, pro-federal	  
newspapers and newssheets such as The African Eagle and FACT often carried stories of 
how the federal government had provided excellent health services and career 
opportunities for African people in what can be considered a battle for the hearts and 
minds of a skeptical and rebellious African population.48 Overseas, the “Voice and 
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Vision” public relations campaign projected an image of the Federation as a fast 
developing, progressive nation that had brought significant benefits to the standard of 
living of African people. Andrew Cohen has argued that it is likely that the campaign 
advertisements proclaiming the educational and health benefits that the Federation had 
brought to Africans were a preemptive rebuttal to the findings of the Monckton 
Commission. The large-scale advertisement illustrating the work of the Federal Health 
Service that appeared in the London Times one day before the official publication of the 
Monckton report supports this assertion.49  
 The need to counter the negative dimensions of the Monckton report was 
important to the federal government for a number of reasons. First, a negative report 
risked damaging the increasingly fragile image of the federal government as one invested 
in the concept of multiracialism and committed to safeguarding the welfare of African 
people. Second, by 1960, the public image of colonialism, empire, and settler states was 
increasingly negative. This was due to the wide international press coverage of brutal 
colonial repression in places such as Kenya, Nyasaland, and South Africa. Third, there 
was a growing awareness that the surging tide of African nationalism on the continent 
was unstoppable and that independent African nation-states were the future. The 
Federation appeared to be increasingly anachronistic, a political formulation out of step 
with current ideas.   
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 Reviewing the evidence to the Monckton Commission suggests that the 
beleaguered federal government and its health service attempted to limit employee 
participation in the evidence hearings. Even though the federal department was one of the 
largest employers of educated, literate Africans in the Federation, I have found no 
submissions from African medical workers. In case of Nyasaland, this may have been 
due to the Malawi Congress Party boycott of the commission. However, it may also have 
been that African medical staff simply did not receive information about how to submit 
evidence to the commission from the government in time. A doctor in Nyasaland said 
that he had only received pamphlets about this after the deadline for applying to give 
evidence had passed.50 Furthermore, there is evidence that the Federal Health Service 
refused to allow government medical officers from appearing in the commission 
hearings. A letter from the office of the Director of Medical Services in Northern 
Rhodesia stated that a government medical officer could only give evidence in an 
individual capacity and only when invited to do so. They were not permitted to give 
evidence as representatives of either the Federal Health Service or in any other capacity 
such as membership of the local BMA.51 
	   The report from the Monckton Commission advocated returning health to the 
territories. Supporters of federated health viewed the findings of the Monckton Report as 
flawed and based on “a cursory examination of the position” illustrating “muddled and 
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uninformed thinking.”52 They derided the commission’s recommendations, arguing that 
political considerations had trumped technical ones.53  
 On the question of the Federation and its future, the Monckton commission 
reported that the political union was deeply flawed. It recommended that Northern 
Rhodesia should follow Nyasaland in enacting constitutional reform to permit elections 
for the Legislative Council.54 Crucially, the commission appeared to step outside its terms 
of reference in recommending that any of the three territories should, in theory, be 
allowed to secede. Roy Welensky called the resultant report, “the death knell of 
Federation.”55 
 The Monckton Commission’s recommendation to return health to the territories 
was in stark contrast to a second commission that reported its findings in the same year. 
The Morton Commission was tasked with performing a general review of the functions 
and administration of the Federal Health Service. The commission toured the Federation 
visiting major towns and hospitals. In doing so, the commission heard evidence from fifty 
interested organizations and sixty individuals, of which a good number were nurses, 
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government medical officers, and private practitioners.56 It did not interview any African 
medical workers and did not visit any rural health facilities.  
 In their final report the commissioners endorsed the decision to federate health. 
However, they were critical of many aspects of the Federal Health Service. The report 
called attention to “the difficulties of the first five formative years of centralized Federal 
control [that] have almost inevitably caused a certain amount of disturbance, 
misunderstanding and discontent.”57 In addition, it noted witnesses’ “complaints of 
delays … in overcoming shortages in the medical, nursing’ and domestic staffing of 
hospitals, all of which, it was claimed, could have been either avoided or lessened if local 
experience and resources had been properly used.”58 Furthermore, the report criticized 
the Ministry of Health of being a “centralized and impersonal administration” that had 
applied “broad national policies blindly” without regard for local conditions.59 
 The Morton Commission’s accusation of over-centralization, excessive 
bureaucracy, and lack of consideration for local needs and concerns resonated with much 
of the evidence submitted to the Monckton Commission. African and European witnesses 
to the latter pointed to the difficulties of working with the health service’s central 
administration. Complaints included the constant shortage of drugs due to the length of 
time it took to procure replacements and the amount of paperwork required before 
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receiving approval for any health project.60 Missions complained that promised grant-in-
aid money was not always forthcoming and that federal officials always took the credit 
for having facilitated the opening of new clinics or hospitals even when missions had 
provided the majority of the funding and local Africans, the labor.61 Furthermore, local 
authorities complained that it was difficult to get permission to build new health 
facilities.62 This was a shift from earlier in the federal period when the participation of 
African local authorities in adding much needed health infrastructure was warmly 
welcomed.63 By the 1960s, the Health Ministry was complaining that this practice 
interfered with the planned development of health infrastructure and created problems for 
the federal department, which was expected to staff and finance the clinics.64 The African 
response was that the federal department was out of touch with what health infrastructure 
was needed on the ground because they were too far away in Salisbury.65 This shift in 
federal policy reflects the growing inability of the Federal Health Service to provide 
adequate medical manpower for its services in the later federal period. It is also indicative 
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of an increasingly defensive federal health department, which perhaps viewed the local 
authorities’ building of health infrastructure as a critique of its operations. 
 Predictably, supporters of the Federal Health Service welcomed the Morton 
Report because of its support for federating health in spite of its criticisms of the service. 
This was probably because, despite recommending sweeping changes to recruitment, 
service conditions, and policy, the report couched its advice within a familiar colonial 
framework. Solutions to the shortage predicament centered, for the most part, on 
continuing a policy of attracting expatriate expertise from Britain or other white settler 
dominated parts of the Commonwealth. While the commission recognized the utility of 
the African medical worker, it asserted the continued need for European supervision. 
Furthermore, its vision of the hospital as a center of medical research and site of 
education of a people, which they believed had only recently been lifted out of savagery 
resonated with an essentially paternalistic colonial administration.66 
 The publication of the Morton Report sparked a lively debate in the Federal 
Assembly. As a major function of the federal government, matters pertaining to the 
policies and practices of the health service were a regular feature of assembly debates. 
The parliamentary discourse on the health service shifted over time. In the early years of 
federation, a major concern was the inadequate and substandard medical facilities, 
especially in Northern Rhodesia. This included questions about the completion dates of 
new clinics or extensions of existing infrastructure, complaints about overcrowding in 
African hospitals, and calling attention to the dilapidated condition of many existing 
hospitals and clinics. In the later federal period, as more qualified African nurses and 
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doctors began working in the Federation’s hospitals, questions about staffing and 
opportunities for Africans to further their careers became more prevalent.  
 The African members in the Federal Assembly were adept at exposing the 
hypocrisy of  “partnership.” When the Health Minister blamed African nationalist 
activism for obstructing recruitment of qualified staff from outside the Federation, 
African members would ask why more African doctors and nurses were not recruited 
from South Africa or why professional nurse training had not been started in either 
Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia.67 Speaking in the debate on the Morton Report, Mr. 
Chembe, African member for Northern Rhodesia, launched a scathing attack on the 
federal Ministry of Health. Chembe deplored the policy that insisted a South African 
black nurse had to be married to a Federation national to be eligible for employment, 
pointing out that white expatriate nurses were not subject to the same restriction.68 
Chembe also questioned the practice that required African nurses to resign from the 
service when they became pregnant and lost all their years of service when they returned 
to work.69 Chembe pointed out that the South African service gave their nurses maternity 
leave, encouraging the nurse back into the workplace.70 Furthermore, Chembe 
complained that the practice of insisting student nurses were single created problems 
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when the nurses worked within an African community that conferred greater status and 
respect to married women.71 Crucially, Chembe linked his complaints to the federal 
government’s stated policy of multiracial partnership, saying,  
“are we following partnership when African doctors from other countries are not 
accepted…and when highly trained nurses are not accepted in this country… 
There are educated people from the Union of South Africa and you will not admit 
them here. And if an African doctor who is trained in the Union of South Africa 
comes here he is chased away from Harari hospital and sent to a rural hospital. 
That is the policy of this government and yet you talk about partnership.”72 
 
 
The Quest for Medical Personnel 
 The federal government and Ministry of Health made several changes in response 
to the crisis in staffing and the recommendations of the Morton Commission. The health 
department launched a vigorous recruitment campaign, improved conditions of service 
and pay, and introduced legislation that expanded recruitment beyond the Federation’s 
traditional recruiting grounds of Britain and countries of the Commonwealth. It is 
significant that the Ministry of Health responded in ways that enhanced recruitment of 
medical professionals from overseas. By doing so, the health department gave greater 
weight to those recommendations from the Morton Commission that perpetuated the 
service’s dependency on expatriate expertise and demonstrated a white settler 
determination to maintain the colonial medical hierarchy and settler colonial order. 
Advice from the Morton Commission that did not fit within this framework was 
disregarded. The decisions about which recommendations the health department chose to 
implement exposes the inflexibility of the medical elite in seeking a solution to the 
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staffing crisis and illustrates that there were limits to the level of African participation 
that the ruling settler elite was prepared to accept.  
 The Ministry of Health improved conditions of service and rates of pay for its 
medical officers. The service increased a doctor’s base pay and prohibited government 
medical officers from private practice, paying a special allowance as compensation for 
loss of potential revenue. The Ministry viewed the payment as having a double benefit. It 
further raised salary levels, making the Federal Health Service more competitive in the 
global marketplace. It also appeased the powerful lobby of private practitioners in 
Southern Rhodesia, who strongly resented the government medical officers’ ability to 
draw a government salary, enjoy generous leave and pension entitlements, and carry out 
private practice for personal gain.73 The service also created a new position for Junior 
Resident Medical Officers. This aimed to attract newly qualified doctors looking to fulfill 
their junior residency requirement, which entailed a year long paid internship in a 
hospital setting. The federal health department hoped to entice graduates from British 
medical schools by offering to cover the cost of travel to and from the Federation.74 
 The federal government also enacted legislative changes effectively widening the 
recruitment net for the health service. The legislation permitted doctors from other 
countries to register in the Federation as long as they demonstrated a working knowledge 
of the English language. It appears to have been fairly successful as eleven doctors with 
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“foreign” degrees accepted employment by the end of 1961 with another twenty in 
1962.75  
 Legislation and structural changes aside, the primary response of the health 
department was a vigorous campaign to recruit expatriate qualified medical personnel 
from Britain. This included a recruitment tour by the Secretary for Health, advertisements 
in professional journals, and use of the Central African Film Unit to make a film aimed at 
attracting medical personnel to the Federation.  
 The Secretary for Health, Blair, spent three months in 1960 in Britain on a 
recruiting mission for medical staff. The tour had limited success and recruitment of 
sufficient staff remained elusive. It was the view of the Minister for Health (one that Blair 
shared) that the negative publicity in the overseas press about the Federation made it very 
difficult to attract staff and this, rather than pay and conditions of service was the primary 
reason for recruitment difficulties. There is evidence that this view may have had at least 
some validity. In the wake of the state of emergency declaration in Nyasaland, for 
example, five of six doctors recruited in Britain for the Federation cancelled their 
passages.76 A member of the federal parliament responded by saying that “it was … a 
very great pity that some of [the doctors] were so chicken-hearted” to allow a small 
disturbance blown out of proportion by the overseas press to deter them and that perhaps 
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they “were not the type we wanted anyway and we are just as well without them.”77 
Officials at the Ministry of Health also asserted that the federal government was unfairly 
blamed for staffing shortages and that potential recruits were deterred by rumors that the 
federal service was to be broken up.78 
 In early 1962, the Federal Health Service contracted the Central African Film 
Unit, to shoot a film aimed at attracting medical doctors and nurses to Central Africa.79 
Shown in medical and nursing schools, at British Medical Association meetings, and to 
enquirers at Rhodesia House in London, the film, Invitation to Adventure, promised a 
medical career that would appeal to a pioneering spirit. However, it also reassured the 
viewer that practicing medicine in the Federation would be similar to that in Britain but 
better because of the superior climate, wide open spaces, and benefits of lifestyle on 
offer. The Federation was portrayed as a country with good communications, and a 
thriving capital city, Salisbury. The narrator asserted that there was “no place on earth 
where as a medical practitioner you can make such an important contribution to building 
a health service.”80 Applicants were encouraged to join the social experiment of the 
Central African Federation and help build a great nation.81  
 Invitation to Adventure showed what a doctor working in a rural area could expect 
on a typical day. In discussing some of the medical issues the applicant might encounter, 
the film stressed that an important part of the work was combating “ignorance.” Issues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Ibid., 252.	  
78	  Ibid., 246.	  
79	  “An Invitation to Adventure” (Southern Rhodesia: Central African Film Unit, 1962), 
VHS (20 min), British Film Institute, London, Colonial Film: Moving Images of Empire, 
viewed September 2016. 	  
80	  Ibid.  
81	  Ibid. 	  
	   142	  
such as malnutrition, for example, were not due to neglect of public health or of poverty 
but a result of the ignorance of the African.82 What was striking about the film was that 
Africans were largely absent, appearing only as patients or, briefly, as (male) medical 
aides. A large part of the film was devoted to selling a white settler way of life to 
prospective candidates. The Federation was depicted as a white man’s country, “a land of 
great natural beauty but also of progress and a vitality that is stimulating.” The film 
emphasized the professional links to Britain and ended with an “invitation to you to join 
us in a great adventure to put medicine to work to create a full and happy life for all our 
people and the generations to come.”83  
 An Invitation to Adventure targeted a certain type of medical practitioner, an 
expatriate professional who was European, preferably British or at least Commonwealth 
trained. Furthermore, the expatriate doctors that the service hoped to attract were white 
and male. The Southern Rhodesian settler elite, of which doctors were very much a part, 
desired a new national identity that would bind together all whites and embraced a 
masculinity that was a “muscular one…laughing-in-the-face-of- danger, at-ease-in-the-
bundu (wilderness), and at-ease-with-the-natives.”84 An Invitation to Adventure aimed to 
attract doctors who had the same pioneering spirit that Southern Rhodesian white medical 
professionals believed characterized the early doctors who made the colony their home in 
the first decades of the twentieth century. Such thinking also illustrates the persistence of 
an ideology that saw white, male doctors at the apex of a gendered and racialized colonial 
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medical hierarchy and also a desire on the part of the medical elite to maintain the image 
of biomedicine as a practice performed, for the most part, by white practitioners.85  
 The exception to this construction was the realization that the only way to provide 
health care effectively in African rural areas was to employ African medical practitioners. 
This represented a shift from an earlier period in which it was thought that African 
medical assistants would be the primary providers of care in rural clinics and even small 
hospitals but always with regular visits and inspections by a white medical doctor. In 
part, this shift was an acknowledgement of the impossibility of staffing remote rural 
hospitals with white professional staff but it also reflected the reality of a small, growing 
cadre of federal African qualified doctors.  
 The first African doctors to work in the Federal Health Service were generally 
mission educated and completed their medical studies at either the University of 
Witwatersrand or the University of Natal in South Africa. Returning to the Federation, 
they often completed their intern year at the Harari hospital before becoming a 
government medical officer. The first of these, Dr. Tichafa Samuel Parirenyatwa, 
remained at Harari hospital as a General Medical Officer after his intern year. Not all 
members of staff at the hospital received his appointment favorably, “a number were 
critical and a few were openly hostile.”86 Parirenyatwa was soon transferred “in the 
interests of race relations” to a rural posting sixty miles south of Bulawayo. Ironically, 
Parirenyatwa was responsible for providing medical care for black and white patients at 
the rural Antelope Mine Hospital because he was the only doctor for sixty miles. White 
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farmers were initially horrified at the idea of being treated by a black doctor. However, 
by the time Parirenyatwa left after two years, to go into private practice and devote more 
time to nationalist politics, he had become very popular with African and European 
patients.87 While more research is needed to trace the careers of these early African 
doctors, it does appear that at least some were posted to rural areas after completing their 
year’s internship. Dr. Mcleod Chitiyo, who would become the first African pathologist in 
Southern Rhodesia, was posted to a remote medical station in Nyasaland.88 A rural 
posting enabled the federal service to man remote medical stations and also circumvented 
the issue of white nursing sisters serving under black doctors.89 
  
Continuing Crisis in the Nursing Service 
  The “R-day,” exodus of expatriate nursing expertise and subsequent difficulties 
in recruitment turned what had long been a chronic shortage of qualified nurses within 
the federal service into a crisis. To be sure, the chronic shortage was the partly a 
consequence of colonial neglect to provide advanced nurse training to Africans but it was 
also exacerbated by the long-standing policy that required women to leave the service 
when they got married.90  This policy conformed to prevailing social norms about gender. 
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A married woman’s place was in the home and her primary function was to raise 
children. The extent to which this was normative is illustrated in the Morton 
Commission’s discussion of the problems within the nursing service. The commission 
said that “a large scale breakdown in the [Federal] nursing service… threatened” due to 
ill-formed policies regarding promotion, inflexible conditions of service, and substandard 
nurses accommodation.91 The commission did not mention the policy dictating 
resignation on marriage and gave no advice about how the service might address the 
problem of large numbers of student nurses finishing their training but leaving soon after 
to get married. By 1959, only thirty-two of 203 European nurses that had been trained by 
the department since the start of federation remained in the Federal Nursing Service.92  
 In response to the Morton Commission’s report, the Ministry of Health introduced 
a one-year contract scheme specifically aimed at attracting white professional nurses 
from Britain.  Advertisements in British nursing journals urged nurses to “come and 
nurse in the sunshine for 12 months. Friends can travel together.”93 The health service 
paid the recruit’s passage both ways and it was hoped that, once in the Federation, some 
would either extend their contracts or join the permanent staff.94 The plan was fairly 
successful and a year later 127 “sunshine girls,” as they were known, were in service in 
government hospitals throughout the Federation. Of the initial group of twenty-seven 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Morton Commission, 63.	  
92	  The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Annual Reports on Public Health, 1959 
(BOA), 27.	  
93	  Sally Hubbard, “Nursing in Zomba, 1963-1964,” in An Expatriate Experience of Life 
and Work in Nyasaland, edited by Colin Baker, vol. 3 (Cardiff: Mbemba Books, 2014), 
303-312.  
94	  The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Annual Reports on Public Health, 1962 
(BOA), 31. 
	   146	  
who arrived in March of 1962, ten extended their contracts, one joined the Federal 
Nursing Service, one left to nurse in South Africa, and four resigned on marriage.95  
 While the one-year contract plan brought more nurses into the service, it barely 
scratched the surface of the shortage in nursing expertise. As previously noted, 250 
nursing posts were vacant at the end of 1960. Two years later, the figure was almost as 
high meaning that the nursing service remained twenty percent understaffed. The 
shortages were evenly spread across the three territories. However, in Southern Rhodesia, 
the shortfall was somewhat cushioned by 588 student nurses who were at various stages 
of the state registered training program.96 Hence the crisis in nurse staffing 
disproportionately affected the northern territories of the Federation and illustrates how 
decisions about the placement of state registered nursing programs can be seen as 
evidence of the marginalization of the northern colonies. 
   The adoption of the “sunshine girls” contract scheme further illustrated the 
reliance of the nursing service on temporary staff. Perpetually short of nurses, the federal 
service had already become heavily dependent on a pool of temporary nursing labor 
made available by the policy dictating that nurses resign on marriage. These nurses 
returned to work for periods varying between a few weeks to several years.97 Relying on 
a largely temporary workforce created difficulties in planning and posting nursing 
expertise where it was most needed. Indeed, the Morton Commission highlighted that 
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many European hospitals appeared to be relatively overstaffed, as the following table 
illustrates: 
	   In-Patient 
Daily Average 
No. of 
Beds 
European State 
Registered Nurses 
Occupancy 
Percent. 
No of Patients 
per Nurse 
(Daily 
Average) 
Rusape 6 12 10 50 0.6 
Marandellas 4 8 7 50 0.6 
Choma 5 13 6 41 0.8 
Selukwe 4 14 7 33 0.6 
Gwanda 2 17 6 30 0.3 
Mazabuka 4 14 7 28 0.6 
Enkledoorn 4 17 7 26 0.6 
Filabusi 2 12 5 18 0.4 
Table 1: Staffing: European Government Hospitals, Central African Federation, 195998 
	  
In contrast, a table with the same data for African hospitals within the same district 
illustrates the extent to which they were over crowded and understaffed by comparison: 
	   In-Patient 
Daily Average 
No. of 
Beds 
African  
Nurses (SRN and 
auxiliary) 
Occupancy 
Percent. 
No of Patients 
per Nurse 
(Daily 
Average) 
Rusape 198 160 27 124 7.3 
Marandellas 120 97 14 124 8.5 
Choma 122 186 30 65 4.1 
Selukwe 62 24 6 258 10.3 
Gwanda 149 116 16 129 9.3 
Mazabuka 61 75 21 82 2.9 
Enkledoorn 109 54 14 202 7.8 
Filabusi 136 120 10 113 13.6 
Table 2: Staffing: African Government Hospitals, Central African Federation, 195999 
	  
What is striking about the data in each of these tables is that despite the African and 
European hospitals being situated within the same district, there does not seem to have 
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been any reallocation of nursing capacity to even the nursing workload. Excess European 
nurses do not appear to have been posted to the African hospitals even where the number 
of patients per African nurses was relatively high and the European nurses had very few 
patients. Indeed, it seems that in some European hospitals, patients received care on a 
one-to-one basis.  
 The second table shows that a number of the African staff were state registered 
nurses. The first professionally trained African nurses were those who had trained in 
South Africa. From 1962, state registered African nurses trained at federal hospitals 
entered the workforce. As far I can discern, the new nurses were solely employed at 
African-only hospitals or on the African wards of multiracial hospitals. Some support for 
this is evident in the Minister for Health’s statement that no qualified African nurses 
worked in European hospitals because they were “fully employed” in caring for African 
patients.100 The training and employment of African state registered nurses permitted the 
maintenance and extension of a segregationist policy that was a cornerstone of health 
care practices in the earlier colonial era and persisted into the federation period despite its 
progressive rhetoric of multiracial hospitals and partnership.  
 Senior health officials in the Federation saw as desirable a separate but somewhat 
equal health service in which Europeans provided care in European hospitals and 
Africans, always under European supervision, care in African hospitals. However, the 
senior medical community never intended to decolonize the health service. They never 
envisaged an African Secretary of Health, for instance, or an African Medical 
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Superintendent of the Salisbury group of hospitals. Accordingly, the pace of 
Africanization of the service was exceedingly slow. In part, this was due to the late start 
of advanced medical training in the Federation. As we have seen state registered training 
of African nurses only began in 1958 and the first cohort did not enter the workforce until 
1962. Training of doctors did not start in the region until 1963, the very end of the federal 
period. But the slow pace was also because the federal health department appeared to 
cling to the belief that that solutions to the staffing crisis lay in recruiting medical 
expertise from overseas. 
 The emphasis on the use of temporary expatriate staff illustrates the unwillingness 
of the Ministry of Health to consider more innovative solutions to the staffing crisis. The 
Morton Commission had recommended that professional nurse training be extended to 
men and that medical aides should be allowed to enter training to become state registered, 
professional nurses.101 Neither recommendation was acted on. In August of 1961, when 
staffing levels in the nursing service had reached a “dangerously low level,” African 
federal MPs asked the Health Minister if he would consider accepting African women for 
training who were currently working as trained medical aides.102 Medical aides training 
programs required less schooling as a condition of entry but the aides would have 
received two or threes years of medical training, were literate in English, and had a 
number of years of hospital experience. Furthermore, the African MPs noted that nursing 
schools within Britain accepted some medical aides from the Federation into their state 
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registered training programs.103 Why, the African MPs queried, did the federal health 
department not do the same? To do so would help provide a long-term sustainable 
solution to the staffing issue while also providing a career path for medical aides perhaps 
encouraging more girls who did not have sufficient schooling for advanced nurse training 
to consider entering medical aide programs. The Health Minister’s response was that 
under no circumstances would the standards of entry into the state registered programs be 
dropped because to do so would merely increase the number of student nurses who failed 
to pass their examinations.104  The minister’s refusal to consider the proposal to train 
medical aides exposes the inflexibility of the Ministry of Health in the way it addressed 
the staffing crisis but it also reflected a belief common among federalists that the 
Federation could only be a success through the hard work of qualified men and 
women.105 The emphasis on standards and qualifications enabled white settlers to 
maintain the colonial medical hierarchy and the settler colonial order while appearing to 
adopt the progressive language of partnership and development. 
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 The staffing situation, at least regarding the number of doctors, did improve by 
the end of 1962. Increases in pay and enhanced career paths for junior doctors combined 
to make the federal medical service more competitive in the global market for medical 
practitioners. Blair asserted that the improvement was also due to the growing reputation 
of federal hospitals as places “where the young medical graduate can gain a wide and 
varied experience under the direction of expert specialist staff in excellent 
surroundings.”106  These changes disproportionately benefited Southern Rhodesia. The 
number of junior medical doctors in the colony tripled without a corresponding increase 
in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. At the end of 1962, ninety-five percent of general 
medical officer posts in Southern Rhodesia were occupied. In Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland nearly a quarter of posts remained vacant.107 
 
 During the last years of the Federation, the white settler elite led by Roy 
Welensky, fought a rearguard action to salvage the political union while African leaders 
in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland made substantial progress towards gaining 
independence. African opposition to the Federation in the northern territories was well 
organized and the Malawi Congress and United National Independence Party had 
widespread support. Banda and Kaunda were released from detention and participated in 
negotiations with the British and colonial governments on constitutional reform. 
 By 1962, Dr. Hastings Banda was the de facto prime minister of Nyasaland and 
under his leadership, the Nyasaland Legislative Council initiated policies designed to 
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illustrate that independence would benefit the African population.108 The policies 
included expansion of secondary education and the abolition of the thangata system.109 
Thangata was a system of labor rent that required agricultural tenants to work for estate 
owners for two months a year, often at times when the tenants’ own farms required 
attention. While the council could not enact any policies pertaining to health care, it was 
able to disrupt the Federal Health Service by refusing to allow federal officers access to 
schools for vaccination programs.110 Nyasaland became a self-governing territory in early 
1963. In Northern Rhodesia, the path to self-government was slower, hindered by a lack 
of progress on constitutional reform. However, elections towards the end of 1962 allowed 
Kaunda and his party, the United International Party for Independence, to form a 
government.111 
 In March of 1963, the British government confirmed the right of any territory in 
the Federation to secede signaling the inevitability of the Federation’s demise. For the 
Ministry of Health, the complicated business of unraveling the Federal Health Service 
had begun.  
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Epilogue 
Endings and Beginnings  
  
 At the end of 1963, the outgoing Secretary for Health lamented the dissolution of 
the Federation and the “destruction” of its health service that put an end to ten years of 
“high endeavour by thousands of devoted and capable officers.”1 It is ironic that the 
Federal Health Service was dissolved at a time when senior health officials considered 
that the Ministry was finally making good on its original aims and objectives. 1962 had 
been a year of growth. Over 900 patient beds had been added and staffing levels had 
somewhat improved, at least in Southern Rhodesia. Other causes for optimism were the 
imminent opening of the new medical school and the first cohort of state registered 
African nurses had completed their training.2 The dissolution of the Federation revealed 
the fragility of the northern branches of the Federal Health Service. Despite assertions 
that federating health had produced a “great health service,” it had largely continued a 
colonial legacy that privileged healthcare for urban dwellers over rural inhabitants, 
Europeans over Africans, and its policies tended to marginalize the northern territories. 
The effect of this marginalization became evident in the early independence period when 
the governments of Malawi and Zambia committed to providing health services for their 
populations.  
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Dissolution 
 The key issue facing negotiators on the transfer of federal functions back to the 
territories was the need to ensure that the territorial services had enough staff to continue 
functioning. To this end, an inter-government agreement was formed in early 1963. In 
theory, the agreement provided a pathway to a smooth transition. In practice, it continued 
the uncertainty and discontent so prevalent in the federal era. 
 Under the terms of the agreement, expatriate federal officers were invited to 
remain for a transitional period and those who wished to stay in Central Africa after 
dissolution could apply to any of the three territorial services. In May 1964, officers who 
had not received offers of employment from the territorial services were eligible for 
enhanced compensation. Any officers who had been offered employment but chose to 
leave anyway would only receive their pension due to them.3  
 According to Blair, offers of employment from the territorial governments were 
late in arriving meaning that officers did not know whether they had employment or not, 
often right up to within a few days of the scheduled transfer of services. Blair accused the 
respective territorial governments of complacency saying that they appeared “obsessed 
with the belief that federal officers would be forced by economic and other circumstances 
to accept whatever offer of employment was made to them.”4 In his view, the 
governments had no appreciation of the competitive global market for medical 
professionals and their attitude led to many officers deciding to leave Central Africa 
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permanently. Whether Blair’s assertion is correct or not, what is clear is that the question 
of compensation did foster a deep sense of injustice and anger among colonial medical 
practitioners at the British government. In 1964, a spate of letters to the British Medical 
Journal from ex-federal medical officers complained that they had been let down by the 
British government and that they felt “expendable.”5  
 The doctors were unhappy with the seeming reluctance of the British government 
to adequately compensate colonial medical officers when independence ended their 
employment in the colonies. The doctors pointed to other parts of the empire such as 
Ghana or Nigeria where medical officers had received enhanced compensation regardless 
of whether they stayed in the colony or not.  In the British government’s view, the 
Federal Health Service had been a locally based one and its medical officers, therefore, 
locally domiciled and as such, not entitled to receive any extra money. As the principle 
mediator for medical practitioners, the British Medical Association (BMA) attempted to 
intercede. The BMA declared that the government’s decision was unacceptable because 
the former members of the colonial medical service in Central Africa had been 
encouraged to join the Federal Health Service based on Britain’s commitment to the 
Federation’s continuing existence. As such, the BMA believed that the British 
government had a moral obligation to these doctors now that it had “blown [the 
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Federation] up.”6 Despite vigorous lobbying by the BMA, the British government 
remained steadfast in its decision to uphold the inter-government agreement, merely 
promising to set up a hardship committee, which would look into individual cases of ex-
federal officers who suffered financial adversity.7  
 
Post Federation – Malawi and Zambia 
 The actions of the British government almost certainly contributed to the exodus 
of European doctors after the dissolution of federation.  At the end of 1963, one in five 
medical professionals employed by the Federal Health Service left Central Africa, a 
disproportionate number of them from the Northern territories.8  Dr. John Goodall, for 
instance, who worked in Nyasaland, wrote that he had to find another job and that 
remaining, as an expatriate doctor in independent Malawi, was not an option. Goodall 
was able to use his connections within the colonial medical service to secure a position in 
the Bahamas.9  
 The number of medical officers in Nyasaland dropped from thirty-seven in 1958 
to just fourteen.10 By May 1964 only twelve out of twenty-five general medical officer 
posts were filled, only one surgeon was available, and no psychiatrist.11 Only three out of 
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thirteen district hospitals had doctors. In addition the nursing service was twenty percent 
understaffed.12 On a more positive note, forty-four medical assistants and aides who had 
resigned in 1959 rather than join the federal service, were reinstated and principal 
medical assistants provided the bulk of care in the vast majority of district hospitals.13 
 The international community stepped in to help the Malawi service with 
personnel and much needed funding. The Israeli government provided a team of eleven 
doctors. Normally new recruits were dispersed to work in the district hospitals but the 
leader of the Israeli group explained that “they were a team and they worked together – 
one doctor knew about heads another about feet – together they could treat all 
ailments.”14 In the event, the Israeli doctors provided medical care at two of the major 
urban hospitals.15 Britain contributed twenty nurses, two matrons, and a senior tutor, 
while Canada sent a tutor and the Netherlands, one nurse. Britain and the Netherlands 
supplemented the salaries of the nurses they provided and Canada took on responsibility 
for paying the tutor.  
 The staffing situation in both Malawi and Zambia was further exacerbated by the 
lack of any facilities to train qualified nurses or doctors. For nursing, both countries were 
able to start training schools relatively quickly. In the case of Malawi, the British and 
Canadian tutors organized a state registered nurse training school in Blantyre. The school 
opened with twenty-three students in the summer of 1965. The Malawian Minister for 
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Health remarked on the large numbers of girls leaving school who were academically 
qualified to enter professional nurse training.16 This is in contrast to the assertion made in 
the federal period regarding the possibility of a training school in Nyasaland. In Zambia, 
too, training of qualified nurses was underway at Kitwe by 1965, a year after 
independence. Medical schools were much longer in the making. In Zambia, the medical 
school opened in 1968. It was attached to the Lusaka hospital, which had been renamed 
the University Teaching Hospital. Malawi however would not start to train its own 
doctors until 1991.  
 Africanization of the health services in Malawi and Zambia proceeded much more 
slowly after independence compared with other British colonies such as Uganda or 
Nigeria. In large part this was due to the almost complete dependence on white 
professional staff. In Zambia, less than one hundred Africans held college degrees and 
less than a thousand had secondary-school certificates.17  As late as 1967, whites 
occupied two out of three of the top Zambian civil service positions. In Malawi, only one 
African doctor worked for the government health service in 1964. Nearly two decades 
later, the government employed just twelve Malawian doctors. In contrast, Uganda and 
Nigeria had the advantage of medical schools established in the colonial period. When 
those countries won their independence, there was a cohort of African medical 
practitioners who were prepared to take over the medical services.18  
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 When Banda ascended to the presidency in Malawi, he was expected to promote 
an African medical profession, in part because he was the victim of a persistent color bar 
that denigrated African medical practitioners.19 However, according to John Luwanda he 
despised African doctors, regarding them as inferior to European expatriates. After the 
Cabinet Crisis in 1964, all educated Africans, including doctors, were marginalized 
losing much of their authority and respect.20  In 1967, the Secretary for Health and the 
Chief Medical Officer were both part of the colonial past having served in the colonial 
medical service for many years.21 Luwanada argues, that attacks on Malawian doctors’ 
professional status initiated a brain drain of physicians that has continued into the present 
day.22 Luwanda further asserts that Banda and the new elite Malawians in power did not 
make good on promises to improve social services, including health, for the benefit of all 
Malawians but monopolized the scarce biomedical facilities that existed at 
independence.23  
 In contrast to Banda’s Malawi, the new government of Zambia made wider access 
to health (and education) a priority in the early years of independence. An important 
difference between the new nations was Zambia’s relative economic prosperity. A vibrant 
world economy fueled demand for the nation’s copper. Between 1963 and 1969, the 
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value of mineral exports rose by 163 percent, permitting the Zambian government to 
expand health and education programs.24  
 At independence, in 1964, most healthcare provision was centered in the large 
urban areas of Livingstone, Lusaka, and the Copperbelt. Outside of these, health 
infrastructure was concentrated along the railway that ran between Livingstone and the 
towns of the Copperbelt. Much of rural Zambia was still without health service provision 
or was served by one of nineteen mission hospitals.25  
 The Zambian government immediately increased aid to many missions.26 The 
staff at Chitambo hospital looked forward to the new era with cautious optimism. 
Relations with the federal government had been strained. Currie, the missionary doctor, 
wrote that the federal government appeared to regard mission hospitals as superfluous 
and not part of the essential medical services of the country.27 The Zambian government 
also altered training courses at missions. In 1965 it scrapped the medical assistants 
course, replacing it with one similar to that of the enrolled nursing course in existence in 
Britain.28 This allowed missions to take applicants with a lower level of education. In 
1966, the length of the nursing course was reduced to two years from three in an effort to 
train much needed medical manpower to staff the growing number of health units in the 
country.29  
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 By 1972, The Zambian government had facilitated the expansion of medical 
missions and had taken over those mission hospitals such as Chitambo, which had run 
into financial difficulties despite the extra grants-in-aid.30 It had nearly doubled the 
number of government hospitals and rural health clinics and there were three times the 
number of urban clinics compared with the end of federation.31  
 
Post Federation – Southern Rhodesia 
 The Southern Rhodesian territorial service did not have the same crisis in staffing 
as did the services in the colonies to the north. The service benefited from the relocation 
of staff from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland during 1964.  In particular, a number of 
senior medical staff moved south. Some were Southern Rhodesians who had been 
deployed in the northern territories and were merely returning home, while others 
decided that career prospects might be more favorable in Southern Rhodesia.32  In 
addition, the nursing service, which would continue to suffer from serious shortages, was 
aided by a considerable number of student nurses, a source of nursing labor not available 
to either Malawi or Zambia because of the policy regarding the opening of training 
schools in the federal era. At the end of 1964, nearly 600 student nurses and a further 30 
trainee midwives were working within the Southern Rhodesian service.33 
 When federation failed, the Southern Rhodesian white settlers narrowed their 
nation building focus onto the Southern Rhodesian state. In 1965, the ruling Rhodesian 
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Front party headed by Ian Smith declared unilateral independence (UDI) from Britain, 
setting the stage for a bloody and protracted war for independence, a struggle known as 
the Second Chimurenga. Zimbabwe finally attained its freedom in 1980.  
 The two major issues facing the Southern Rhodesian service after the end of 
federation were a severe lack of funding and a growing isolation that began with UDI in 
1965 and accelerated after the declaration of the Rhodesia republic in 1970. Funding had 
been difficult in the twilight of federation as first, political uncertainty and then the 
Federation’s seemingly inevitable demise, made it increasingly difficult to attract 
investment. The end of federation meant that Southern Rhodesia lost significant income 
from copper revenue and taxes levied in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. During the 
federal era Southern Rhodesia had received some £70 million in taxes from Northern 
Rhodesia. The northern territories had shouldered proportionally more of their previous 
expenses than Southern Rhodesia, which transferred some of its expenditure, for 
example, European education and agriculture, to the federal government.34 For the 
territorial medical service in Southern Rhodesia, the funding crisis in its first year after 
dissolution meant that services were cut.35 The new Secretary for Health, Dr. Webster 
warned that the health service must be properly funded, especially if the service wanted 
to attract sufficient professional staff.36 
 The crisis of funding endangered the future of the newly opened medical school 
in Salisbury. The school had opened its doors to twenty-four students in the March of 
1963. However, many of the faculty buildings and a proposed 350-bed teaching hospital 
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were not yet built or paid for. After it became clear that federation would end, first 
Nyasaland and then Northern Rhodesia declared their intentions to withdraw support. 
Clearly, the medical school was seen as a Southern Rhodesian institution that the 
Northern territories were giving considerable financial backing to without any real 
tangible benefit in return. This may have been due to the small representation of students 
from either Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia in the first entering cohort. In the event, the 
school was saved from premature closing only by the injection of a considerable sum of 
cash from the British government.37  
 The years between 1965 and 1970 were tumultuous for the school. It maintained 
its commitment to admitting students based on academic merit regardless of race, 
religion, or gender. UDI ushered in a period of fiscal constraint, shortage of teaching 
staff, and a growing isolation. By 1970, representatives from the school were excluded 
from conferences of the Association of Medical Schools in Africa. Further, the 
declaration of the Rhodesia republic led to the withdrawal of the school’s major partner, 
the University of Birmingham. In addition, the school’s graduates were no longer able to 
register with the General Medical Council in Britain removing reciprocity, one of the 
most sought after benefits for any medical school in the ex-colonies of Britain.38 
 Evidence of further isolation in the wake of UDI can be seen in the fracturing of 
the colony’s relationship with the World Health Organization (WHO). An associate 
member, since 1950, Southern Rhodesia had close ties with the organization particularly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  The amount included £750,000 for recurrent costs up to 1967 and £800,000 for capital 
expenditure. Lindsay Davidson. “Birmingham's Baby: The Beginnings of Medical 
Education in Rhodesia,” British Journal of Medical Education 5, 1 (1971), 64. 
38	  Ibid.,66-7. 
	   164	  
with regard to research into bilharziasis and malaria.39 During the federal era, Southern 
Rhodesia had been a site for one of the pilot projects on malaria eradication in the mid 
1950s.  After UDI communication between the two ceased and pre-eradication malaria 
programs previously agreed on, were scrapped.40  
 
Conclusion 
 The Federal Health Service illustrates much of the contradictions of federation. It 
professed to embrace the progressive rhetoric of “partnership” but at the same time its 
policies can be seen as a determination to maintain the colonial order. To a large extent, 
professional medical work remained the province of whites. State registered nurse 
training was extended to Africans but the refusal to open schools in either of the northern 
territories suggests that this was at best a partial admission that Africans should be part of 
the professional medical community.  
  At least in theory, the Central African Federation was a “textbook biopolitical 
regime.”41 The Ministry of Health harnessed the language of development to promise 
better healthcare and opportunities for African people. In practice, the moral basis 
underpinning healthcare provision was incompatible with a settler desire to maintain the 
colonial order. Faced with a crisis in staffing, the Federal Health Service responded in 
ways reminiscent of the earlier colonial period. Officials at the federal health department 
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maintained a worldview very much in keeping with the colonial past. As such, this thesis 
illustrates that the development ethos that emerged in the post war period could be 
subverted to meet settlers’ aims and desires. 
 From an African perspective, the federal era represented a time when the 
government had promised to promote the health of African societies and advance the 
interests of Africans by providing careers in the medical professions. When clinics were 
closed, promises to build hospitals were reneged on, or opportunities for Africans to work 
in healthcare did not materialize, Africans judged and interpreted these actions as 
evidence of the failure of federation to live up to its promises and its premise of racial 
partnership.  
 When Roy Welensky visited Birmingham University in 1960 to acknowledge the 
close institutional ties between the British university and the proposed medical school in 
the Federation, he pointed to the Federal Health Service as evidence of the importance of 
standards and qualifications to the federal nation-building enterprise.42 The speech can be 
seen as public relations exercise designed to illustrate the biopolitical benevolence of the 
Federation to an international audience but Welensky’s words also underscore a 
controlling ethos within white settler elite thinking in Southern Rhodesia. Southern 
Rhodesians based their right to sovereignty on their ability to govern. As far back as 
1923, the struggle for settler government autonomy combined the post World War One 
Wilsonian language of self-determination and Cecil Rhodes’ language of “equal rights 
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for all civilized men” to argue for responsible government.43 In the federal era, the 
language of ability gained currency due to the post Second World War international 
language of universalism. It was no longer acceptable to frame policies and practices in 
overt racial terms. In accordance with the new language, African nurses were placed in a 
lower branch of the Federal Civil Service not because they were black, but because the 
white elite believed that African nurses had to demonstrate their ability to take on the 
same responsibilities as the European state registered nurse. In addition, the federal 
government’s refusal to open state registered training to medical aides was justified by a 
perceived need to ensure that black nursing students would have the academic capacity to 
pass their examinations. By placing a premium on the requirement to maintain standards, 
the white settler elite was able to manipulate the language of development and African 
advancement to fit their desire to maintain a settler colonial order.  
 Paying attention to settler concerns about standards and qualifications in advanced 
medical training is important because it illustrates the extent to which settler policies 
towards the African population in Central Africa were fluid and situational. In an era 
when universal human rights and citizenship were becoming increasingly significant, the 
federal language of partnership allowed the federal government to frame its activities as 
befitting a modern developing nation in the new post war international order. Partnership 
meant that to be seen to be training African doctors and state registered nurses, for 
example, was an important part of the image of the Federation to internal and 
international audiences.  However, these settler concerns are also important because they 
illustrate the ways in which the white elite could marshal the international language of the 
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day and accommodate it to their preferred practices and ideas. Welensky’s emphasis on 
the superiority of British medical training shows that the Federal Health Service valued 
British trained doctors, clearly evident in the recruitment campaign and film designed to 
entice British doctors to the Federation. As African members of the Federal Assembly 
pointed out, African doctors and nurses from South Africa faced greater obstacles in 
finding employment in the federal service despite the desperate shortage of staff. At the 
same time, training African doctors and nurses made possible a greater degree of 
segregation in healthcare in the Federation. This appeared to be most important in 
Southern Rhodesia, where the majority of the European population resided. Here, African 
medical professionals would care for African patients, not Europeans, and would not be 
placed in positions of authority where they could challenge and subvert the colonial 
hierarchy. Hence, the first African state registered nurses to be promoted to the rank of 
nursing sister worked in the hospitals of Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland rather than 
those in Southern Rhodesia. 
 These insights bring into sharp relief the intentions of the settler state. They are 
evidence of the Federation’s white settler ruling elite’s refusal to decolonize even as they 
accommodated the post war language of universal rights. Most of all, examining the 
rhetoric and realities of healthcare and access to healthcare professions in the Central 
African Federation helps us to see more clearly, the ways in which the language of 
inequality can be made normative in a settler state and how it can persist in the post 
colonial settler states today. It is the very failure of the Federation to establish a 
multiracial nation that highlights its unequal practices and policies. 
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